

CHAPTER 10

THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

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I. ASIA MINOR, 188–158 B.C.

The war between Antiochus III and the Romans had been decided in Asia Minor and it was in Asia Minor, almost exclusively, that territory changed hands. Antiochus had to cede all his possessions west of the Taurus mountains to Rome; these amounted to more than one third of the vast Anatolian block. Rome imposed this condition, like all others, unilaterally on the king and settled affairs without allowing her allies to participate. The Senate decided; the allies waited upon its pleasure. The Greek cities that had sided with the Romans before the decisive battle were declared free; the Rhodians were given Caria south of the River Maeander and Lycia. The rest of the territory that had belonged to Antiochus was incorporated into the kingdom of Eumenes II of Pergamum.¹ It was the lion's share.

The territories Eumenes and Rhodes received were unequivocally a gift,² a gift from Rome, which implied an expectation that both powers would act as guarantors of the new order and that both would prevent any development disturbing to Rome. The Rhodian acquisitions, situated on the southern margin of Anatolia, were not so crucial in this respect as those of Eumenes; he therefore held the key to the preservation of the *status quo*. His newly enlarged realm bordered on three of the four remaining major powers, that is, on the kingdoms of Bithynia and Cappadocia and, between them, on the Celtic tribes in Galatia. Eumenes did not share a border with the kingdom of Pontus in the north, but the other three powers who were his neighbours all were neighbours of Pontus.

(a) *The Attalid monarchy at its peak*

During the war Bithynia and Pontus had remained neutral, whereas the Galatians and the king of Cappadocia had fought for Antiochus. The

¹ Bickerman 1937: (E 5) on the superiority of the annalistic tradition (Livy xxxvii.56.1–6) over Polybius (xxi.24.6–9, 46.2–12). The fate of several cities remains disputed: Bernhardt 1971, 54–71: (D 7). However, most cases can be settled through the coinage: Seyrig 1963: (B 134).

² Schmitt 1957, 93–128: (E 77).

Galatians were punished with a plundering expedition led by the consul of 189, Cn. Manlius Vulso, who was supported by Pergamene forces. Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia fared better. He arranged the engagement of his daughter Stratonice to Eumenes and thereby won the latter's protection and the indulgence of the Senate.³

Having the neighbour-state Cappadocia as an ally did add considerably to Eumenes' strength, but his other neighbours, the Galatians and King Prusias I of Bithynia, were his enemies and almost as soon as the oaths for the treaty of Apamea were sworn, Eumenes found himself at war with both of them. The causes were intimately connected with a clause in the peace treaty. Earlier, when the Roman army was on its way to the Hellespont, Prusias had been inclined to respond to Antiochus' call and join forces with him. A letter from the brothers Scipio, assuring him that Rome would respect the integrity of his realm, caused him to remain neutral. He had, however, already seized part of Phrygia, the so-called Phrygia Epictetus that had belonged to Attalus I of Pergamum. Attalus' son Eumenes, in his dealings with the Senate in 189, had convinced the *patres* that the disputed area rightfully belonged to him. The treaty of Apamea stipulated that it be restored.⁴ It is strange indeed that such a clause was incorporated in the treaty with Antiochus. By remaining neutral, Prusias had served Roman interests and for this service had been recognized as a 'friend of the Roman people'. Nevertheless Rome now acted against his interests. Naturally enough, Prusias refused to comply. War was inevitable; it became the first major test for the new state of affairs in Asia Minor.

Hostilities began c. 187 and lasted into 183. Prusias found allies among those enemies of Eumenes who were also enemies of Rome. He won support from Philip V of Macedonia, who was then engaged in a bitter dispute with Eumenes over the Thracian cities Aenus and Maronea; he probably received aid from the Pontic king Pharnaces; and, most important, he received aid from the Galatians, who were led by the chieftain of the Tolistobogian tribe, Ortiagon, who had recently become king of all three tribes. Furthermore, Prusias counted among his generals none other than Hannibal, who, after his escape from Antiochus' court, had reached Bithynia via Armenia and Crete.⁵

³ Vulso: Stähelin 1907, 50–66: (E 169); Pagnon 1982: (E 49). The dates of Stratonice's birth and marriage are disputed: Hopp 1977, 27–9: (E 60); Allen 1983, 200–6: (E 52). Inscription of her statue erected by the people of Pergamum: *IGP*, III, pl. 2.

⁴ Habicht 1956, 90–100: (E 56); *id.* *PW*, 'Prusias', 1097–1105; Schmitt 1964, 276–7: (E 50). The most important document is *AE* 1940, 44. Restoration to Eumenes: Livy xxxviii.39.15 (the corresponding passage, Polyb. xxi.46.10, is corrupt).

⁵ At the time of the events in Polyb. xxi.8.5 (Errington 1969, 257–63: (D 23): late summer 187; but see n. 49) war was at least imminent. Hannibal is said to have founded Artaxata in Armenia and Prusias ad Olympon (modern Prusa).



Map 13. Asia Minor and Syria.

Almost nothing is known about the military operations: Hannibal defeated Eumenes in a naval engagement; Eumenes won a major victory over Prusias and Ortiagon, the Galatians 'and their allies' in the autumn of 184.⁶ Finally Rome had to step in. The Senate had long remained deaf to Eumenes' complaints that Prusias resisted the Roman demand. The *patres* obviously were caught in the dilemma they had created for themselves by yielding to Eumenes' claim, but in 183, after the Scipiones had lost all their power, a Roman embassy led by T. Quinctius Flamininus forced Prusias to give in to Eumenes and to agree to surrender Hannibal, who then committed suicide. Eumenes regained possession of Phrygia Epictetus and also established control over Galatia. For almost a century the Greeks of Asia Minor had been threatened by the Galatians; now they hailed Eumenes as 'Saviour' (*Soter*) and the epithet became quite common, though the king never styled himself so. To commemorate the victory Eumenes enlarged the sanctuary of Athena 'Bringer of Victory' (*Nikephoros*) in Pergamum and raised her festival, founded by his father long ago, to panhellenic rank. In 182 numerous Greek cities were invited to participate. The new festival, henceforward to be held every fifth year, was celebrated for the first time in 181;⁷ by then the king was involved again in a major war.

This war, fought against Pharnaces I of Pontus and his allies, arose, our sources say, as a result of Pharnaces' aggressive ambition.⁸ The Pontic rulers had long wanted to control the flourishing Greek cities on the south coast of the Black Sea and, in particular, Sinope. Pharnaces' father, Mithridates III, had failed in an attempt in 220 to subdue Sinope, mainly because of Rhodian aid to the city. Pharnaces, however, stormed Sinope in 183. The Rhodians protested in Rome. The Senate, at the same meeting, listened to Eumenes' envoys – the king had differences of his own with Pharnaces – and to Pharnaces' representatives. The cause of the dispute is not specified, but it seems to have concerned Eumenes' newly won control over Galatia, through which he had become Pharnaces' neighbour. In any event Galatia was soon the main theatre of action and a principal subject of the treaty, when peace was finally concluded.

Following its standard policy, the Senate despatched an embassy to look into the situation. Meanwhile, the war had begun and other powers

⁶ *Riv. Fil.* 60 (1932) 446ff.

⁷ Hannibal's death: Habicht 1956, 96–100: (E 56). Flamininus went on to see King Seleucus IV. Incorporation of Galatia: Stähelin 1907, 61: (E 169). Eumenes as 'Saviour': Robert 1934, 284 n. 1: (B 63); *id.* 1937, 73 n. 1: (E 162). Sanctuary of Athena: Ohlemutz 1940, 38: (E 63); the festival: Jones 1974: (E 61), superseding previous work. For silver tetradrachms of Athena Nikephoros from these years: Le Rider 1973: (B 111).

⁸ Main sources: Polyb. xxiii.9.1–3, xxiv.1.1–3, 5, 14–15, xxv.2, xxvii.7.5, fr. 112; Diod. Sic. xxix.22–24; Livy xlii.2.6; Just. *Epit.* xxxviii.6.2. Recent bibliography: Hopp 1977, 44–8: (E 60); Burstein 1980: (E 12).

had become involved: for Eumenes, the king of Bithynia, Prusias II, who had just succeeded his father, and Ariarathes of Cappadocia;⁹ for Pharnaces, some Galatian chieftains and Mithridates, satrap of Armenia. King Seleucus IV of Syria almost joined the Pontic king, but in the end refrained, to avoid violating the treaty with Rome (p. 339). For some time the initiative lay with Pharnaces. He captured the Greek city of Tieium in Bithynia and seems to have invaded Galatia. The Roman ambassadors, who reported back to the Senate, supported Eumenes and a second embassy was sent out to urge Pharnaces to end hostilities. In 181 there was a truce, soon violated by the Pontic king, who continued to ravage Galatia during the winter of 181/80. Eumenes' three brothers now urged the Senate to punish the aggressor, but the Conscript Fathers confined themselves to sending out a third embassy with instructions to end the war by any means.¹⁰

This embassy arrived in the spring of 180, just in time to halt a major counter-attack by Eumenes and Ariarathes which had already advanced well into Pontic territory. Peace negotiations were held in Pergamum in the presence of the Romans. The Pontic delegation played for time, the Romans returned home in frustration, and the war continued. Eumenes, just recovered from an illness, now exerted himself to put an end to the war without Roman support. He greatly enlarged his army and blockaded the Hellespont in an attempt to weaken Pharnaces, but pressure from Rhodes forced him to withdraw.¹¹ In the autumn of 180 or spring of 179, he took the field with his allies, and Pharnaces indicated at last that he was ready for peace.

The peace treaty is described in some detail by Polybius.¹² Pharnaces had to renounce all his ambitions in Galatia, which thus remained firmly under Eumenes' control; he had to restore Tieium to Eumenes (who then gave it to Prusias of Bithynia); he also had to return whatever he had taken from Ariarathes and from Morzius, the dynast of Gangra in Paphlagonia. Ariarathes was to receive 300 talents from Mithridates of Armenia as an indemnity. Pharnaces, however, kept Sinope; Eumenes, it appears, now that his relations with Rhodes were strained, was indifferent to the fate of a city which had close ties with the Rhodians.

Included in the treaty are several other powers that are not mentioned as participants in the war: Artaxias, the ruler of Greater Armenia,

⁹ A decree of Cos at this time praises Ariarathes and his queen Antiochis: Segre and Pugliese-Carratelli 1972: (E 164); Piejko 1983: (E 158).

¹⁰ Of three Roman embassies during the war, the first was 'to look into the matter of the Sinopeans and into the differences between the kings', the second 'to look more closely into the differences of the aforementioned', the third 'to end the war by any means'.

¹¹ Eumenes exploited perhaps more fully the treaty of 183 with 33 cities of Crete: *IC* IV.179; Dunst 1956: (E 54). A fragmentary treaty of his with Lato is dated c. 180: *SEG* XVI.524.

¹² Polyb. xxv.2; Walbank 1957-79, III.271-4: (B 38).

Acusilochus (unknown); in Europe, the Sarmatian chieftain Gatalos, and a number of Greek cities, viz. Heraclea on the Black Sea, Cyzicus on the Propontis (Sea of Marmara), Mesambria (Mesebâr) on the west coast of the Black Sea and Chersonesus (Sevastopol) in the Crimea. Whether all of these had participated in the war is disputed.¹³ The peace may have come about partly because the Romans had begun to put pressure on Pharnaces at the very end of the war.¹⁴

Eumenes had been victorious in two major wars. The confidence that Rome had placed in him seemed fully justified, and yet in both wars peace had come only when the Senate finally exerted pressure. Eumenes, though he had won the alliance of Cappadocia and had established control over Galatia, though under the treaty of Apamea he was secured against an attack by a Seleucid king, nevertheless faced Celts, who resented the loss of their freedom; the kings of Pontus and Bithynia, who, momentarily weakened, continued to be or again became his enemies;¹⁵ Macedonia, which remained an enemy; and Rhodes, which had turned hostile. The situation in Asia Minor was delicate and dependent on continued Roman support for the Pergamene king.

Nonetheless, the kingdom of Eumenes was now the dominant power. The 170s witnessed the height of the monarchy and of Pergamene art. In the capital magnificent buildings were erected, new festivals created, and the royal residence finally transformed into a place of splendour.¹⁶ Strabo calls attention to the sanctuary of Athena Nikephoros (p. 328), to prestigious votives and to the foundation of libraries. A new festival was instituted in honour of Asclepius, who now rose to prominence, and of Heracles; the king's own brothers were the first to preside over the games that formed part of the festival. The city was considerably enlarged and was fortified with new walls. The most famous enterprises, however, were on the acropolis: the enlargement of the sanctuary of Athena and, above all, the erection of the Great Altar to Zeus. The major frieze, displaying the gigantomachy, appears to have been begun soon after the battle of Magnesia and completed by 170, followed by work on

¹³ Bickerman 1932: (E 124) argues that non-participants in the war could be included in the treaty. Against this view: Dahlheim 1968, 213ff.: (H 86). Both opinions have supporters. This writer tends to agree with the latter.

¹⁴ This, however, cannot be inferred from Pharnaces' treaty with Chersonesus (*IPE* 12.402, 3-5, 26-8), traditionally dated to 179, since its true date is c. 155 B.C.: Burstein 1980: (E 12).

¹⁵ Prusias II, an ally of Eumenes against Pharnaces, soon rejoined his enemies (as reflected by his marriage to Apame, the sister of Perseus, c. 177).

¹⁶ The fundamental publications are the volumes of *Altertümer von Pergamon* (since 1885); see details in Hansen 1971, 485-6: (E 57) (and vols. XI.2-XI.4 (1975-84), XII (1978), XIII (1981)). Reports on current work: *MDAI(A)* 1899, 1902, 1904, 1907, 1908, 1910, 1912; *Abb. Akad. Berlin* 1928 no. 3; 1932 no. 5; *Arch. Anz.* 1966, 1970, 1973-83. General survey and detailed bibliography in Hansen 1971: (E 57); Allen 1983, 76-135: (E 52).

the smaller frieze, that of the royal ancestor Telephus, which had not yet been completed in 158 when Eumenes died.¹⁷

The increased importance of the kingdom caused an expansion and intensification of its foreign relations. Attalid ambassadors appear in new areas, such as Thessaly, where common enmity towards Macedonia seems to have prompted the contact.¹⁸ Increased wealth allowed the king to give, or at least to offer, money to a large number of Greek states. Eumenes donated buildings, grain and other goods. To Athens, for instance, he sent an architect and also, it seems, a foreman to build the stoa that bears his name, the Stoa of Eumenes, for the benefit of the spectators in the theatre.¹⁹ He did, however, suffer a few setbacks when Pergamene diplomacy was tactless; for instance, when the king offered to pay the Council of the Achaean League and was rebuffed, or when he was too eager to gain what the Senate had not assigned him; in Thrace his envoys tried to persuade the Roman commissioners that the cities of Aenus and Maronea, also claimed by Philip V, were, in fact, an 'appendage' to the gift of the Thracian Chersonese. In the end, the Senate refused to let either party have them.²⁰

A visible and important change within the kingdom of Eumenes was the introduction of a new royal silver coinage, the 'basketbearers' (*cistophori*). The basket, depicted on the obverse, is associated with Dionysus, a favourite god of the Attalids. The new coinage was supposed to replace the old silver pieces bearing the portrait of Philetaerus, the founder of the dynasty. Its circulation was confined to the realm of the Attalids – the coins are almost never found elsewhere – and within the limits of the kingdom it was the only lawful coinage. Scholars now

¹⁷ Strabo XIII, p. 624; *IVP* III no. 3: Prince Athenaeus *agonothetes* of the second celebration. For the cult of Asclepius in Pergamum: Ohlmutz 1940, 123–73: (E 63), and *IVP* III, pp. 1–20. The Great Altar: Schrammen 1906: (B 197); Kähler 1948: (B 175); Schober 1951: (B 196); Rohde 1982: (E 64). A head recently found is probably from a statue of Asclepius, perhaps the one by Phrymachus (Simon 1975, 19–20: (I 33), and see p. 360). On the frieze of Telephus, 'a kind of *Aeneid* of the Attalids' (Gruben 1966, 408: (I 16)), see Stähler 1966: (B 201). Whether the work began early or late in the 180s is disputed. It is almost unanimously agreed, however, that the larger frieze was completed by c. 170, to be followed by work on the smaller frieze. It is, however, argued by Callaghan 1981 and 1982: (B 153 and 155) that both friezes were begun simultaneously and only after 166 B.C. Christians considered the altar (to pagans one of the seven wonders of the world) 'Satan's throne' (Apoc. John. 3.13, if this is the altar and not the temple of Roma and Augustus or, possibly, of Asclepius).

¹⁸ *IG* IX.2.512 from Larissa. One ambassador honoured is a well-known kinsman of Eumenes; another, Demetrius, also honoured at Delos (*IG* XI.765–6) and later at Ephesus (*JÖAI* 50 (1976) *Beibl.* 12 no. 4), had charge of Eumenes' seal. Common interests of Eumenes and the Thessalians: Polyb. XXII.6.

¹⁹ Eumenes' relations with Greek states: Polyb. XXXII.8.5; Livy XLII.5.3. References in Robert 1937, 84–5: (E 162); and also, for Athens: Ferguson 1911, 299 (D 26); for Delphi: Daux 1936, 497–511 (D 15); for Miletus: Herrmann 1965: (E 142); for Cos: Sherwin-White 1978, 132–3: (E 168). Stoa of Eumenes in Athens: Vittr. *De Arch.* v.9.1. Bibliography in Hansen 1971, 295 n. 181: (E 57); add Thompson 1953, 256–9 (D 53).

²⁰ Achaia: Polyb. XXII.1.6, 7–9; Diod. Sic. XXIX.17. Thrace: Werner 1977, 167ff.: (D 55).

generally agree that the new coins were not minted before 188 and that they were royal money, despite the fact that the pieces lack the portraits as well as the names of the kings, and that they were struck in various cities. Recently, the view that the cistophoric coinage began immediately after the peace of 188 has won wide acceptance, though there are strong arguments in favour of putting the beginning even later, in either *c.* 175 or *c.* 166 when King Eumenes had already fallen out with Rome.²¹

Late in 175 Eumenes seized an opportunity to befriend a traditional enemy; he helped the Seleucid prince Antiochus, youngest son of Antiochus the Great, to win the throne after the assassination of his brother, King Seleucus IV (p. 341). It was a masterly move and one that earned him Antiochus' gratitude. Relations between the two kingdoms, traditionally hostile, immediately became cordial and remained so as long as Antiochus lived.²² On the other hand, his aid to Antiochus had alienated Seleucus' legitimate heirs; this was to have consequences later, when they regained their inheritance (p. 357).

(b) Rome's rebuff to Eumenes

Now at the height of his fortunes, Eumenes gambled once too often. As he had been instrumental in preparing Rome to go to war with Antiochus III, so again he was instrumental in causing the Senate to decide to wage war against Perseus of Macedonia. When Eumenes addressed the Senate in 172, he accused the king of violating the treaty and preparing war against Rome; later he accused him of plotting the attempt on his life at Delphi on his way home that had left him near death. Rome declared war on Perseus, and Eumenes, once again, seemed to have won, but he failed to foresee that his very success would render superfluous the role which, for thirty years, he had been allowed to play. Once the Macedonian monarchy was annihilated, the Senate rebuked and humiliated Eumenes and gave encouragement to his enemies, the Galatians and King Prusias.²³ The Senate concealed the political issue in a personal attack on Eumenes; it voiced allegations of treachery; for treason, it was insinuated, had been committed by Eumenes in secret negotiations with Perseus.²⁴ The Senate courted the king's brother Attalus, and even made him a secret offer of the crown or at least a realm

²¹ Kienast 1961: (B 102); Seyrig 1963: (B 135); Boehringer 1972, 44-6: (B 82); Kleiner and Noe 1976: (B 105); Mørkholm 1979: (B 116). Kleiner and Noe date its introduction to *c.* 166, Mørkholm prefers *c.* 175. See further Waggoner 1979: (B 145); Kleiner 1980: (B 104); Mørkholm 1982: (B 119).

²² The theory of Rostovtzeff, 1941, 656-9: (A 31), that a period of close co-operation in economic affairs followed rests on erroneous assumptions and has to be abandoned; Seyrig 1963, 26-8: (B 135). There is now, however, more documentary evidence for the friendship between Eumenes and Antiochus: Herrmann 1965, 82-7: (E 142).

²³ Habicht, *PlW*, 'Prusias', 1113-15. Gruen 1984, 569ff.: (A 20), denies that there was such encouragement. ²⁴ Schleussner 1973: (D 50).

of his own.²⁵ The allegations were probably not true.²⁶ Eumenes had participated in the war from beginning to end and his brothers Attalus and Athenaeus had fought at Pydna with a considerable part of his army.²⁷

The king himself was convinced that he could easily prove his loyalty before the Senate and a majority of the senators must have known they had no valid reason for suspecting him, but they did not want this issue resolved, so, just after they had heard King Prusias address them and knowing that Eumenes was then in Italy on his way to Rome, they voted not to allow kings to speak before them. Eumenes, therefore, under strict rules of fair play between allies, had a good reason to complain of his treatment by Rome, though that was the only one, because the situation had changed since 193. Eumenes then had actually been threatened by Antiochus' aggressive expansion, whereas in 172 there was no threat whatsoever from Perseus. Likewise, Rome in 193 may have had a legitimate grievance against Antiochus, whereas it did not have any against Perseus in 172. The two states had been partners in an unscrupulous war and after the victory Rome continued to be unscrupulous. Eumenes made the mistake of expecting loyalty from a Senate which, after the defeat of Perseus and the compliance of Antiochus IV (pp. 344-5), no longer needed him.

In 168, apparently encouraged by the absence of part of the Pergamene forces in Macedonia, the Galatians rebelled. Eumenes, after two years of heavy fighting during which he once came close to being captured by the enemy, finally won a decisive victory, somewhere in Phrygia, and suppressed the insurrection. It was a hollow victory; before it, Roman commissioners had secretly encouraged the Galatians; after it, the Senate, openly hostile, declared his Celtic subjects free.²⁸ Eumenes, however, did not entirely comply and his tenacity, in turn, gave Prusias ammunition for years of denunciations before the Senate of Pergamene activities in Galatia.²⁹ Eumenes had fought four times for the possession of Galatia; for its loss there was but one compensation: contrary to

²⁵ Polyb. xxx.1-3; Livy xlv.19-20. They promised him the Thracian cities Aenus and Maronea as a gift, but when he remained loyal to his brother, declared them free (suppressed in Livy) and concluded a treaty with Maronea: *Arch. Delt.* 28 (1973), pl. 418. Gruen 1984, 574-5: (A 20), is sceptical of the tradition. ²⁶ Most scholars agree, despite minor differences of opinion.

²⁷ Eumenes and the Thessalian cavalry by and large had kept an engagement in 171 from becoming a Roman disaster: Livy xlii.59-60. The Thessalians founded a festival to commemorate the occasion: *Arch. Delt.* 16 (1960) 185; *Bull. épigr.* 1964, 227; Kramolisch 1978, 135-6: (D 38).

²⁸ Main sources: Polyb. xxix.22, xxx.1.2, 2.8, 3.7-9, 19.12; Diod. Sic. xxxi.12-14; Polyaeus, *Strat.* iv.8.1; Welles, *RC* 52.8-14; Swoboda, Keil and Knoll 1935, 32 nos. 74-5 (Amlada): (B 202). *FD* III.3.241-2 (Sardis), discussed by Daux 1932: (D 14). Robert 1934: (B 63) (Tralles). For the victory in Phrygia see *lvP* 165, augmented by *MDAl(A)* 27 (1902) 90 no. 74. The date of *lvP* 167 is not 165, but 149 (no connection with this war): Jones 1974, 186-9: (E 61). Stähelin 1907, 66-72: (E 169), remains the best modern account. For the freedom of Galatia: Polyb. xxxi.2.

²⁹ Prusias' allegations (n. 134) are in part confirmed by the secret correspondence of Eumenes and Attalus with the priest Attis of Pessinus (pp. 373-4).

Roman expectations, their own conduct and Eumenes' courageous stand against the barbarians caused a wave of goodwill and genuine sympathy for him to spread throughout the Greek states of Asia Minor and the Aegean world. He was also reconciled with Rhodes, another of the Senate's victims.³⁰

The shift in Roman policy after 168 is significant. Eumenes and Rhodes, Rome's oldest and firmest allies, dropped completely from favour and Antiochus IV of Syria, who had been more than loyal (pp. 344–5), became an object of suspicion, while their enemies – Prusias II, the Galatians, some cities in Asia Minor that had differences with Eumenes, like Selge in Pisidia, or were opposed to Rhodian domination, and the Jewish rebels in Antiochus' kingdom – all found an open ear in the *curia* for their ambassadors' assertions that Eumenes, Ariarathes and Antiochus had formed a block with common interests that, if something less than a formal alliance, was still prepared for common action and was therefore dangerous to Rome.³¹ The Senate, well aware that it had treated two of these kings badly, found it necessary to watch them closely through repeated inspections. Nor was that all; the Roman commissioner C. Sulpicius Galus publicly invited accusations against Eumenes. For ten days in 164 in Sardis, one of Eumenes' most important cities, Galus listened to the meanest slanders against a king who was still Rome's 'friend and ally'.³² The conduct of Cn. Octavius in Syria (p. 354) was similar. Under these cloudy skies Eumenes received another blow: in 164 his two friends Ariarathes and Antiochus both died.

During his last years the Pergamene ruler once more made major benefactions to several Greek states.³³ In 160/59, his health failing, he appointed his brother Attalus co-ruler. Eumenes died some time later, apparently in 158.³⁴

(c) *Rhodes, 189–164 B.C.*³⁵

After the war against Antiochus the republic of Rhodes was amply rewarded by Rome for what it had contributed to the Roman victory.

³⁰ Polyb. xxxi.6.6. Welles, *RC* 52.8–14, and the documents from Sardis and Tralles (n. 28); see Holleaux 1924, 323–6; (E 59). Rhodes: Polyb. xxxi.31; Diod. Sic. xxxi.36.

³¹ *Koinopraxia* ('concerted action') is used repeatedly (Polyb. xxx.30.4, xxxi.9.8).

³² Details in *MRR* 438–44. Chronology: Walbank 1957–79, III.33ff.: (B 38).

³³ Such as Delphi: *FD* III.3.237–9, all of 160/59; Miletus: Herrmann 1965: (E 142); Rhodes: see n. 30.

³⁴ Appointment of Attalus: Hopp 1977, 3–15: (E 60). Eumenes' death is generally dated to 159, since it is assumed that he died in his 38th or 39th regnal year. A new inscription, mentioning his 40th year, suggests the date must be 158: Petzl 1978, 263, no. 12: (B 59).

³⁵ Main sources: excerpts from Polybius, books xxi–xxx, with Walbank 1957–79, III: (B 38). Also many passages in books xxxvii–xlv of Livy; most of them are Livy's adaptations of Polybius' narrative, others are derived from Roman sources, a few outright annalistic falsifications, for which

The gift of Caria south of the Maeander and of Lycia added greatly to the Rhodian realm in Asia Minor, the so-called *Peraea*. Special clauses in the peace treaty served Rhodian interests. One imposed an interdiction on Antiochus against making war on 'the islands', others upheld the rights and privileges of Rhodian property-owners and merchants within his empire.³⁶ The Senate was even prepared to grant the city's demand that the town of Soli in Cilicia be declared free, despite the fact, duly stressed by Antiochus' envoys, that the preliminary treaty had left Cilicia under the king's rule. And the Aetolians owed the peace they were granted in the same year, 189, at least in part to the good offices of the ambassadors from Rhodes and from Athens who spoke in their favour before the consul in Greece and before the Senate.³⁷

In Asia Minor Rhodes had to fill part of the vacuum created by the retreat of Antiochus and to defend the new state of affairs created by Rome in the south, just as King Eumenes had to defend it north of the Maeander. Caria as a whole, where the Rhodians had had a small dominion for some time, seems not to have opposed directly Rhodian rule, but some cities did not welcome it. Alabanda managed to obtain a decree from the Senate declaring the city free, that is to say, exempt from Rhodian domination.³⁸ An inscription from Apollonia in the Salbace Mountains suggests that Rhodian domination was less troublesome to the native inhabitants of the countryside than to the larger cities, who were afraid of losing their grip on the territories surrounding them.³⁹ It is, however, difficult to say whether these instances permit generalization. Strong Rhodian influence was felt even north of the Maeander, where several free cities attached themselves to Rhodes rather than to Eumenes. In a treaty concluded during the 180s Miletus and Heraclea-on-Latmus agreed not to act contrary to the interests of Rhodes, their dominant ally.⁴⁰

In Lycia, on the other hand, Rhodes encountered stiff resistance. The Lycians had fought for Antiochus and resented becoming subjects of Rhodes. In 189 they had envoys from Ilium plead their case before the

see Schmitt 1957, 140 n. 4, 150 n. 1, 212-15: (E 77). Also Diod. Sic. xxix.11, xxx.24, xxxi.5; Livy, *Per.* xlv; Dio. Cass. frs. 66.2, 68.1-3; Zon. ix.23.3; App. *Mac.* 11.2-3, 17. Fragments of Cato's speech for the Rhodians in Gell. *NA* vi.3; Calboli 1978: (H 34). Several inscriptions give details on the beginning and end of Rhodian domination in Caria and Lycia. For modern work see the exhaustive discussion of Schmitt 1957, 81-172: (E 77), and the survey of Gruen 1975: (E 76); for the Rhodian dominions in Asia Minor: Fraser and Bean 1954: (E 75).

³⁶ Schmitt 1957, 85: (E 77); Gruen 1975, 65: (E 76).

³⁷ One of the Rhodian delegates may have been Timarchus, honoured by the Aetolians sometime before 169 (*Ilindos* 195).

³⁸ *REG* 11 (1898) 258ff. Bibliography in Schmitt 1957, 97 n. 1: (E 77). The city had assumed the name Antioch before 250, but returned c. 190 to its old name: Robert 1973, 453-66: (B 68).

³⁹ Robert 1954, 303-12 no. 167: (E 163).

⁴⁰ *IMilet* 150, 35; for the date see *Arch. Anz.* 1977, 95; Robert 1978, 509-10: (B 69).

Senate, whose polite reply encouraged such high hopes in Lycia that the Confederacy voted to establish a cult of 'Rome the Goddess Manifest'. Soon, however, they learned that the Rhodian claim had been upheld;⁴¹ nothing was left for the Lycians except recourse to arms. They fought for many years against the Rhodians. Finally, in 177, when Rhodes seemed to be prevailing, a Lycian delegate obtained a decree from the Senate that the Lycians had not been given to Rhodes as a gift, but as friends and allies. Encouraged by this decree, the Lycians at once resumed hostilities and the war continued until, in the end, Rhodes and Rome fell out and the Lycians won.

From the beginning Rhodian relations with King Eumenes were delicate. On the one hand, the republic and the king had been rivals for the spoils of the victory over Antiochus; on the other, both were bound together by their common interest in the stability of the new order in Asia Minor. It was for this reason that Eumenes supported the Rhodians in 181 against the rebellious Lycians. Soon, however, after the Rhodians had forced the king to abandon his attempt to blockade the Hellespont during his war with Pharnaces (p. 329), relations became hostile. The king thereafter lent clandestine support to the Lycians and denounced Rhodian policy before the Senate, while Rhodes refused to admit his envoys to an international festival⁴² and two Rhodians, who were asked by the Achaean League to investigate whether honours granted earlier to Eumenes by the Achaeans had been legal, exceeded their instructions and convinced the Achaeans to cancel them all, thereby creating new disputes.⁴³

The two sides, however, had more to worry about than their mutual quarrels once the war between Rome and King Perseus began. Both rallied to the Romans. The Rhodians, in fact, had no choice. They had no complaints against Perseus and had nothing to gain from war; on the other hand, they could not afford to disappoint the expectations of the Senate. For this reason they turned down the Macedonian ambassadors who had come to ask Rhodes to mediate. They also obeyed the Roman demands for military aid, slight as these seem to have been. They were active against Perseus: once a Rhodian fleet captured a Macedonian envoy on his way to King Antiochus IV, then campaigning in Egypt. But the longer the war dragged on, the more the Rhodians felt its adverse effects on their economy. Once they had to ask the Senate's permission to

⁴¹ Polyb. xxii.5.3-6; cult of Roma: *JHS* 68 (1948) 46ff.; bibliography in Mellor 1971, 37 n. 56: (I 25), and Robert 1978, 288 n. 57: (B 70); Sherwin-White 1984, 49-50: (A 34).

⁴² Polyb. xxvii.7.5-7; Livy xlii.14.8; App. *Mac.* 11.2-3. Commerce between the former allies suddenly all but ended in the 170s: Schmitt 1957, 135: (E 77).

⁴³ Polyb. xxvii.18.3, xxviii.7.3-15, with Holleaux 1938-68, 1.441-3: (D 35). As Livy xlii.17.7 shows, these honours had been cancelled before 172.

import grain from Sicily. And the situation grew even worse when Egypt and Syria also went to war. The interests of Rhodes demanded that peace be established on both fronts, and the earlier the better. In 169 Rhodian ambassadors went to Alexandria to mediate between the two kings, but mediation of the Macedonian war was a much more delicate question. The consul of 169, Marcius Philippus, who was then campaigning without much success against Perseus, seems to have suggested such an initiative to a Rhodian ambassador in a private conversation.⁴⁴ When the Rhodians decided to attempt mediation in 168, they obviously thought that the recent alliance between Perseus and the Illyrian king Gentius would have inclined the Senate towards peace. Just the opposite happened. The Senate was more determined than ever to dispose of the Macedonian kingdom. The Rhodians failed to understand what the election of Aemilius Paullus to a second consulship and his appointment as general in Macedonia had meant. When their envoys arrived at Paullus' headquarters at Pydna, they were given a frosty reception. Only a few days later the consul destroyed the royal army on the battlefield. Other envoys from Rhodes, who had been sent to Rome and had been kept waiting there, were introduced to the Senate-house only after the news of the victory had arrived. They had come to mediate a war the Romans had won. Now they could only offer their congratulations. The Senate chose to interpret their mission as motivated entirely by the interests of Perseus and, for that reason, as a hostile act towards Rome. The ambassadors were told that with this action the friendship between Rome and Rhodes had come to an end.

The intimidated Rhodians at once sentenced to death the politicians responsible for the attempt at mediation and made every effort to conciliate the Romans. It was in vain. In 167, the Senate formally decreed that Caria and Lycia, given to Rhodes in 188, were to be free. Moreover, the Carian towns Caunus and Stratoniceia, which had been Rhodian long before 188 and which had revolted after Pydna and been subdued, also were granted their freedom by the Senate. These two cities alone had brought the Rhodians an annual income of 120 talents and their loss was a severe blow to the Rhodian economy. Still worse, however, was the Romans' gift of the island of Delos to Athens on condition that Delos be a free port. Traffic shifted from Rhodes to Delos, and Rhodes lost some 140 talents in annual harbour dues. The republic also lost its hegemony over the League of Islanders, and for a while there was even talk of a Roman war against Rhodes, promoted by an ambitious praetor, but

⁴⁴ Polyb. xxviii. 17; App. *Mac.* 17. It remains disputed whether Philippus meant mediation in the Syrian war, as Gruen 1975, 71-4: (E 76) or in the Macedonian war, as Walbank 1957-79, III. 350-1: (B 38). The latter view seems correct.

finally prevented (if the threat was, in fact, intended to be taken seriously) by a famous speech of Cato.⁴⁵

With the Rhodians ousted from Asia Minor⁴⁶ and from their hegemony over the islands, with their economy profoundly shaken and their pride shattered, the Senate had fulfilled its purpose 'to make an example of Rhodes'.⁴⁷ Eventually, in 164, it paid heed to what the Rhodians had been requesting over the last few years and granted them a treaty. Friendship was restored, but not, as before, on the basis of equal partnership.

II. THE SELEUCID MONARCHY, 187-162 B.C.

(a) *Seleucus IV*

Within the short span of only seven years Roman armies had defeated the Hellenistic world's two most powerful kings, Philip V and Antiochus III. While defeat was followed in both cases by a substantial loss of territory and other severe conditions, Rome had made no effort to replace either monarch on the throne or to destroy the monarchy. The fate of the two rulers, however, was different. Philip lived on for eighteen years and was able to recoup his strength, whereas Antiochus lost his life in an attempt to raise money from a native temple in Elymais only a year after the settlement with Rome. His eldest son, Antiochus, had died six years earlier. The second, Seleucus, had been co-ruler since 189 and was now about thirty years old. He succeeded his father as Seleucus IV. Our sources are unanimous in depicting him as inactive and weak. Only one piece of personal evidence survives from his twelve-year reign, a letter written in May 186 to the city of Seleuceia in northern Syria to request a grant of citizenship for a courtier who had served his father and himself well.⁴⁸

Seleucus was able through diplomacy to regain lost ground. At the very beginning of his reign he won a reconciliation with two former enemies in Greece, Achaia and Athens. Political and personal reasons alike caused him to make an effort in Achaia, since in 190 one thousand Achaeans had come to the aid of King Eumenes and had fought brilliantly against Seleucus when he was besieging Pergamum. Late in

⁴⁵ Schmitt 1957, 151ff.: (E 77); Gruen 1975, 77ff.: (E 76); for Cato's role: Astin 1978, 137ff., 273ff.: (H 68). Rhodian campaigns in Asia Minor between 168 and 164: Polyb. xxx.5.11-16, 21.2-5, 23.2, 31.4-8; *ILindos* 200-2.

⁴⁶ The Lycian Confederacy expressed its gratitude by a dedication to Jupiter Capitolinus and the Roman people: *CIL* 12.725; Mellor 1978, 321 n. 14: (B 54). The Carian city of Amyzon began a new era (of liberty) in 167: Robert 1954, 309: (E 163); while another, Antioch-on-Maeander, praised the Romans as the 'common benefactors of the Greeks' and instituted a cult of Roma: Habicht 1957, 242 no. 65: (B 51). ⁴⁷ Polyb. xxix.19.5.

⁴⁸ Seleucus: Stähelin, *PIW*, 'Seleucus IV'. The letter: Welles, *RC* 45, with Holleaux 1933: (B 52).

the summer of 187, at the request of his envoys, the Achaean assembly renewed their former friendship, although they politely declined 'for the moment' the king's offer of a gift of ten warships.⁴⁹ Only a few months later, in April 186, the Athenians, who had supported Rome in the war, honoured a Seleucid ambassador. The voting of honours implies that normal relations had been re-established.⁵⁰

Seleucus did not fight a single war and came close only once, in c. 182, when Eumenes was fighting against King Pharnaces of Pontus (p. 329) and Pharnaces offered 500 talents if Seleucus would help him. Seleucus had already moved his army so that he could intervene, when 'it occurred to him' that the treaty of Apamea forbade his crossing the Taurus Mountains.⁵¹ His original intention shows that Seleucus had no desire to come to terms with the ruler of Pergamum, whose predecessors had been subordinate to the Seleucid kings and who had acquired most of what the Seleucids had recently lost.

Instead, the king sought out Eumenes' enemies. Perseus, the Macedonian king, was one and Rhodes was no longer Eumenes' friend (p. 336). Seleucus saw his chance. He offered his daughter Laodice to Perseus to be his queen and Perseus accepted. Since the treaty of Apamea prohibited Seleucid vessels from sailing west of Cilicia, Seleucus asked the Rhodians to escort the bride to Macedonia, to which they agreed and used the occasion to parade their naval strength. The wedding ceremony, in 177, was an international event. It seems to be reflected in a dedicatory inscription to the young queen from Delos and a hoard of one hundred magnificent mint-fresh silver coins bearing the portrait of Perseus, to be dated before 174, found in Mersin in Cilicia; the coins had obviously been given to one of the courtiers who accompanied the princess.⁵² The Senate was extremely suspicious of the harmony shown by the three powers involved in this wedding and the one that was soon to follow between King Prusias II of Bithynia and Perseus' sister Apame.⁵³ The Rhodians later felt the *patres'* anger (p. 337).

Perhaps the most significant feature of Seleucus' reign is his avoidance of any closer contact with Rome. If this impression is not caused merely

⁴⁹ This number is the maximum allowed to the Seleucids by the treaty of Apamea, Polyb. xxi.43.13. For the date: Errington 1969, 257-63; (D 23); the conventional date, 185, is defended by Walbank 1957-79, III.9-10; (B 38).

⁵⁰ Pritchett and Meritt 1940, 117-18; (B 215); cf. Ferguson 1911, 283-6; (D 26).

⁵¹ Polyb. fr. 96; Niese 1910, 75-6; (D 46); Diod. Sic. xxix.24; Bevan 1902, 123-4; (E 4).

⁵² Inscription: *IG* xi.1074; coin hoard: Seyrig 1973, 47-8; (B 219). The dedication in Delos for the king by a courtier in 178 may be connected with this event: *IDelos* 1450A43 (text) and 443B71 (date).

⁵³ Seibert 1967, 43-4; (I 32). An indication that Seleucus in 186 wanted the friendship of Macedon is the naming of his son Demetrius, whose mother may have been an Antigonid princess: Mørkholm 1966, 34; (E 33); Helliesen 1981; (E 22). The political significance of the royal weddings, generally acknowledged, seems to be underestimated by Giovannini 1969, 85 s; (D 28), and Gruen 1975, 66-7; (E 76).

by the deficiency of our sources, the fact is remarkable: by then an almost constant stream of yearly embassies from eastern courts was pouring into Rome; in this period at least seven are attested for Macedonia, at least five for Pergamum. The Seleucid ruler did send envoys to Rome: he had to deliver an instalment of the war indemnity every year and he must have had some contact with the Senate before the Romans accepted the prince Demetrius as a hostage in exchange for the king's brother Antiochus, but, except for these unavoidable and rather technical missions, there were apparently few, if any, of political importance. The king may well have realized that he had little to gain from closer connections with Rome and that he would be wiser to avoid her as best he could.

Seleucus may have been a quiet person, but there is no indication that he lacked authority within his own realm. As a result of the war against Rome, some client kings became more or less independent, as, for instance, Armenia (p. 329); in other cases it is impossible to determine the circumstances. Seleucus had also inherited a cash problem and he was careful with his expenditures. The scarcity of silver is reflected in the small quantity of coins minted during his reign and in other numismatic features.⁵⁴ He soon fell behind schedule in paying the indemnity to Rome. On the other hand, the resources of the kingdom were in no way exhausted, as his successor would soon prove. Perhaps he was not concerned with glory, but he did care, as his relations with Rome suggest, about his dignity and he may well have cared about his subjects' welfare; under his rule they enjoyed twelve years of uninterrupted peace.

A pious Jew, the author of II *Maccabees*, records that in Seleucus' time the holy city enjoyed peace and lawful government and the king himself paid for the liturgical needs of the holy temple. Paradoxically, it was this very temple which is somehow connected with Seleucus' downfall; the same author goes on to tell the story of the king's chancellor Heliodorus, who was sent to raise money from the temple. For one reason or another, which later Jewish legend has obscured, the mission failed. Whether Heliodorus had been bribed or not, it was this failure rather than a plot with the Ptolemaic court, that prompted him, on 3 September 175, to have the king assassinated.⁵⁵ He proclaimed his victim's son Antiochus, then a boy of four or five, king and the dowager queen Laodice regent.

At the time of the murder the dead king's brother Antiochus happened to be in Athens, on his way back from Rome, where he had been a hostage but was replaced in 178 at the latest by his nephew Demetrius, a

⁵⁴ Seyrig 1958, 194-6: (B 132); Mørkholm 1966, 31-2: (E 33); Boehringer 1972, 96: (B 82).

⁵⁵ II *Macc.* 3.4-40; Bickerman 1939-44: (E 88). Habicht 1976, 209-14: (B 10). In 178 Heliodorus made dedications to Apollo at Delos: Durrbach 1921, 95-6: (B 50); and he received there at least three statues, one of them from Seleucus himself with strong words of the king's affection (*IG* XI.1112-14). Heliodorus is occasionally assumed to have been part of a conspiracy formed in Alexandria: Plöger 1955, 79: (E 107); Bunge 1974, 58 n. 4: (E 9).

son of Seleucus. He thought the boy Antiochus was unfit to rule, so he decided to take matters into his own hands. When he arrived in Asia Minor, he was met by Eumenes, solemnly crowned, and then escorted by Pergamene armed forces to the frontier of the Seleucid kingdom.⁵⁶ He soon overcame his opponents and was proclaimed King Antiochus IV. As a result of a deal he apparently concluded with the opposing party, he married his brother's widow, adopted her son Antiochus, and tolerated him as his co-ruler for several years.⁵⁷

(b) *The early years of Antiochus IV*

The events that brought Antiochus to the throne moved so quickly that scholars have often assumed part or all of them, including the assassination of Seleucus, had been arranged by Rome and Eumenes, perhaps with Heliodorus the pawn.⁵⁸ No such explanation is required. On the other hand, the Senate may have welcomed an usurpation which would bring discord to the dynasty and would likely weaken the kingdom. The Conscript Fathers must also have realized that their hostage, the legitimate heir Prince Demetrius, was a weapon that could, if necessary, be used to discipline Antiochus. Swift as the seizure of royal power had been, it cannot have been completed, as the cuneiform king-list has it, 'the same month' Seleucus was murdered, that is, before 22 September 175. No doubt the new king antedated his accession to make his reign appear strictly consecutive with his brother's and therefore legitimate.

Antiochus was in his late thirties when he seized power. He had a stronger personality than his brother; our sources agree that he was high-spirited, capable, energetic and self-confident; he was also ambitious. He assumed divine epithets, which no other Hellenistic king had done, such as 'God Manifest' (*Theos Epiphanes*) and, after his defeat of Egypt, 'The Victorious' (*Nikephoros*).⁵⁹ The sources, in particular Polybius, also speak of often eccentric behaviour, capricious actions, and even insanity – Antiochus Epiphanes, they say, was nicknamed *Epimanes*, the 'madman'. Opinions differ on the value of these statements. They could easily be unfounded gossip, promulgated by the king's enemies, Deme-

⁵⁶ App. *Syr.* 45.233-4, confirmed and illustrated by the Athenian decree for Eumenes and his family (*OGIS* 248) who are praised for the assistance given to Antiochus. A copy sent to Eumenes was found in Pergamum. It was at first believed to be a decree of Antioch, the Seleucid capital, but recognized to be Athenian by Holleaux 1900: (E 46). See also n. 65.

⁵⁷ Mørkholm 1963, 63-76: (B 112), and 1966, 36, 41-58: (E 33), whose main conclusions have been generally accepted.

⁵⁸ Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 241: (E 8); Will 1982, 304-5: (A 40). Just scepticism in Errington 1971, 273: (D 24), and Hopp 1977, 35 n. 6: (E 60).

⁵⁹ Mørkholm 1963: (B 112): *Theos Epiphanes* from 173/2 on; *Theos Epiphanes Nikephoros* since 169/8. The use of *Theos* was restricted; it appears on royal coins, but is never used by the chancery of the king. A remarkable portrait of Antiochus: Kyrieleis 1980: (B 176).

trius (his nephew and a friend of Polybius) and King Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II (also a nephew, on his mother's side).⁶⁰ Antiochus' policy certainly displays no symptoms of capriciousness or insanity, quite the contrary: it is steady and prudent. Antiochus proved to the world that his kingdom was still a power to be reckoned with and that his army was second only to Rome's. He had a lasting impact on his subjects, favourable in most cases, disastrous for the Jews (p. 346).

First of all, Antiochus was more successful than Seleucus in breaking out of the political isolation that the war against Rome had caused. His accession transformed the traditional enmity towards the Attalids into a cordial relationship and wooed Cappadocia, which had been close to Eumenes for some time, to his side. Antiochus gained further ground through sumptuous gifts to many Greek states. Benefactions are attested for Athens, Rhodes, Miletus, Cyzicus, Megalopolis and Tegea, for the Boeotian and Achaean Leagues, and for the sanctuaries in Olympia and Delos.⁶¹ The king paid off the last instalment of the indemnity due to Rome in 173; from that time onwards the Seleucids minted substantially more coinage than they had in the previous fifteen years.⁶² The king had considerable resources.

His active diplomacy is reflected in the number of extant decrees voted by Greek states. One of Antiochus' agents, Eudemus of Seleuceia in Cilicia, was voted honours by at least seven different states – Argos, the Boeotian League, Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus, Chalcedon and Lampsacus – and by some more than once. He received these honours between 174 and 171, the first years of the king's reign.⁶³ Many more such decrees, now lost, must have existed. King Perseus of Macedonia, too, though slightly earlier, had tried to win the goodwill of Greece, but with a smaller effort. Many states sent embassies to Antiochus. In 168/7 an embassy from Delphi came to the court and was assisted by two brothers in Antiochus' entourage, Dicaearchus and Philonides from Laodicea in Syria, of whom the latter was a well-known philosopher.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Tarn 1951, 183; (F 152); Kiechle 1963, 159; (E 28); Mørkholm 1966, 181–8; (E 33). For a different view: Welwei 1963, 62ff.; (B 44). Ptolemy VIII as a source: Ath. x.438D.

⁶¹ Mørkholm 1966, 54–5; (E 33) (Cappadocia). For the Greek states, general statements in Polyb. xxvi.1.10–11 and Livy xli.20.5–10. Details in Mørkholm 1966, 55–63; (E 33). The assumption that the king contributed to the building of the temple of Zeus at Lebadea in Boeotia has been refuted by Etienne and Knoepfler 1976, 342 n. 300; (D 25).

⁶² Indemnity: Livy xlii.6.7; Mørkholm 1966, 65; (E 33). II *Macc.* 8.10 is therefore erroneous. Volume of coinage: Boehringer 1972, 86; (B 82).

⁶³ Heberdey and Wilhelm 1896, 108–17; (E 140) (*SIG* 644–5); for the document from Lampsacus, *ILampsakos* 6.

⁶⁴ *OGIS* 241 with Daux 1936, 511–13; (D 15). Since Dicaearchus and his sons are here appointed *thearodoci*, the entry of the two brothers in the list of Delphian *thearodoci* must be later (*BCH* 45 (1921) 24 col. iv, lines 78–80 and pp. 37, 41); G. J. Toomer, *GRBS* 13 (1972) 187 n. 45. For Philonides see n. 138; for a new inscription from Laodicea, dated 174: *ISyrie* 1261.

Athens, however, from the beginning was the city that had the closest ties with the king and profited most from his liberality. Antiochus had lived there for several years after his release from Rome and had come from there to win the crown. The Athenians rejoiced at his success and heaped praises on King Eumenes and his brothers for the aid they provided. Several statues of the Seleucid king stood in the agora; three Athenian decrees honouring high-ranking friends of his, and a fourth decree, voted by the noble clans of the Eumolpids and Ceryces, in honour of the elder Philonides of Laodicea, still survive. Two Athenian citizens dedicated statues of Antiochus in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delos.⁶⁵ The king's most lavish gift to the city was the work he commissioned, under the direction of his royal architect, the Roman D. Cossutius, to fulfil his promise to complete the magnificent temple of Olympian Zeus, left unfinished by the Pisistratids.⁶⁶ Construction was still underway when the king died in 164; the temple was not completed for another three hundred years.

(c) *The war with Egypt*

Antiochus' first major test was a war with Egypt, begun by Egypt to recover southern Syria and Palestine, which had been lost to Antiochus III in 200. This so-called 'Sixth Syrian War' had long been in the making. Ptolemy V Epiphanes would have renewed hostilities had he not been assassinated in 180. His widow Cleopatra – Antiochus' sister – acted as regent for her son, Ptolemy VI, and kept him from war, but when she died in 176 the new government, led by the king's guardians Eulaeus and Lenaeus, prepared for war. They justified it with the claim that the disputed lands had been promised to Egypt as Cleopatra's dowry when she married Ptolemy V in 194/3.⁶⁷ Their intentions were so poorly concealed that Antiochus was very early informed what to expect by a representative he had sent to the court of Alexandria. When the enemy

⁶⁵ Antiochus in Athens in the fall of 178 B.C.: *Hesperia* 51 (1982) 60 no. 3. Athenian decree for Eumenes: *OGIS* 248 (the statues of Antiochus in lines 55–6). *IG* 112.982 for the Milesian Menestheus; for his family: Habicht 1976, 214: (B 10). Robert 1969: (B 67) for Menodorus. Moretti, *ISE* 34 for Arridaeus. *IG* 112.1236 (Eumolpids and Ceryces) with the restorations of Robert 1960, 109 n. 3: (B 64). *IDelos* 1540–1 (Athenians).

⁶⁶ Vittr. *De Arch. praef.* v.14.17; Polyb. xxvi.1.11; Livy xli.20.8; Strabo ix, p. 396; Wycherley 1978, 155ff.: (B 207). Close to the Olympieum was found the Greek inscription of D. Cossutius P. f. *cives Romanus*, probably the architect (*IG* 112.4099). The Latin graffito of Cossutius, from Antioch (*ISyrie* 825), probably refers to a later member of this family which was one of the Republic's most active in marble trade and marble work; cf. Rawson 1975: (H 211), who, however, is inclined to accept identification with the architect.

⁶⁷ Diod. Sic. xxix.29; Porph. *FGrH* 260F 48; Shore and Smith 1959, 55: (B 220) (death of Cleopatra). On Eulaeus and Lenaeus: Mørkholm 1961, 32–43; (E 154); Robert 1963, 71–6: (B 65).

finally attacked in the fall of 170 or the early part of 169 he was ready.⁶⁸ He counter-attacked and won a decisive victory near Pelusium.

The war was fought while the Romans were fighting Perseus; the participants, despite their diplomatic efforts in Rome and despite the attempts of several Greek states to mediate, were left to themselves. Antiochus won control of almost all of Egypt except for the capital. He could have had himself proclaimed king and pharaoh and many scholars believed that this is what he did, but the view prevailing now is that he rather tried to establish a protectorate of sorts in the name of Ptolemy VI Philometor, his nephew, with himself as guardian.⁶⁹ Antiochus had a pretext for this in 169 when the young king was in his hands, but the new government in Alexandria under Comanus and Cineas had the other two children of Ptolemy V, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and Cleopatra, proclaimed king and queen. Philometor, when he was left behind in Antiochus' withdrawal, joined them in Alexandria. Antiochus returned with his army in 168 and laid siege to the capital. Under the circumstances he could no longer claim that he was acting as Philometor's protector, but his ultimate plans are unknown, because suddenly the war became a mere episode. On 22 June 168 the Romans defeated Perseus. Immediately afterwards the Roman ambassador, C. Popillius Laenas, appeared before Antiochus in a suburb of Alexandria and delivered an ultimatum to the king to withdraw all his forces from Egypt and Cyprus, which he had just occupied. Antiochus complied immediately and avoided war with Rome. His compliance, painful as it must have been, shows wisdom and restraint and effectively disproves the allegations that he was unbalanced.

Since the king was under no obligation to respect the integrity of Egypt, it has rightly been said that the Roman demand in 168 added 'a new clause' to the treaty of 188.⁷⁰ Popillius' treatment of Antiochus, an acknowledged 'friend of the Roman people' and a king of flawless loyalty to Rome, is much the same as the Senate then chose to administer to its two main allies, Eumenes and Rhodes (pp. 332, 337). Not only was it

⁶⁸ II *Macc.* 4.21. Habicht 1976, 219: (B 10) (preparations in Egypt). On the eve of the war, Antiochus, whose son (the future Antiochus V) had been born a few years earlier, had his nephew and co-ruler killed (August 170) through his minister Andronicus, who in turn was executed a little later; Habicht *op. cit.* 222. Outbreak of the war: for the earlier date Skeat 1961: (B 222), followed by Mørkholm 1966, 69 n. 21: (E 33). There are difficulties; early spring 169 may be correct: Walbank 1957-79, III.321ff.: (B 38). On the course of the war: Otto 1934, 1-66: (E 156); Bickerman 1952: (E 7); Volkmann *PlW*, 'Ptolemaios', 1705-10; Walbank *op. cit.* 321ff., 352ff., 402ff.; Will 1982, 313-20: (A 40).

⁶⁹ For the former view: Otto 1934, 51ff.: (E 156), followed with modifications by Pédech 1964, 151: (B 26); Fraser 1972, II.211-12: (E 137). For the latter view: Bickerman 1952, 402: (E 7); Aymard 1952, 85ff.: (D 3); Mørkholm 1966, 80ff.: (E 33); Walbank 1957-79, III.358: (B 38); Mooren 1979, 78ff.: (E 31). See also Will 1982, 319: (A 40).

⁷⁰ The sources are collected and discussed in Walbank 1957-79, III.401-4: (B 38). Antiochus' restraint: Tarn 1951, 192: (F 152). The 'new clause': Will 1982, 322: (A 40).

extremely harsh, not only did it lack the tact previously observed by the Senate in foreign relations, but none of the three powers had done anything to deserve it. The Senate simply no longer bothered to conceal the fact that Rome now had the power to dictate her will. The Roman aristocracy, it is true, seldom favoured annexation, but their attitude, often regarded as self-restriction, that is to say, a virtue,⁷¹ included a moral deficiency: unwillingness to assume the responsibility for the conditions they had created.⁷² Roman policy at this time was imperialistic; it did not allow for meaningful negotiations, for mutual acknowledgement of legitimate political goals, for compromise; there were demands on one side and obedience on the other.⁷³

It has been argued that the ultimatum presented by Popillius broke Antiochus' spirit and that his subsequent actions became erratic. The known facts, however, do not sustain this theory and it has rightly been rejected by subsequent historians.⁷⁴ Antiochus accepted what was unavoidable and turned his energies to the eastern frontier of his kingdom, where Roman interference was less likely than in the Mediterranean. Whether this had been his intention before he was drawn into the struggle with Egypt cannot be known. In 166, before he set out, he organized a magnificent spectacle, a festival in Daphne, the charming suburb of the capital, Antioch, in honour of Apollo, whose temple there was renowned. In addition to the solemn procession and usual agonistic features, which attracted large numbers of athletes and artists from far away, there was a splendid military parade, similar in some ways to a Roman triumph. Only a year before Aemilius Paullus, the victor of Pydna, had held comparable festivities in Amphipolis; Antiochus' festival was obviously, at least in part, an answer to the Roman celebration, perhaps an attempt to outdo it. The parade of the victorious army from Egypt was both a demonstration of strength and an opportunity for Antiochus to review the forces he would use in his eastern campaign.⁷⁵

⁷¹ This, at least, is the impression created by Badian 1968: (A 5); more strongly Werner 1972, 557: (A 39): 'Selbstbändigung und freiwillige Beschränkung seiner tatsächlichen Herrschaftsmöglichkeiten.'

⁷² Bleicken 1964, 183: (12): 'Antinomie von tatsächlicher Herrschaft und Mangel an Willen zum Regieren.' 'Aber der ganze Jammer des Ostens war, dass die Römer diese Sehnsucht nach Übernahme moralischer Herrscherpflichten nicht erfüllten.'

⁷³ On Roman imperialism: Badian 1968: (A 5); Werner 1972: (A 39); Veyne 1975: (A 38); Musti 1978: (B 22); Harris 1979: (A 21); Richardson 1979: (A 30); Sherwin-White 1980: (A 33); North 1981: (A 28); Gruen 1984: (A 20).

⁷⁴ The theory is Otto's (1934, 80ff.: (E 156)), followed by Bengtson 1977, 493: (A 9), but duly criticized by Pédech 1964, 152 n. 278: (B 26); Mørkholm 1966, 96: (E 33); Briscoe 1969, 51: (D 9). Cf. Will 1982, 345: (A 40).

⁷⁵ Polyb. xxx.25-6. Diod. Sic. xxxi.16.2. See Mørkholm 1966, 97-100: (E 33), and Walbank 1957-79, III.448-54: (B 38). The far-reaching theory of Tarn 1951, 192-5: (F 152), that what Antiochus celebrated was in fact the victory of Eucratidas (according to Tarn, his cousin as well as his general) over Demetrius of Bactria, has been refuted by Altheim 1947-8, II.20ff.: (E 122), and Narain 1957, 53ff.: (F 103). Different, but equally hazardous, speculations in Bunge 1976: (E 11).

This was just the sort of event to make the Senate again suspicious of Antiochus. Two Roman embassies, the first in 166, the second in 164, were sent to explore his state of mind and his intentions. The Romans, it seems, realized the danger that could arise from co-operation between Antiochus and Eumenes, both victims of the Senate's change in foreign policy, and they were afraid that such a union might attract other powers, such as Ariarathes of Cappadocia. The first embassy, however, led by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (the father of the famous tribunes), was disarmed by the king's charm and satisfied by his assurances; the second embassy arrived in Syria about the time the king met his fate in Iran.⁷⁶

It is not for this chapter to describe Antiochus' administration or evaluate his foundation of cities, but one part of his internal policy must be discussed: the conflict with his Jewish subjects.

(d) *Antiochus and the Jews*⁷⁷

The Jews came to regard Antiochus as the archetypal oppressor, 'the wicked root', so wicked that Christians would call him the Antichrist.⁷⁸ Their condemnation derived from his desecration of the holy temple and his persecution of Jews for their religion; the condemnation implies that the king bears all the responsibility for these acts and that he alone is to blame for them. The Jewish version has prevailed for centuries; the true story, however, is different, much more complex and the result of special circumstances. The king, certainly, had he understood the Jews, could have avoided the conflict, but nevertheless was not the one who provoked it. The Jewish side took the initiative in the events leading to persecution and martyrdom and consequently must share the responsibility.

⁷⁶ Sources in *MRR* I. 438 and 439-40 (where, however, the first embassy is erroneously dated to 165); Walbank 1957-79, III.33; 454: (B 38). On Cappadocia: Mørholm 1966, 100-1: (E 33). For Gracchus: Gelzer 1962-4, III.166-7: (A 19); for the chronology of the second embassy see II *Macc.* 11.34-8.

⁷⁷ The principal sources: I *Macc.* (from which Jos. *AJ* XII. 137-361 is almost exclusively derived), a Greek translation of an Aramaic original, first century B.C.; II *Macc.*, in original Greek, composed of (i) the account of Judas' deeds, written by Jason of Cyrene in five books shortly before 152; (ii) an abridgement of this with the addition of 1.1-10a, 2.19-32 and 15.37-9, published in 124 B.C.; (iii) a revision of this, adding 1.10b-2.18 and changing the order of events here and there, to be dated before A.D. 70. Habicht 1976, 169-77: (B 10). The book of Daniel (esp. ch. 11) repeatedly alludes to the events; its author witnessed the profanation of the temple in December 168, but did not live to see the temple rededicated in December 165; he also witnessed the persecution of 167, but not its end early in 163 nor Antiochus' death late in 164. The book, therefore, was published c. 165. Bickerman 1937, 143-4: (E 86). A couple of documents, besides those inserted in *Maccabees*, are preserved in Jos. *AJ* XII. 258-264, discussed by Bickerman 1937, 188ff.: (E 87). Recent studies: Schürer 1973, 125ff.: (E 112); Habicht 1974: (E 100) and 1976: (B 10 and E 101); Vidal-Naquet 1978: (E 118); Bringmann 1980 and 1983: (E 91 and 92) (all with copious bibliography).

⁷⁸ I *Macc.* 1.10. Cyprian, *ad Fortunatum* XI.115: *immo in Antiocho antichristus expressus*.

Since their return from exile centuries before, under the Achaemenids, Ptolemies and, from the year 200, Seleucids, Jews had been free to live in accordance with their own law and religion. When Antiochus III conquered Palestine, he solemnly granted them the right to their own way of life;⁷⁹ the Jewish subjects of his successor, Seleucus IV, appreciated the peace and prosperity they enjoyed (p. 340). Antiochus IV changed this idyllic picture when he revoked the privileges and prohibited the practice of the Jewish religion. What caused such a dramatic change?

Earlier scholarship explained it as Antiochus' alleged desire to strengthen hellenism throughout the kingdom at the expense of traditional native cultures and customs. His motive was said to have been the conviction that hellenism meant unification and that unification would give the monarchy greater strength.⁸⁰ The primary basis for this theory was I *Macc.* 1.41-3:

Moreover King Antiochus wrote to his whole kingdom, that all should be one people, and everyone should leave his laws: so all the heathen agreed according to the commandment of the king. Yea, many also of the Israelites consented to his religion, and sacrificed unto idols, and profaned the sabbath (tr. the King James Version).

More recent research has refuted this view. Such a policy, even if it had not been unworkable, was simply alien to the way of thinking and acting of Hellenistic kings and especially to the traditions of the Seleucids, who (like the Achaemenids before them) had to deal with a great number of native cultures, for which they had always shown the greatest respect. Moreover, the theory that such a policy existed is not compatible with the sources. The statement from I *Maccabees* quoted above is not just 'a manifest exaggeration',⁸¹ it is false in general and specifically for Judaea, since the king was not the one who initiated the plan to hellenize the Jews, but Jews themselves had put this demand before him. When Antiochus granted their demand, he was unaware of what the consequences of his concession could be.

The Jews themselves took the initiative to adapt their nation to a Greek way of life. This fact is unequivocally attested in both I and II *Maccabees* and their testimony deserves credence, since both are hostile to Antiochus.⁸² The story, in short, is this. In 174 Jason, the brother of the

⁷⁹ See the documents issued by him, Jos. *AJ* XII.138-144 and 145-146, both discussed by Bickerman, the former in 1935: (E 85), the latter in 1946-8: (E 89).

⁸⁰ This has long been the dominant theory, held by historians such as Bevan, Wilcken, Meyer, more recently Otto 1934, 85: (E 156); Tarn 1951, 186: (E 152); Kiechle 1963, 167-8: (E 28). For a fair evaluation and decisive criticism see Tcherikover 1961, 175-86: (E 115); Bringmann 1983, 99ff.: (E 92).

⁸¹ So Mørkholm 1966, 132 n. 53: (E 33); similarly Tcherikover 1961, 183-4: (E 115); Hengel 1973, 151ff.: (E 102). ⁸² II *Macc.* 4.4-15, with which I *Macc.* 1.11-15 agrees in all essential points.

conservative high-priest Onias, appeared before the king. Jason was the spokesman for those Jews who had been advocating hellenization. He offered Antiochus a substantial sum of money if the king would appoint him to his brother's place, and he promised more if Antiochus would permit him to transform Jerusalem into a Greek city, name it Antioch, build a gymnasium, and institute a corps of youths as Greeks did, an ephebate. The king granted all his requests and put Jason in charge of the enrolment of citizens for the city of Antioch.⁸³ The new high-priest swiftly carried out his plans; his 'hellenistic reform' was met by enthusiasm as well as resentment among the Jews.

Nothing indicates that it was Jason's intention to change the Jewish faith, but his opponents felt that his reforms affected Jewish religion as well as their traditional way of life. The policy of segregation from the outer world had, for centuries, facilitated (or rather made possible) the preservation of that religion. To open up the gates to Hellenistic manners was therefore considered a danger, perhaps even a mortal danger, to the ancestral faith. In addition, there were other reasons for divisiveness, the struggle for power between the different factions, the inclination of some families towards the Ptolemies, of others towards the ruling royal house,⁸⁴ and the contrasts between rich and poor, city and country, priests and laymen. The men selected by Jason to be citizens of Antioch on the soil of Jerusalem would become a new privileged class within the nation.

Tension was already running high when, after a few years, Jason was outmanoeuvred by a certain Menelaus, who offered the king a higher bid for Jason's post and secured it. As a consequence more radical reformers seized power. Menelaus' followers and their opponents clashed, and the king had to intervene. The climax came when a rumour spread that Antiochus, then campaigning in Egypt, had been killed in battle. Jason seized his opportunity and invaded the country with an army recruited from Nabataean Arabs, amongst whom he had lived while in exile. He forced an entry into Jerusalem and tried to regain control of the city, but finally, after heavy fighting, he was expelled.⁸⁵

Antiochus was returning from Egypt when he heard of these events. He thought there was a rebellion and the Jews were using his preoccupa-

⁸³ For the interpretation of II *Macc.* 4.9 and 19 see Bickerman 1937, 59-65: (E 86), and, with different conclusions, Tcherikover 1961, 161-9, 404-9: (E 115), followed by most scholars since; Habicht 1976, 216-17: (B 10); Bringmann 1983, 83-4: (E 92).

⁸⁴ The only factions in the sources are the Tobiads and the Oniads; bibliography in Habicht 1976, 211: (B 10). There must have been others. The Tobiad Hyrcanus, who feuded with his older brothers and took his life after the accession of Antiochus IV, may have supported the house of Seleucus IV or the Ptolemies.

⁸⁵ II *Macc.* 4.23-9, 43-50. Menelaus also had Jason's predecessor Onias killed through the same royal minister who was held responsible for the murder of Antiochus' nephew and co-ruler in 170 (n. 68). The battle in Jerusalem: II *Macc.* 5.5-7.

tion with a major war to stab him in the back.⁸⁶ He attempted to suppress the insurrection with punitive measures. He removed part of the treasure of the temple, garrisoned Jerusalem and Mount Gerizim, the religious centre of the Samaritans, and, shortly thereafter, by royal decree in the autumn of 168, prohibited the practice of the Jewish religion and demanded the worship of pagan gods. The temple was transformed into a sanctuary of Zeus.⁸⁷ The great majority of Jews, it seems, obeyed the king's orders. Some who did not suffered death, among them several who refused even to simulate compliance, when the opportunity was offered by the authorities. There were martyrdoms, but the surviving stories, however edifying and famous, are legendary.⁸⁸

Open resistance to the oppression came from two sides, from the group of the 'Pious' (*Hassidim*), and from people living in the countryside. The Hassidim, apparently influenced by intellectuals, were so pious that they even refrained, in the beginning, from defending themselves on a Sabbath. The resistance from the countryside was more pragmatic. The men around Mattathias and his sons from Modein realized that, if the Jewish faith was to have a chance to survive, religious scruples had to be subordinated to the needs of the day. Led by Mattathias' son Judas Maccabaeus, they began a guerrilla war. Progress was slow but steady.⁸⁹ The Jewish rebels defeated royal troops in more than one skirmish, and late in 165 even recaptured Jerusalem and the area of the temple. The king's garrison kept control of the citadel only, where the high-priest Menelaus and all the Jews who were loyal to him and to the king took refuge.

The royal government had taken the insurrection lightly in the beginning, but now felt the need to change its policy. The king realized that the persecution of Judaism, a measure he took against the supposed insurrection, had in fact caused insurrection. Consequently, he took the first step and withdrew the oppressive order. In a letter directed to Menelaus he declared an amnesty for all Jews who put down their arms before an appointed day. He also reaffirmed the principle that Jews should be free to live in accordance with their own law.⁹⁰ The formula included freedom of religion. It is clear that the king hoped to end hostilities by this act. Judas and his followers, however, continued the

⁸⁶ II *Macc.* 5.11.

⁸⁷ I *Macc.* 1.20ff.; II *Macc.* 5.11ff. Bringmann 1980 and 1983: (E 91 and 92) argues that Menelaus suggested these measures to the king, for purely political reasons.

⁸⁸ II *Macc.* 6.18-31, 7.1-42. For the late origin of ch. 7: Habicht 1976, 171: (B 10); for the martyrdom of Eleazar (ch. 6) *ibid.* 173.

⁸⁹ Sabbath: I *Macc.* 2.32-8, 41; II *Macc.* 6.11. The story of Mattathias (I *Macc.* 2) is suppressed in II *Macc.*, which is cool towards the Maccabean or Hasmonean family. Etymology and meaning of Judas' surname remain disputed: Schürer 1973, 158 n. 49: (E 112).

⁹⁰ The king's letter is preserved in II *Macc.* 11.27-32, discussed in Habicht 1976, 7-18: (E 101), and Bringmann 1983, 40ff.: (E 92).

war, because the king still backed the hated Menelaus. A large army, led by the chancellor Lysias, marched towards Jerusalem in the summer of 164 to crush the rebellion. Judas soon had to negotiate and to accept most of Lysias' conditions. A few details were left to the discretion of the king, but Antiochus died at this very moment and the decision passed to his son, Antiochus, who succeeded him at the end of 164; the new king, however, was only nine years old, so the decision was actually made by Lysias, his guardian. This time, at the beginning of 163, the government unconditionally and solemnly granted the Jews religious freedom and the right to live as their ancestors had.⁹¹ The relationship between the crown and the nation that had existed from 200 to 168 was restored. In order to show how serious its intentions were, the new government sacrificed Menelaus. He was executed and replaced by Alcimus, who was expected to be acceptable to orthodox Jews and, in fact, the Hassidim did make their peace with him and with the king. The war for the God of Israel was over.

(e) *Antiochus in the east*⁹²

In the spring of 165 King Antiochus began the campaign in the east from which he was not to return. Before leaving he appointed his son Antiochus co-ruler and the chancellor Lysias guardian of the boy. Sources for the campaign are extremely meagre and modern theories on the causes and aims of the expedition are therefore contradictory. There is, however, agreement on one essential fact: some of the eastern satrapies needed to be reinforced, some that had been lost needed to be recovered. Forty years before, the king's father, Antiochus III, had made a strong and successful effort to consolidate his authority throughout his eastern dominions. His defeat at the hands of the Romans, however, had undercut his power and shaken his prestige; it undoubtedly caused repercussions in the east and encouraged those who wished to throw off Seleucid rule.

That this is what actually happened can be at least partially corroborated from the scanty evidence. Iranian troops, numerous in the royal army at Raphia in 217 and at Magnesia in 190, are absent at Daphne in 166. The satraps of Greater and Lesser Armenia, Artaxias and Zariadres, who had been appointed by Antiochus III, both assumed the title king

⁹¹ The document, II *Macc.* 11.22-6, refers to the death of the king as a very recent event.

⁹² Sources: Polyb. xxi.9; Diod. Sic. xxxi.17a; App. *Syr.* 46.236, 66.349 and 352; Tac. *Hist.* v.8.4-5; Porphyr. *FGrH* 260F 38, 53, 56; I *Macc.* 6.1-16; II *Macc.* 1.10-16, 9; Jos. *AJ* xii.354-361. Modern works: Meyer 1921, 216-23; (I 26); Altheim 1947-8, II.35-50; (E 122); Tarn 1951, 213ff.; (F 152); Narain 1957, 53ff.; (F 103); LeRider 1965, 311-21; (E 149); Mørkholm 1966, 166-80; (E 33); Will 1982, 348-55; (A 40).

after 188 and henceforward acted as independent rulers.⁹³ The case of Bactria is similar. King Euthydemus I had been forced to bow before Antiochus III, who had then reinstated him. After 190, however, there is no sign that any Bactrian ruler was a dependent of the Seleucid king. Bactria and the adjacent satrapies, Sogdiana, Aria and Margiane, were definitely lost to the Seleucids. The new realm was also safe from any immediate Seleucid attack, since the Parthians had occupied land between the two.⁹⁴ Farther to the south, in Persia, the homeland of the Achaemenids, a local dynasty of priests and princes had risen to power. By the first years of the reign of Antiochus IV at the latest, these so-called *fratadara* had won their independence from royal authority and the control of at least part of Persis around Persepolis and Istakhr.⁹⁵ More to the west, in the land of the Elamites, Antiochus the Great had encountered stiff resistance, which led him to his death in 187; his misfortune caused (or strengthened) the drive for independence in Elymais.⁹⁶

Antiochus' expedition has to be viewed against the background of a disintegrating empire. What his ultimate goals were is hard to say and a matter of controversy. Tarn's opinion that the king intended to restore Alexander's empire by recovering Parthia, Bactria and India has been refuted by subsequent scholars as excessive and utopian.⁹⁷ Closer to the truth seems to be the view that he wanted to protect western Iran, endangered by the Parthians and by local uprisings, and to recover lost territory where he could,⁹⁸ but a definite answer, if at all possible, can only come from an assessment of the king's actions before his premature death.

First, he invaded Greater Armenia and defeated Artaxias, who was left on the throne as a vassal king.⁹⁹ Several passages of the elder Pliny, though difficult to interpret, seem to show that Antiochus also campaigned in the area of the Persian Gulf, where he refounded a colony of

⁹³ Strabo xi. pp. 528, 531; Polyb. xxv. 2. 12, xxxi. 16; Diod. Sic. xxxi. 17a, 27a; Plut. *Luc.* 31.3-4. It may be more than coincidence that the name of Artaxias' father was Zariadres (Zariatr), as revealed by two Aramaic inscriptions: Dupont-Sommer 1946-8: (B 49). Artaxias naming his capital Artaxata shows his self-esteem. Some recently found Greek inscriptions show that Hellenistic influence in Armenia was already considerable around 200: Habicht 1953: (E 139); Trever 1953, 113-46: (E 172) (which I have not seen).

⁹⁴ For Bactria in this period see, besides the major works of Tarn 1951: (F 152) and Narain 1957: (F 103); Simonetta 1958, 154ff.: (F 144); Will 1982, 350-2: (A 40). For the Parthian kingdom: Debevoise 1938: (E 132); Junge, *PIW* 'Parthia'; for the sequence and genealogy of the earlier kings: Wolski 1962: (E 178). See further LeRider 1965, 311ff.: (E 149).

⁹⁵ Stiehl 1959: (E 170); Schmitt 1964, 46-50: (E 50).

⁹⁶ Stiehl 1956, 13ff., and 1959, 375, 379: (E 114 and 170); LeRider 1965, 349ff.: (E 149); Will 1982, 355: (A 40). ⁹⁷ See n. 75.

⁹⁸ So Stiehl 1959, 375ff.: (E 170), and Mørkholm 1966, 166ff.: (B 33), both emphasize the attempt to strengthen royal authority in Elymais and Persis. More generally: Will 1982, 352: (A 40), 'réaffirmer la présence séleucide' (in Iran).

⁹⁹ The fate of Zariadres was probably similar; Meyer 1921, 217: (I 26).

Alexander under the name Antioch on the site of the later Spasinu Charax. The victories of Numenius over the Persians, recorded by the same writer, may well belong to the same or another, perhaps simultaneous, expedition.¹⁰⁰ The king's presence, probably in 164, in Ecbatana in Media can be inferred from the renaming of the city 'Epiphania' in his honour; one source, in fact, does report that he marched from Persepolis to Ecbatana. It is also attested that he attempted to raise money from the temple of Nanaia in Elymais, but had to retreat before the opposition of the natives. Soon afterwards, the king fell ill and died in the autumn of 164 in Tabae in Paraetacene.¹⁰¹

The facts so far related show that Antiochus regained control of Armenia and that he attempted to regain lost territories in Persis and Elymais. The key question, however, is whether he planned to invade Parthia or not. Many historians have assumed that Parthia was his target; their assumption is based on the king's itinerary and a passage in Tacitus; others disagree.¹⁰² His itinerary seems not to furnish any clues, at least as long as Tabae has not been located. The answer, therefore, must be sought in the following passage of Tacitus:

After the Macedonians gained supremacy, King Antiochus endeavoured to abolish Jewish superstition and to introduce Greek civilization; the war with the Parthians, however, prevented his improving this basest of all peoples; for it was exactly at that time that Arsaces had revolted. Later on, since the power of Macedon had waned, the Parthians were not yet come to their strength, and the Romans were far away, the Jews selected their own kings (*Hist.* v.8.4-5, tr. C. H. Moore).

Some scholars identify this Antiochus as Antiochus VII, who captured Jerusalem in 134 and lost his life during a campaign against the Parthians in 129; some, though they concede that the sentence about Jewish superstition and Greek civilization can fit only Antiochus IV, maintain that the allusion to a Parthian war fits only Antiochus VII; but the king in question, it is clear, is one and the same throughout, that is,

¹⁰⁰ Plin. *HN* vi.138-139, 147: Antioch, for the coinage of which see Mørkholm 1970: (B 114). Numenius: Plin. *HN* vi.152. Opinion is divided whether he served Antiochus III or Antiochus IV; several scholars are undecided: LeRider 1965, 303, 310: (E 149).

¹⁰¹ Mørkholm 1966, 117, 171-2 n. 22: (E 33) (Epiphania). Ecbatana: II *Macc.* 9.2-3. The account is not too reliable, and ch. 9, in fact, invents a fictitious letter of the king: Habicht 1976, 3-7: (E 101); but the accuracy of the reported itinerary need not be doubted. Temple of Nanaia: Polyb. xxxi.9.1-2; Porph. *FGH* 260 F 53. Different accounts of other writers are discussed by Holleaux 1916: (E 23). See also Mendels 1981: (E 30). Tabae has not been located, but cannot have been far from Gabae (modern Ispahan): Weissbach, *PW*, 'Tabai'; Treidler, *PW*, 'Paraitakene'.

¹⁰² Most scholars agree that Parthia was his target. Mørkholm 1966, 176-7: (E 33), however, argues that Parthian aggression began only later (which is true for Media). Antiochus could have had other reasons than Parthian aggression for waging war (see below).

Antiochus IV.¹⁰³ The Tacitus passage derives ultimately from either Polybius or Poseidonius;¹⁰⁴ it attests to a war between Antiochus IV and the Parthians – Antiochus, therefore, may be assumed to have intended to invade Parthia.

In support of this view it has been pointed out that what is known about his campaign closely resembles the famous ‘Anabasis’ of his father, who had succeeded in regaining the Parthian king’s formal recognition of his supremacy.¹⁰⁵ The Parthian king Mithridates I (Arsaces V), who succeeded his brother Phraates I (Arsaces IV) c. 171, was the first Parthian monarch to strike coins and the coins bore his own portrait,¹⁰⁶ which proves that he considered himself a sovereign ruler and therefore implies the cancellation of the treaty that his father had concluded with Antiochus III. This, then, may well be the ‘revolt’ of which Tacitus is speaking and which would have prompted Antiochus Epiphanes’ reaction. Antiochus’ ultimate goal, it seems, was the subjugation of the Parthians, but he died before hostilities began and his army was soon led home.

The king died in his prime. He could not accomplish what he intended and it is idle to speculate how he would have fared against the Parthians, had he lived longer. It is, however, worth noting that the Parthians, so far as is known, did not attack Seleucid territory (p. 363) for more than fifteen years to come, and it need not be doubted that – Parthia aside – the presence of the king and his army in the eastern satrapies encouraged those loyal to the dynasty. Antiochus, on the whole, was an able monarch, committed to his duties. His only serious mistake had been his misjudgement of the situation in Judaea, but as soon as he realized that his policy was a failure, he changed it. The Romans denied him a major success in the south; death prevented him from trying his strength in the east.

(f) *Antiochus V*

The king was succeeded by his son Antiochus V Eupator, who was under the tutelage of the chancellor Lysias. Epiphanes is said to have changed this arrangement shortly before he died by substituting a certain

¹⁰³ As argued by Kolbe 1935, 56–7: (E 103) (followed by Jacoby *ad FGrH* 260 F 55–7); Altheim 1947–8, II.36: (E 122); LeRider 1965, 312: (E 149); and Will 1982, 354: (A 40). Antiochus VII, on the other hand, was able to impose his conditions on the Jews, and several years before his Parthian campaign.

¹⁰⁴ Meyer 1921, 268 n. 3: (1 26). Jacoby, *loc. cit.* (n. 103). See also Jacoby’s remarks on Poseidonius, *FGrH* 87 F 69 and 109.

¹⁰⁵ Altheim 1947–8, II.36ff.: (E 122). For Antiochus III see Holleaux 1930, 138–43: (D 34); Herzfeld 1932, 37–8: (B 171). ¹⁰⁶ LeRider 1965, 311–23: (E 149).

Philippus, who was with him in the east, for Lysias. Most scholars have accepted the story of this substitution, though some have doubted it; for good reasons, since the young Antiochus was in Lysias' hands. Philippus probably advanced the claim as a pretext for seizing power.¹⁰⁷ The news about Philippus reached Lysias when he seemed to be on the verge of wiping out the Jewish rebels. It forced him to compromise and the high-priest Menelaus was made the scapegoat (p. 350). Lysias then took the field against Philippus, defeated him, and had him executed.¹⁰⁸ King and guardian seemed safe.

Trouble, however, lay ahead for both of them, first from the still malignant Roman Senate, and second from the king's cousin Demetrius, who had been deprived of the throne by Antiochus' usurpation in 175. A Roman embassy had come to see Epiphanes (p. 346) when he was in the east. On the way to Antioch the ambassadors contacted the Maccabean party that was negotiating with Lysias in the autumn of 164, wrote them a short letter, and promised them their advice. Moreover, they 'agreed' to some concessions Lysias had already made,¹⁰⁹ which was tantamount to supporting rebellious subjects of a king who was an 'ally and friend' of Rome. Strange as their conduct was, it is not unique; that same year C. Sulpicius in Sardis invited accusations against King Eumenes, another 'ally and friend' of Rome.¹¹⁰ About a year later another Roman embassy, headed by Cn. Octavius, arrived at Antioch to inspect matters under the new regime. When Octavius discovered that the king, in violation of the treaty of Apamea, possessed a fleet and elephants, he had the ships burnt and the animals hamstrung. The Romans must have known about these violations all along and they had not cared, so it is hard to say what caused the Senate to enforce the letter of the old treaty at this time. Anyway, these actions caused an uproar in the city of Laodicea and Octavius was murdered by a certain Leptines (early 162).¹¹¹

The murder put Lysias in a difficult position with Rome; his relations

¹⁰⁷ I *Macc.* 6.14, 55; Jos. *AJ* xii.360. Accepted by Meyer 1921, 221: (t 26); Mørkholm 1966, 172: (E 33); Schürer 1973, 166: (E 112) and Will 1982, 353: (A 40). Disputed by Niese 1910, 218 n. 6: (D 46); Bevan 1930, 514: (E 83); Habicht 1976, 248–9: (B 10); and Gruen 1976, 79–80: (E 20): Antiochus IV 'would not likely give incentive for chaos after his death'.

¹⁰⁸ I *Macc.* 6.63; II *Macc.* 9.29; Jos. *AJ* xii.386. I *Macc.* is silent about Philippus' fate; the second says he escaped to Egypt; Josephus has him executed. Josephus is probably correct and the statement of II *Macc.* erroneous, owing to a confusion between Philippus and Onias, the son of the Jewish high-priest Onias III: Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 310 n. 2: (E 8); Habicht 1976, 249: (B 10).

¹⁰⁹ II *Macc.* 11.34–7; Habicht 1976, 7ff.: (E 101), where earlier opinions are cited, including those which dismiss the letter as a forgery; Paltiel 1982, 252: (E 37); Bringmann 1983, 47ff.: (E 92).

¹¹⁰ Above p. 334. The present writer cannot agree with the attempt of Gruen 1976, 78: (E 20), and 1984, 581: (A 20), to belittle the importance of this and to deny, in general, that Roman policy at this time was often malignant.

¹¹¹ The career and embassy of Octavius: Münzer, *PIW*, 'Octavius' 1810–14. See further the decree of Argos in his honour, *BCH* 81 (1957) 181–202, and, for the incident in question, *P. Herc.* 1044, col. 9 iff., as discussed by I. Gallo, *Frammenti Biografici da Papiri* (Rome 1980) 115–17.

with the new king of Cappadocia, Ariarathes V, were tense because Lysias had executed Ariarathes' mother, a Seleucid princess, and sister. The chancellor did what he could to conciliate both Rome and Ariarathes. He sent an embassy to Rome to offer apologies and returned the bones of Antiochis and her daughter to Cappadocia, but he was unpopular in Syria¹¹² and his position remained shaky. As soon as a strong pretender appeared, Lysias and his protégé, the boy-king Antiochus, were helpless.

Late in 162 a pretender arrived. Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV, had spent at least sixteen years as a hostage in Rome. It is significant that he had been kept in Rome long after the indemnity demanded by the treaty of 188 had been paid off (in 173, p. 342), and it is easy to speculate that the Senate had kept him partly in connivance with Antiochus, who had seized the throne that rightfully belonged to Demetrius, partly as a weapon that could be used against Antiochus, should he fail to satisfy the wishes of Rome.¹¹³ After Antiochus' death Demetrius approached the Senate, argued that it was absurd to hold him hostage for Antiochus' children, and demanded his restoration to the throne of his father. The Senate refused, as Polybius states, because they assumed that it would be easier to deal with an under-aged king and his guardian than with a full-grown king. Cn. Octavius was sent out to enforce the treaty of 188. After his murder, Demetrius, now twenty-three years old, approached the Senate once more, against the advice of Polybius, this time only with the request that he be released, but was rebuked again.¹¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, he escaped with the help of paternal friends, of Polybius and an ambassador of Ptolemy VI, perhaps also with the tacit approval of influential Romans. By the time his escape was discovered it was too late for pursuit. The Senate confined itself to sending another embassy to the east, headed by Ti. Gracchus, to look into conditions in Greece, Asia, and especially Syria.¹¹⁵

On his way home Demetrius seems to have avoided the territory of Eumenes. From a port belonging to the Lycian Confederacy, which had become independent in 167, he sent a message to Rome saying that his

¹¹² Polyb. xxxi.7.2-4. The circumstances under which the ladies left Cappadocia are not known, but may have been connected with the death of Ariarathes IV: Breglia Pulci Doria 1978, 121-2: (E 128). For Queen Antiochis see n. 9. Lysias: Polyb. xxxi.8.6, 12.4.

¹¹³ Will 1982, 322: (A 40), suggests that the ultimatum transmitted by Popillius in 168 may have contained an allusion to Demetrius and his rights.

¹¹⁴ Polyb. xxxi.2 with Walbank 1957-79, III.465-6: (B 38); App. *Syr.* 46.238 (first attempt); Polyb. xxxi.11; App. *Syr.* 47.241-2; Just. *Epit.* xxxiv.3.8. Polybius advised him 'not to stumble twice on the same stone'.

¹¹⁵ Polyb. xxxi.11-15, eyewitness and personal friend of several key persons involved; Gelzer 1962-4, III.161-4: (A 19). It has often been suggested that the Scipios, perhaps also the Aemilii, favoured, or tolerated, Demetrius' escape; for instance Badian 1958, 108: (A 3). Sceptical is Gruen 1984, 665 n. 246: (A 20). Embassy of Gracchus: Polyb. xxxi.23.

target was not his cousin, King Antiochus V, but the chancellor Lysias, who had failed to avenge the murder of Octavius. That fooled no one and, in fact, as soon as Demetrius had landed in Syrian Tripolis, he proclaimed himself king, seized Apamea, the military capital of the kingdom, and marched on Antioch. Lysias and Antiochus were captured. Demetrius had them executed; before the end of 162 he was acknowledged as king throughout the empire.¹¹⁶

III. THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162–129 B.C.

(a) *Demetrius I*¹¹⁷

From the day of his accession Demetrius faced tremendous problems. Within his realm were men loyal to the house of Antiochus or men who at least used such a pretext to further their ambitions. The most powerful was the Milesian Timarchus, satrap of Media and perhaps of Babylonia as well; he was aided by his brother Heraclides, once director of the king's finances.¹¹⁸ Timarchus wasted no time in proclaiming himself, on his coins, 'Timarchus the Great King'. He annexed adjacent territories and concluded an alliance with Artaxias of Armenia, who now reappears as an independent ruler.¹¹⁹ Timarchus and his brother had been sent to Rome more than once as ambassadors and had the support of many Roman senators, gained, reputedly, through bribery.¹²⁰ Timarchus, or

¹¹⁶ Zon. ix.25.6–8; I *Macc.* 7.1–4; II *Macc.* 14.1–2; App. *Syr.* 47.242. Chronology: Volkmann 1925, 389; (B 143); Schürer 1973, 129–30; (E 112).

¹¹⁷ Principal sources: Polyb. iii.5.2–3, xxxi.33, xxxii.2–3, 10–11, xxxiii.6, 18–19; Diod. Sic. xxxi.19.19a, 27a, 28–30, 32.32a, 36.40a. The only coherent narratives surviving come from Jewish authors and focus on Syria and Palestine: I *Macc.* 7–10; II *Macc.* 14–15 (ending with Nicanor's defeat in 161); Jos. *AJ* xii.389–xiii.62. References to their works will only be given in special cases. Josephus from book xiii on, close as he remains to I *Macc.*, has also consulted another well-informed source, either Nicolaus or Strabo, that ultimately derives from Poseidonius; Schürer 1973, 21–2, with bibliography; (E 112). The other literary sources consist of scattered references, mainly App. *Syr.* 47.243–244, 67.354–355, 70.367; Livy, *Per.* xlvi–xlviii; Strabo xiii, p. 624; Porph. *FGrH* 260 F 32.14; Just. *Epit.* xxxiv.1–2, xxxv.1–2; Zon. ix.24.8–9, 25.8.

¹¹⁸ Timarchus: Olshausen 1974, 216–17; (1 29). Heraclides: *ibid.* 212–13. In Miletus the brothers dedicated the *bouleuterion* (meeting place of the Council) to King Antiochus IV: *Milet* 1.2, nos. 1–2; Tuchelt 1975; (B 204). Some 250 years later, a Milesian claimed descendancy from 'King Timarchus': Hommel 1976; (E 144). The Milesian Eireneas also had influence with Antiochus IV: Herrmann 1965; (E 142). On the other hand, the party of Demetrius in Miletus is represented by Apollonius and by his sons Menestheus, Meleager and Apollonius, who are called generals of Demetrius in an epigram from Miletus (Peck, *GVI* 1286). All four appear repeatedly in Polybius; Menestheus was honoured by the Athenians (n. 65). Apollonius was governor of Coele Syria under Demetrius II (I *Macc.* 10.69).

¹¹⁹ Timarchus' coins, including a gold stater, are rare; most of them were melted down by Demetrius. Timarchus seems to have minted coins in Ecbatana and Seleucia on the Tigris: Jenkins 1951, 1ff.; (B 99); LeRider 1965, 332–4; (E 149); Houghton 1979; (E 25). For military operations: Diod. Sic. xxxi.27a; for Artaxias, p. 351.

¹²⁰ Harris 1979, 90; (A 21), observes that this is the first attested instance of large-scale bribery of senators.

an Elamite dynast by the name of Hycnapses, may have controlled Susa for a part of 162/1.¹²¹ Ptolemy, satrap of Commagene beyond the Euphrates, defected at the same time¹²² and the Maccabees, now striving for the independence of Judaea, took up arms against all who were loyal to the high-priest and the king.

In addition, there were enormous external difficulties, the greatest of which was the hostility Demetrius had provoked in Rome by escaping and by pretending in the east that he had the Senate's approval. The Senate's hostility, once it became known, strengthened all forces that were opposed or disloyal to Demetrius. The king himself immediately felt isolated. The situation was worse than when Seleucus IV became king. Demetrius could not hope for any help from Eumenes, who had been active in placing Antiochus on the throne Demetrius had now reclaimed, nor from Cappadocia, which had been close to Eumenes for twenty-five years.

Demetrius worked hard to overcome these difficulties. He tried to placate the Senate; through Menochares he contacted first Ti. Gracchus, then the Senate, but the results were not reassuring.¹²³ He offered the hand of his sister Laodice, the widow of King Perseus, to his neighbour and cousin, the newly crowned Ariarathes V of Cappadocia, in an attempt to win his friendship. Ariarathes must have been flattered, but the Romans on the spot pressured him to decline and he then added insult to injury by making the affair public in Rome.¹²⁴ Demetrius did succeed with another project: he married off Nysa, daughter of Antiochus IV, to King Pharnaces of Pontus, but Pharnaces, himself isolated and rather weak after his defeat in 179 (p. 329), was little help.¹²⁵

Demetrius had more success within his kingdom. In Judaea his troops, previously defeated, were finally victorious and seemed about to suppress the rebellion.¹²⁶ Much more important, however, was his swift recovery of the eastern satrapies. Timarchus had obtained a decree from

¹²¹ Suggested by LeRider 1965, 86 nos. 65, 346–7: (E 149), because of a coin with the legend 'King Hycnapses', minted in Susa. The alternative date *c.* 150 is perhaps more likely.

¹²² Diod. Sic. xxxi.19a. More generally xxxi.27a: 'some of his own satraps became disloyal'.

¹²³ Polyb. xxxi.33. He won the personal support of Ti. Gracchus. Demetrius' gift of grain to Rhodes (Diod. Sic. xxxi.36), where Menochares and Gracchus met, may have been promised or delivered on this occasion. On the embassy to Rome, p. 358.

¹²⁴ Diod. Sic. xxxi.28 attests that it was pressure by, or regard for, Rome that made Ariarathes turn down the offer; Just. *Epit.* xxxv.1.2. Gruen 1976: (E 20) unconvincingly argues that there was no pressure. The negotiations belong to winter 161/60, since Ariarathes' embassy was in Rome before autumn 160.

¹²⁵ The marriage is mentioned, as a fairly recent event, in the Athenian decree, *IDélos* 1497 bis, of 160/59, now firmly dated: bibliography in Hopp 1977, 4 n. 8: (E 60). The context makes it clear that Nysa was the daughter of Antiochus IV, not of Antiochus III or his eldest son, Antiochus: Mørkholm 1966, 60: (E 33).

¹²⁶ Judas defeated Nicanor in the battle of Adasa, but soon he lost a battle and his life against Bacchides (autumn 161): Meyer 1921, 236–52: (I 26); Schürer 1973, 168–73: (E 112).

the Senate that he was king as far as the Romans were concerned.¹²⁷ Although this was far from official recognition, it was tantamount to an assertion that Rome did not recognize Demetrius and was, therefore, injurious to his cause. Encouraged by this, Timarchus invaded Mesopotamia with a large army and reached Seleuceia-Zeugma, where he planned to cross the Euphrates and invade Syria, but he was defeated and killed by Demetrius, in 161 or 160. This victory enabled the king to recover the upper satrapies. In Babylonia he was hailed as 'Saviour' (*Soter*) and the epithet became part of his royal title.¹²⁸

Demetrius' main concern remained the unsettled relations with Rome. He had approached the Roman ambassadors through Menochares and had been encouraged by Gracchus' reaction,¹²⁹ so he now sent Menochares to Rome. Menochares was admitted to the Senate chamber early in 159, some time after Ariarathes' envoys had been praised there for announcing the king's rebuttal of Demetrius. Menochares offered Rome a crown of 10,000 gold staters, said to be a token of gratitude for the hospitality shown Demetrius while he was there. He had also brought those responsible for the murder of Octavius. The senators were divided on how to respond; in the end they accepted the gift, though not the men extradited by the king, and decreed that the king would find Rome amenable if he complied with the Senate's wishes (these, however, were not specified).¹³⁰ Whether this response implied the formal recognition of Demetrius as king has been debated, but this is not the crucial issue, since Demetrius did not need Roman recognition to be king. The Senate, for this reason, did not commit itself; instead, it announced that Demetrius would be tolerated as long as he was obedient. This was all but a declaration that Rome considered itself Demetrius' master; moreover, insofar as the decree seemed to confer some sort of recognition, it was dishonest, because a short time before, in 161, at the request of envoys from Judas Maccabaeus, the Senate had granted an alliance to Demetrius'

¹²⁷ Diod. Sic. xxxi.27a, where the wording is slightly corrupt but the meaning not in doubt. Gruen 1976, 85: (E 20), whose view, however, that the decree 'was no more than a polite formality' – or an 'innocuous statement', 1984, 45: (A 20) – seems unrealistic. The text has Timarchus coming to Rome in person, certainly a mistake: Meyer 1921, 240 n. 3: (I 26). Perhaps Heraclides approached the Senate on his behalf: Will 1982, 368: (A 40).

¹²⁸ A cuneiform tablet from Babylon, dated 14 May 161, mentions Demetrius as king and seems to presuppose his victory: Parker and Dubberstein 1956, 23: (B 214). For coins minted after the victory see Kùthmann 1954, 4–5: (B 109). Demetrius as 'Saviour': App. *Syr.* 47.242.

¹²⁹ Polyb. xxxi.33.2–4. Menochares seems to be the man who received a statue in Delos as one of the 'first friends' of King Demetrius in charge of his correspondence, *IDelos* 1543. He seems also to be mentioned in *PHerc.* 1044, fr. 10.2–3, where Crönert restored [συ]νέχραρον. This violates the syllabic division, and the second letter is, in fact, *omicron*: Capasso 1976, 55: (I 3). Since King Demetrius himself appears in line 1, the restoration [Μη]νοχάρην is compelling.

¹³⁰ Polyb. xxxi.2–3; Diod. Sic. xxxi.29.30; App. *Syr.* 47.243; Zon. ix.25.8. Both Polybius and Diodorus quote the main sentence as *τεύχεται τῶν φιλανθρώπων Δημήτριος, ἐὰν τὸ ἰκανὸν ποιῇ τῇ συγκλήτῳ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξουσίαν*.

Jewish subjects. This act, whatever its actual or potential effects, was incompatible with normal relations between Rome and the Seleucid kingdom.¹³¹

Demetrius now knew that he could expect no support from Rome, but Cappadocia soon seemed to present an opportunity to improve his position and take vengeance on Ariarathes. King Ariarathes IV had been married to Antiochis. The queen is said to have believed she was barren and so had faked the birth of two boys, Ariarathes and Orophernes; later, however, she did give birth to Mithridates. When he was born she revealed the truth, the false princes were sent abroad, Mithridates took the dynastic name Ariarathes, and in 163 succeeded his father. The supposedly false prince Ariarathes disappears from history, but his brother Orophernes claimed the throne. The truth behind this sensational story cannot be known, but Orophernes may well have been, in fact, a genuine son of the former king. It was undisputed that he was born before Ariarathes V.¹³² In any case Demetrius stepped in and supported him. In 159/8 Ariarathes was driven out of the country.¹³³

In the summer of 158 he went to Rome and asked for help. He was kept waiting for a long time, during which he courted individual senators, as did, and with greater success, the envoys of Orophernes and Demetrius. Eventually, in 157, the Senate decreed that Cappadocia be divided between the two rivals. Orophernes, it seems, refused to comply, but Ariarathes now received active support from Attalus, the new king of Pergamum, and in 156 Orophernes, already unpopular at home, was defeated and Ariarathes reinstated by Pergamene forces. Demetrius, apparently, had not protected Orophernes, though he did give him asylum in his capital.

It is perhaps more than coincidence that just at that time (156) the territory of Attalus was invaded by another of his enemies, King Prusias

¹³¹ *I Macc.* 8.17-30; *Jos. AJ* xii.415-419 (a different text), xiv.233 (letter of C. Fannius, *cos.* 161, on behalf of the Jewish envoys); *II Macc.* 4.11; *Just. Epit.* xxxvi.3.39. See Meyer 1921, 246-7: (I 26); recently Giovannini and Müller 1971, 166-71: (E 98); Fischer 1974: (E 94); Timpe 1974: (E 116); Gauger 1977, 153-328: (B 9); Vidal-Naquet 1978, 859-60: (E 118); Gruen 1984, 748ff.: (A 20). Problems abound, but the fact that a treaty was concluded in 161 is beyond doubt; Gauger's criticism of the sources is excessive.

¹³² *Diod. Sic.* xxxi.19.6-8 (a shorter and slightly different version in *Zon.* ix.24.8), discussed by Breglia Pulcia Doria 1978: (E 128). It is obvious that the story reflects what Ariarathes V wanted known.

¹³³ Demetrius was promised 1,000 talents for his aid by Orophernes (*App. Syr.* 47.244, with whom *Diod. Sic.* xxxi.32 is in agreement) and received at once 600 and a crown of 70 talents. Orophernes set aside a sum of 400 talents as a cash reserve in the temple of Athena in Priene. While chronology is uncertain, Demetrius would hardly have taken any serious action before his envoys returned from Rome; 160, therefore, as advocated by Hansen 1971, 125: (E 57), is unsuitable. On the other hand, it was Attalus who counteracted the expulsion of Ariarathes, *Diod. Sic.* xxxi.32a, where the name Eumenes is a mistake; see Hopp 1977, 79 n. 110: (E 60). Since Eumenes died in 158 (n. 34), Demetrius' invasion of Cappadocia may be dated to 158.

II of Bithynia. The causes of the war are unknown, but for years Prusias had been complaining to Rome that Eumenes and Attalus were trying to regain some control of Galatia, despite the Senate's declaration in 166 that Galatia was to be free. Nor is the reason Prusias took up arms at that particular moment known. It could have been the opportunity presented by the involvement of Pergamene forces in Cappadocia; it could have been a bribe offered by Demetrius. In any event, a battle was fought, Attalus' forces were defeated, and a war began that lasted for two years.¹³⁴ Both sides presented their case before the Senate, which, in turn, intervened with no less than four embassies. In 155, after a treacherous assault that violated a truce and affected Roman envoys as well as Attalus, Prusias succeeded in driving his enemy into the capital, but was unable to take Pergamum. He ravaged the sanctuaries outside the city: of Athena Nikephoros, a memorial of his father's defeat in 183 (p. 328), and Asclepius, from which he looted the famous statue of the god, a work of the Athenian Phryomachus (n. 17), and other objects.

Having been repelled from the harbour-town of Elaea by Attalus' kinsman Sosander, he turned homeward and ravaged the territory of Attalus and the cities under his protection. During the following winter Attalus prepared for a major counter-attack; reinforcements came from Ariarathes V and from the Pontic king Mithridates IV who, sometime after 159, had succeeded his brother Pharnaces.¹³⁵ Roman intervention prevented the resumption of hostilities in the spring of 154, but Prusias' intransigence caused the Romans to terminate their friendship with him. Prusias, now influenced by Roman pressure and the threat from a large fleet, to which Rhodes, Cyzicus and others had contributed, finally yielded. No territory changed hands, but Prusias had to turn over twenty battleships, restore whatever he had taken, and pay indemnities to Attalus and a number of Greek cities. In many ways the war resembles the earlier one between Eumenes and Pharnaces (p. 328): the reaction of the Senate was slow and reserved, a major counter-attack against the aggressor was curtailed by Rome, and the aggressor only minimally punished. Rome had no intention of weakening the Attalids' rival.

There was a sequel to this war which had its origins in the quarrel in Cappadocia. Orophernes had deposited 400 talents in Priene (n. 133), but after he had been expelled, Ariarathes claimed the money as a possession of the kingdom. The Prienians refused. Orophernes, it seems, had lived in Priene when he was in exile from the court, and later rewarded the city,

¹³⁴ Prusias' complaints: Habicht 1957, *PIW*, 'Prusias', 1113-15. Sources for the war: *ibid.* 1115ff. Recent bibliography: Vitucci 1953, 75-82: (E 176); Habicht 1956, 101-10: (E 56); Polyb. xxxii. 15 belongs to book xxxiii, between chs. 1 and 7. Hopp 1977, 74-9: (E 60). The route of Prusias' retreat has been reconstructed by Robert 1937, 111-18: (E 162).

¹³⁵ Mithridates made a dedication on the Capitol in Rome (*CIL* 12.730); Mellor 1978, 325-7 no. 5: (B 54). For the date (not earlier than 160/59) see n. 125.

which in turn endured hardship out of loyalty to him.¹³⁶ Priene was attacked, its territory ravaged by the forces of both Ariarathes and Attalus, who bore a personal grudge against the city. Priene sought help from Rhodes, to no avail, and then from Rome. Enough is preserved of a decree of the Senate, inscribed on the temple of Athena in Priene, to show that Rome did intervene; the magistrate-in-charge was instructed to write to both kings and the Prienians were finally able to return the money to Orophernes, their benefactor.¹³⁷

The events of 157-154 in Cappadocia and Asia undoubtedly diminished the prestige of Demetrius; moreover, his personality showed more and more characteristics that made him unpopular. He did not, as Antiochus IV had done, reach out to his subjects or include them in royal spectacles; he preferred seclusion and was reputed to be a drunkard. How serious his interest in Epicurean philosophy was, is hard to say, but it certainly did nothing for his image among his subjects.¹³⁸ The people of Antioch hated the king for his harshness. Orophernes was able to stir them into a major uprising, in an attempt to win the throne of his cousin for himself. Demetrius suppressed the rebellion with measures which made him look even worse in the eyes of many and did not prevent the Antiochenes from rebelling again.¹³⁹ Worst of all, he made a serious political mistake. With Rome already hostile and Attalus and Ariarathes his enemies, he now antagonized Ptolemy Philometor. In 155/4 Demetrius bribed Archias, the Ptolemaic governor of Cyprus, to betray the island, for which the Seleucids had always had an appetite. Archias, however, was caught and tried; during the trial he hanged himself.¹⁴⁰

Ptolemy was infuriated. He joined Attalus and Ariarathes and the

¹³⁶ Orophernes had been sent to Ionia, probably to Priene (Diod. Sic. xxxi.19.7; Polyb. xxxii.11.10). He dedicated the cult statue of Athena Polias, in whose bases have been found the only existing coins of the king: Regling 1927, 8ff., 44ff.: (B 127); Kleiner, *PIW*, 'Priene', 1195. He also donated a statue of the Demos, if the letter to the city (Welles, *RC* 63) is in fact his. He almost certainly made these gifts while king, between 158 and 156. Priene participated in a festival held by Demetrius I, before or after Orophernes had found refuge with him (*IPriene* 108, lines 152-5).

¹³⁷ The main source is Polyb. xxxiii.6 (see also Diod. Sic. xxxi.32), with two fragmentary documents, the second being part of the Senate's decree (Sherk, *Documents* 6). From the order of excerpts from Polybius the episode belongs to one of the years 155/4-153/2: Walbank 1957-79, III.61-2: (B 38). The most likely date is 154, shortly before or after the peace between Attalus and Prusias, when Pergamene and Cappadocian forces were united in Asia.

¹³⁸ On the king's relations with Philonides from Laodicea in northern Syria see *PHerc.* 1044, with Gallo (n. 111), fr. 27, pp. 152-3. The fragmentary state of the papyrus presents many problems; nevertheless it seems that Philonides had been Demetrius' teacher before 175, that he participated in efforts to spare Laodicea punishment after the murder of Octavius, and that he was the head of a school in the capital that was visited by the king himself.

¹³⁹ Just. *Epit.* xxxv.1.3-4. Orophernes was imprisoned in Seleucia in northern Syria. Antioch's hostility endangered Demetrius again in the affair of Andricus.

¹⁴⁰ Antiochus III attempted to take Cyprus by surprise in 197. Antiochus IV took it in 168, but the Romans forced his immediate withdrawal. Demetrius' move: Polyb. xxxiii.5; for the chronology: Walbank 1957-79, III.41-2, 546: (B 38), who rightly rejects the dates 158/7 (Otto 1934, 112 n. 6: (E 156) and 151/50 (Volkman 1924, 53-4: (B 142)).

three kings, as Polybius says, 'converged on Demetrius'.¹⁴¹ Attalus had prepared the instrument years before, when he was reacting to the overthrow of Ariarathes. A young man by the name of Balas lived in Smyrna; he claimed to be the son of Antiochus IV, to whom he bore a striking resemblance. Attalus had him conducted to Pergamum, invested him, as he had done with Antiochus IV in 175, with the diadem and the royal purple, and called him by the dynastic name Alexander. He settled him close to the Seleucid border under the protection of the Cilician dynast Zenophanes, whom Attalus had supported in a quarrel with Demetrius, and he had the rumour spread through Syria that Alexander would soon come to claim his father's throne.¹⁴² In 153 the time seemed ripe for a move. Under the guidance of the Milesian Heraclides, who had once been in charge of Antiochus' finances (p. 356), Alexander Balas, with Antiochus' daughter Laodice at his side, appeared in Rome; in 152 he obtained a decree from the Senate that granted him permission to claim 'the throne of his ancestors' and even promised Roman support.¹⁴³

This was a signal that Rome wanted Demetrius overthrown. There was no need for material aid. Heraclides gathered an army in Ephesus with the help of Attalus. Before October 152 Alexander made a landing, perhaps with ships supplied by Ptolemy, in Ptolemais, where the garrison betrayed the city to him. The Maccabean party under Judas' brother Jonathan, courted by both king and pretender, finally chose the latter, who appointed the Hasmonean rebel high-priest. At first Demetrius was victorious, but eventually, though he fought courageously, he lost a battle, the kingdom, and his life in the summer of 150.¹⁴⁴

(b) *Kings and usurpers*¹⁴⁵

Perhaps it was inevitable that the new king, Alexander, should execute his predecessor's son Antigonus, his wife Laodice, and a number of his

¹⁴¹ Polyb. III.5.3: *συστροφέντων ἐπ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων*.

¹⁴² Diod. Sic. xxxi.32a. Zenophanes was perhaps the dynast of Olba, as suggested by Hopp 1977, 80 n. 119; (E 60). On the role of the Pergamene king see Ritter 1965, 137-8: (131). Most pagan sources call Balas an imposter (App. *Syr.* 67.354, 70.367; Trogus, *Prol.* xxv; Just. *Epit.* xxxv.1.6-7; Ath. v.211A; Livy, *Per.* LI). This is undoubtedly what Polybius, the friend of Demetrius, wrote. On the other hand, the Jewish tradition, obliged to Balas for privileges, presents him as a genuine son of Antiochus (I *Macc.* 10.1; Jos. *AJ* XIII.35). So is he regarded by Strabo XIII, p. 624, and, of course, by the decree of the Senate (n. 143).

¹⁴³ Polyb. xxxiii.18.12; Gruen 1976, 91-3: (E 20). Shortly before, the Senate had received Demetrius' son Demetrius coolly.

¹⁴⁴ Alexander seems to have become master of Tyre and Sidon in 152: Küthmann 1954, 8: (B 109). Jonathan: Tcherikover 1961, 232ff.: (E 115). The latest date for Demetrius is at present 1 June 151 (or a date sometime between 6 April 151 and 26 March 150). The earliest date for Alexander is 21 October 150: Parker and Dubberstein 1956, 23: (B 214). It remains a puzzle, for whom the bronze coin with 'King Antiochus' and the date 151/50 was minted, apparently in Antioch: Heichelheim 1944: (B 95); Bellinger 1945: (B 79).

¹⁴⁵ Jewish sources: I *Macc.* 10-15; Jos. *BJ* 1.48-50, *AJ* XIII.35-224. In addition, besides those quoted in the notes, App. *Syr.* 67-8, 355-358; Livy, *Per.* p. 145, 213 Rossbach; Just. *Epit.* xxxv.1-2, xxxvi.1; Charax, *FGH* 103 F 29.

friends, but Alexander was not by nature a cruel man. Twenty-three years of age when he became king, more affable than Demetrius had been, he was popular at first, the more so because he cultivated the memory of Antiochus IV, whose son he pretended to be. He wore the radiate crown in tribute to him; he assumed the title 'Son of God' (*Theopator*) and had his bronze coins struck with the epithets *Epiphanes*, *Nikephoros* and *Eupator*, all characteristic of Antiochus IV and Antiochus V.¹⁴⁶ He also restored certain privileges, once granted by Epiphanes, but cancelled by Demetrius, to some Syrian cities.¹⁴⁷ In reality, however, Alexander was a creature of foreign kings and the puppet of Ptolemy Philometor. Although his prestige may have been given a boost by his marriage to the Egyptian king's daughter Cleopatra, that memorable event, which took place in Ptolemais, was not so much a pledge of continued Egyptian support as a symptom of mounting Ptolemaic influence in Seleucid affairs.¹⁴⁸

It soon became apparent that Alexander, despite some familiarity with Stoic philosophy, cared little for duty. Much of the daily business he left to favourites, in particular to his minister Ammonius. While the king himself mostly resided in Ptolemais, two other men, Hierax and Diodotus, governed the capital. He had so little control over his realm that two cities in Syria, Aradus and Marathus, fought each other in a war caused by the corruption of Ammonius. Alexander made no attempt to restore royal authority over Judaea, where Jonathan had risen from rather despicable beginnings as a rebel to the dignity of high-priest. His elevation into the circle of the king's favourites – he was an honoured guest at the royal wedding – marks the level to which the kingdom of Seleucus I had fallen.¹⁴⁹

Worst of all, Alexander remained apathetic even after he had lost two important satrapies, Media and Susiane, in 148/7 (or soon thereafter). No wonder, then, that at the first challenge to his rule he found himself deserted by the very men who had once helped him win the throne: Attalus and Ariarathes did not lift a finger in his support, and Ptolemy, his father-in-law, even joined the side of the pretender. The challenge came from the quarter where it might have been expected, from the sons

¹⁴⁶ For *Theopator* see Maricq 1958, 378–82: (B 180); for the rest: Volkmann 1924, 61ff.: (B 142). Portraits of Alexander: Charbonneau and Laumonier 1955: (E 13); Mørkholm 1981: (B 118).

¹⁴⁷ El-Zein 1972, 164–5: (E 17), for the autonomous coins of Apamea. For coins of Antioch and Seleucia with the legend 'of the brother peoples' ('*Ἀδελφῶν Δῆμων*'), sometimes thought to illustrate the erosion of royal authority, see Rigsby 1980, 242–8: (E 39).

¹⁴⁸ The coins minted for the occasion have Cleopatra in the foreground, Alexander behind her: Kùthmann 1954, 9–10: (B 109). Ptolemaic influence is revealed by the royal mints in Syria changing from the traditional Attic standard of Seleucid coins to the Phoenician standard of the Ptolemies.

¹⁴⁹ Diod. Sic. xxxii.9c, xxxiii.3 and Livy, *Per.* I, call Alexander downright incompetent. His connection with philosophers, hardly more than superficial familiarity: Ath. v.211A–D. The war of the cities: Diod. Sic. xxxiii.5; Rey-Coquais 1974, 131: (E 159); Mørkholm 1975–6: (B 115). Jonathan: Meyer 1921, 253–6: (I 26).

of Demetrius I, Demetrius and Antiochus, who had been sent to Asia Minor by their father before he made his last stand. Demetrius the son, when he was hardly more than thirteen years old, undertook an expedition to avenge his father. Determined to do away with the man whom he regarded as an imposter, he landed in Phoenicia in 147 with an army of mercenaries collected mainly from Crete and the Greek islands. For some time his moves seem to reflect the dominant influence of a Cretan by the name of Lasthenes.¹⁵⁰

Although some of the sources imply that Alexander was almost immediately overthrown, the decisive battle did not take place until two years later, in the summer of 145. Not much is known about those two years, except that the Jews under Jonathan fought successfully against Apollonius, whom Demetrius had appointed satrap of Coele Syria.¹⁵¹ Eventually Ptolemy Philometor intervened and decided the struggle. He brought an army into Palestine on the pretence that he was coming to support his son-in-law. He accepted the welcome of numerous cities, but put his own garrisons into them and suddenly turned against Alexander, according to some authors because he had come to despise his conduct, according to others because Alexander refused to extradite his minister Ammonius, whom Ptolemy accused of being responsible for an attempt on his life.¹⁵²

The change of face occurred in Ptolemais in the presence of Alexander's queen. Ptolemy promised her to Demetrius with whom he concluded an alliance. Alexander was forced to leave the capital; he went to Cilicia to muster an army. Meanwhile Antioch was in an uproar; the mob killed the hated Ammonius, but they did not support Demetrius, for fear that he might seek revenge for their treatment of his father. They received Ptolemy with enthusiasm, and applauded the attempt of Alexander's former ministers Diodotus and Hierax to crown him with the diadem of the Seleucids. The king declined. He might have feared Rome's reaction and seems to have been satisfied with Demetrius' promise to cede Coele Syria and Palestine, which the Ptolemies had lost fifty-five years before.¹⁵³ Ptolemy managed to reconcile the city and

¹⁵⁰ Jos. *AJ* XIII.86, 126-7; cf. *I Macc.* 10.67, 11.31-2; Just. *Epit.* xxxv.2.2. Lasthenes may well be Lasthenes, son of Eunomos, from Cnossus who was honoured as *proxenos*, some time after 168, by an Epirate tribe in Butrinto: Cabanes 1974, 130 no. 10: (p 11). There are only two other individuals of that name attested in Crete, but from a different time: Masson, *BCH* 107 (1983) 396-7.

¹⁵¹ Schürer 1973, 181: (E 112); Bar-Kochva 1976: (E 2).

¹⁵² Diod. Sic. xxxii.9c; *I Macc.* 11.10; Jos. *AJ* XIII.106-107. According to *I Macc.*, Ptolemy really wanted to establish himself on the throne of the Seleucids, and the attempt, real or fictitious, was only a pretext for changing his alliance. Different is Josephus' story that the crown was forced upon him. Josephus, however, is as partial to him as *I Macc.* is to Alexander. Ptolemy's conduct in Antioch (below) seems to disprove the accusation that he wanted to be king of Asia.

¹⁵³ Diod. Sic. xxxiii.9c; Livy, *Per.* LI; *I Macc.* 11.12-13; Jos. *AJ* XIII.109-116. According to Josephus, the marriage between Demetrius and Cleopatra was concluded before Alexander died. Regarding Ptolemy's refusal, Josephus aptly remarks that he was afraid of Rome's reaction. A dedication by Demetrius in honour of Ptolemy has been found in Paphos, *SEG* XIII.585.

Demetrius; Demetrius was acknowledged as his father's heir to the throne.

Alexander arrived with an army, was defeated in a battle fought near Antioch, at the River Oenoparas, but escaped and fled for refuge to an Arab dynast, who, a few days later, had him murdered. His head was brought to Ptolemy, but Ptolemy himself had been severely wounded and soon died. Demetrius was the sole winner and he acted in cold blood. He could not stop Ptolemy's field army from retreating to Egypt, but he seized his elephants and had his garrisons in the coastal cities slaughtered. No more was heard about the ceding of Palestine. Demetrius also stopped Jonathan's attempts to storm the citadel of Jerusalem, still occupied by a Seleucid garrison and Jewish hellenizers. Jonathan paid homage to the king in Ptolemais and extorted some major concessions from him.¹⁵⁴

Demetrius II, now called 'The Victorious' (*Nikator*) like the founder of the dynasty, seemed safe on the throne of his ancestors, but a grave mistake soon jeopardized his position. With the exception of the mercenaries with whom he had come, he dismissed his forces, that is to say, the regular Seleucid army. They became restless and bitter and created serious difficulties. In Antioch the unemployed soldiers and the general population, harassed by Demetrius after their protector, King Ptolemy, had disappeared, rallied to attack the palace. The king had only Jonathan to call upon. Jonathan responded; three thousand Jewish soldiers came to the king's rescue and got the upper hand in a vicious battle fought in the streets of Antioch.¹⁵⁵ In Apamea, the main arsenal of the kingdom, a citizen named Diodotus – he called himself Tryphon, was perhaps of Macedonian origin and probably the same man who, together with Hierax, had administered the capital and proclaimed Philometor king – collected the jobless and unruly soldiers and took possession of the elephants and all the armour stored in the city. He then persuaded an Arab dynast, perhaps the emir of Emesa (Homs), to hand over Alexander's son Antiochus, a boy two years old, and proclaimed him King Antiochus VI in late summer of 145.¹⁵⁶

Demetrius, at first contemptuous of Tryphon, was soon forced to send

¹⁵⁴ The battlefield: Strabo xvi, p. 751; for the identification Honigmann, *PW*, 'Οἰονόπας', 2253. For main events: Polyb. xxxix.7; Diod. Sic. xxxii.9d and 10.1; App. *Syr.* 67.355; Trogus, *Prol.* xxxv; Just. *Epit.* xxxv.2.4; Livy, *Per.* lvi; I *Macc.* 11.14-19; Jos. *AJ* xiii.116-119; Porph. *FGH* 260 F 32.15. The latest date for Ptolemy, 15 July 145, even if posthumous, approximately dates the battle: Skeat 1955, 34; (B 221). Demetrius and Jonathan after the battle: Schürer 1973, 182; (E 112).

¹⁵⁵ Demetrius' cruelty in Antioch: Diod. Sic. xxxiii.4; Just. *Epit.* xxxvi.1.1; Livy, *Per.* lvi, ascribed by Diodorus to the influence of his chancellor, probably Lasthenes. The war in Antioch: I *Macc.* 11.42-51; Jos. *AJ* xiii.134-142.

¹⁵⁶ On Tryphon see Hoffmann, *PW*, 'Tryphon', 715-22; Schürer 1973, 183-97; (E 112). Since there are coins of Antiochus VI from year 167 of the Seleucid era which ended in October 145, all these events must have followed each other in rapid succession. It is significant that Antiochus took the epithet *Dionysus Epiphanes* and that he (Tryphon) had posthumous coins of Antiochus IV

an army against him. The usurper defeated it and grew in strength. He won Chalcis on the edge of the desert and in 145/4 forced Demetrius to abandon Antioch and to retreat to the adjacent coastal town of Seleuceia.¹⁵⁷ Tryphon then made generous offers in Antiochus' name to Jonathan, who was embittered because Demetrius had used his people to extricate himself in Antioch and then had revoked his earlier concessions. An alliance was concluded that guaranteed Jonathan his position as high-priest, confirmed all earlier privileges and appointed Jonathan's brother Simon to be Antiochus' satrap of the coastal region between Egypt and Tyre. The treaty created an opportunity for the Jews to attack the cities which remained loyal to Demetrius in that region, to seize them in the name of Antiochus and, should the new king fail, to annex them. Jonathan, in fact, captured Ascalon and Gaza. He also fought successfully in Galilee against the forces of Demetrius, while his brother Simon captured the fortress of Beth-sur in southern Judaea itself.¹⁵⁸

Meanwhile there was fighting in northern Syria. Despite some setbacks, Tryphon kept gaining ground, until he controlled, besides Antioch and most of its hinterland, the coastal cities of Aradus, Orthosia, Byblus, Berytus, Ptolemais and Dora; Demetrius held on to Seleuceia, Laodicea, Sidon and Tyre. Tryphon also occupied Coracesium, a stronghold in western Cilicia, and encouraged Cilician pirates to raid the territory controlled by Demetrius; the internal struggle for control of the Seleucid empire contributed much to the rapid spread of Cilician piracy.¹⁵⁹

Once he had gained the upper hand in the struggle, Tryphon became more concerned about his ally Jonathan than about his royal foe, and with good reason, for Jonathan had had success after success; he had captured (through Simon) Joppa and fortified Jerusalem. It must now have been obvious that he was striving for an independent Jewish state, especially if he had indeed sent ambassadors to Rome and received

Epiphanes minted, whose grandson he pretended to be: K  thmann 1954, 17: (B 109); M  rkholm 1963, 71: (B 112), and 1966, 185: (E 33) (who wants Alexander to be the one who minted these); El-Zein 1972, 153-4, 210 n. 29: (E 17).

¹⁵⁷ Diod. Sic. xxxiii.4a. Retreat of Demetrius to Seleuceia: Livy, *Per.* lII (Cilicia according to Jos. *Ant.* xiii.145). In 145/4 Antioch minted first for Demetrius (*IGCH* no. 1593), then for Antiochus VI: the change dates these events. Antiochus' pieces of 146/5 must therefore have been struck somewhere else, probably in Apamea: El-Zein 1972, 231 n. 45: (E 17). The letters *TPY* on his coins show Tryphon's prominence.

¹⁵⁸ Sch  rer 1973, 183-6: (E 112).

¹⁵⁹ A paradoxical victory of Demetrius' general Sarpedon over an army of Tryphon is recorded by Poseidonius, *FGrH* 87 F 29, a later victory of Demetrius over Antiochus, dated to 140/39, by Porph. *FGrH* 260 F 32.16. Ptolemais began to coin for Antiochus in 144/3. Not Berytus, said to have been destroyed by Tryphon (Strabo xvi, p. 756), but Byblus minted for him: Seyrig 1950, 9-12: (B 131). On the other hand, Tyre and Sidon minted continuously for Demetrius II. For Coracesium: Strabo xiv, p. 668.

encouragement from the Senate.¹⁶⁰ Before the winter of 143/2, Tryphon turned against him.¹⁶¹ After some manoeuvring, he took Jonathan prisoner in Ptolemais and moved on Judaea, but the Jews did not yield as he had expected; they elected Simon to his brother's place and defended themselves. Tryphon tried to take Jerusalem with a surprise assault and failed when a heavy snowfall prevented his cavalry from attacking; he returned to Ptolemais and had Jonathan killed.¹⁶² Soon thereafter, he had his ward murdered and himself proclaimed king, with the additional title of *Autokrator*. For the first time there was a king who did not even pretend to have a connection with the royal house, and in fact made it quite clear that he wanted to do away with all tradition.¹⁶³

It was a natural consequence of these events that Simon now approached Demetrius and concluded an alliance with him. The king granted him all his former privileges (over which he had no control anyway) and only a few months later, in June 142, Simon, who had taken the city of Gazara (Gezer), finally forced the garrison in the citadel of Jerusalem to surrender: 'The yoke of the Gentile was taken from

¹⁶⁰ As reported by I *Macc.* 12.1-4 and Jos. *AJ* XIII.163-165. Opinions are divided whether there was in fact such an embassy: so Fischer 1970, 96ff.: (E 18); Gauger 1977, 278-83; (B 9); or whether the report is only a doublet of Simon's embassy a little later: so Momigliano 1930, 148-9; (E 105); Giovannini and Müller 1971, 170 n. 53; (E 98), with whom the present writer agrees. The question remains open in Schürer 1973, 184; (E 112) and Gruen 1984, 748; (A 20).

¹⁶¹ The Jewish writers give as Tryphon's reason his desire to become king and his fear that Jonathan might not let him have his way. As to the chronology, winter 143/2 was the time of great distress for the Jews, after Jonathan had been killed (I *Macc.* 12.52-4; Jos. *AJ* XIII.194-196). The year must therefore be Jonathan's last and Simon's first. Simon's first year is equated with Sel. 170 in I *Macc.* 13.41-2, but the same events are equated with Sel. 169 in II *Macc.* 1.7. The use of *θλίψις* depicting the Jewish situation in both I *Macc.* 13.5 and II *Macc.* 1.7 proves that these are the same events. It follows that the date in I *Macc.* reckons from the era in spring 312, the date in II *Macc.* from that in spring 311. See Bickermann 1933, 239-41; (E 84); but also Bringmann 1983, 21ff. and his entire ch. 1; (E 92).

¹⁶² Schürer 1973, 186-8; (E 112), with bibliography, n. 42, on the identification of Jonathan with the 'Wicked Priest' of the Qumran texts.

¹⁶³ Tryphon's assumption of the title *Autokrator*, his dating, not by the Seleucid era but by his own regnal years, and the symbols he chose for his coins show his break with Seleucid tradition: Seyrig 1950, 12.34; (B 131). A marble head of Tryphon with the diadem is said to have been found in Syrian Chalcis, one of Tryphon's strongholds, and intentionally damaged after his fall: Fischer 1971; (B 166). The chronology of Tryphon's accession and Antiochus' murder is vexed; Hoffmann, *PW*, 'Tryphon', 720-1. Most of the ancient authors date these events to 139, but I *Macc.* 13.31 clearly indicates spring 141, and this is corroborated by the fact that Antiochus' last coins are dated 142/1, the earliest of Antiochus VII 139/8. Since this king seems to have disposed of Tryphon swiftly, Tryphon can hardly have lived until 136/5. His coins bear numbers of years 2, 3 and 4 and should be dated 141/40, 140/39 and 139/8. The attempt of Baldus (1970; (E 1)) to show that Tryphon proclaimed himself king in 142/1, but kept Antiochus as his (dependent) co-ruler until 139/8, is open to serious objections: Fischer 1972; (E 19). It follows that the assertion of the authors that Tryphon became king in 139/8 must be abandoned: Seyrig 1950, 12-17; (B 131); Schürer 1973, 131, 189 n. 2; (E 112). Tryphon may, however, not have killed Antiochus VI until 139/8, when he learnt that Demetrius was in Parthian captivity. The following equations have to be made: Sel. 171 (142/1) is Antiochus VI's last and Tryphon's first year; Sel. 174 (139/8) is Antiochus VII's first and Tryphon's last (fourth) year (and Simon's fifth year).

Israel.¹⁶⁴ From then on, the Jews counted the years of their own leader, 'year one of Simon', an obvious manifestation of their belief that they were independent and of their determination to remain independent. In September 141 an assembly of the Jews, held in Jerusalem, praised Simon in a long decree, intended mainly to confirm by their own free will the honours the king had bestowed upon him, the high-priesthood and the leadership of the nation. At the same time, an embassy that Simon had sent to Rome returned with a decree of the Senate that guaranteed, as far as Rome was concerned, the integrity of Jewish territory.¹⁶⁵ For the second time in history, there was an independent Jewish state.

The alliance between Demetrius and the Jews did not so much strengthen the king as weaken Tryphon. In 142/1 Demetrius, Tryphon and Simon, each controlling parts of Syria and Palestine, were almost deadlocked. Tryphon asked for Roman support to improve his position and was rebuked in a peculiar manner: the Senate accepted his gifts, but had them inscribed with the name of Antiochus VI, the king Tryphon had murdered.¹⁶⁶ Eventually Demetrius began a major effort to change things to his advantage. In the course of the year which began in autumn 141/40 he left Seleuceia and went to Mesopotamia, which had remained loyal. He intended to push back the Parthians, who had taken advantage of the struggle within the Seleucid realm to invade Seleucid territory. Demetrius hoped to enhance his prestige with a victory and create an army strong enough to crush Tryphon. He was defeated and taken prisoner, sometime in 140/39 (p. 371).

When his younger brother Antiochus, who was in Rhodes, learned of this, he decided to take over. He had difficulty entering the kingdom, however, since Tryphon controlled most of the coast. Several ports closed their harbours, but Cleopatra, his brother's wife, besieged by Tryphon in Seleuceia, not only received him but also accepted him as her husband (she had already heard that Demetrius had married a daughter of the Parthian king). The forces of Demetrius that still operated in that region must have joined Antiochus also, and in 139/8 he was proclaimed King Antiochus VII. He soon concluded an alliance with Simon. Tryphon was defeated in northern Syria and besieged in Dora in Phoeni-

¹⁶⁴ Schürer 1973, 191-2: (E 112), where the surrender of the citadel of Jerusalem is dated June 141; 142 has to be preferred (see n. 161).

¹⁶⁵ The document for Simon: *I Macc.* 14.27-45; Schürer 1973, 193-4: (E 112). Despatch of the embassy: *I Macc.* 14.24; its return: *ibid.* 14.40. The return also appears in *I Macc.* 15.15, under the year 139/8 (beginning in autumn 139), which has created great difficulties (Schürer, *op. cit.* 195-6 nn. 16-17). It has, however, been shown that *I Macc.* 15.15-24 is not only inserted in the wrong place, but is a forgery: Giovannini and Müller 1971: (E 98). The decree of the Senate is perhaps the one transmitted by Jos. *AJ* XIV.145-148, used as the basis on which to fabricate the forged document (see, however, n. 170). The embassy should have been in Rome in 142: Schürer, *op. cit.* 194-7, with bibliography, esp. Giovannini and Müller; in addition, Fischer 1974, 90-1: (E 94); Gauger 1977, 261-310: (B 9); Gruen 1984, 749: (A 20). ¹⁶⁶ Diod. Sic. xxxiii.28a.

cia. He escaped to Apamea, his home town. There, unable to defend himself any longer, he took his own life.¹⁶⁷

(c) *The catastrophe of hellenism*¹⁶⁸

Once Tryphon was dead, Antiochus VII gained swift recognition throughout the Seleucid empire. Antiochus Sidetes – the nickname comes from the city of Side in southern Asia Minor, where he had been brought up – was a young man, twenty years of age, able and gallant. On his coins from 135/4 onwards he is 'King Antiochus', with the addition of 'Benefactor' (*Euergetes*) and, during his last year, 'The Great' (*Megas*).

After Antiochus had established himself firmly on the throne, he had to deal at once with two major problems: his Jewish subjects, who were developing an independent state within his realm, and the Parthians, who had taken advantage of the internal struggles in Syria to occupy large parts of the kingdom. The Parthians, who also held his older brother Demetrius in captivity, posed the more important and the more difficult problem, but logic demanded that the Jewish question be resolved first. The king had already shown his intentions. When he was besieging Tryphon in Dora, the Jewish leader Simon sent 2,000 picked troops to assist him. The king, with victory well in hand, refused their service and thereby signalled that he regarded the treaty with Simon as void. He demanded the recognition of his sovereignty and the restitution of several towns recently seized by the Jews; when he learned that Simon was prepared to make only minimal concessions, he resorted to force. For a while Simon's sons, who now led the army, seem to have held their ground against the king's general Cendebaeus. The king had to take matters into his own hands; in 135 he invaded Judaea.

By then Simon was dead. A few months earlier he and two of his sons had fallen victim to a plot conceived by his son-in-law Ptolemy, who

¹⁶⁷ I *Macc.* curiously does not record his end. Most of Tryphon's coins were melted down by Antiochus VII, but in Orthosia 33 pieces, all in mint condition, have been found. Thirteen are dated, all to Tryphon's last year. Orthosia was the place he stopped last before meeting his destiny: Seyrig 1950, 1-23; (B 131). By coincidence, Frontin. *Strat.* II. 13. 2 says that Tryphon had coins scattered to slow down the pursuing horsemen.

¹⁶⁸ The literary sources survive only in scattered pieces. The fragments of Poseidonius in *FGH* 87. See also Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 1, 15-19, 21; I *Macc.* 15. 10-16. 24; Jos. *AJ* xiii. 224-259 (partly following Nicolaus of Damascus, *FGH* 90) and *BJ* 1. 51-63; Trogus, *Prol.* (and Just. *Epit.* xxxvi, xxxviii, xxxix, xlii); App. *Syr.* 68. 358-360; Livy, *Per.* lviii-lxix; Jul. Obseq. *ada.* 130; Oros. v. 10. 8; Euseb. *Chron.* 1, pp. 255-6 Schoene. Valuable precision can be derived from the coinage of Antiochus VII, Phraates II, Camniscires and other rulers: LeRider 1965, 361-86; (E 149); Strauss 1971: (B 139); and from Babylonian cuneiform tablets: Olmstead 1937: (B 213) and Parker and Dubberstein 1956: (B 214). A dedication from Ptolemais/Akko which was thought to refer to Antiochus VII is for his son Antiochus IX: Fischer 1970, 102-9; (E 18). Modern accounts: Meyer 1921, 265-73; (I 26); DeSanctis 1907-64, IV. 195-206; (A 14); Schürer 1973, 198-207; (E 112); Will 1982, 410-16; (A 40). For Antiochus' eastern campaign: Fischer *op. cit.*

wanted to seize power for himself (c. March 135), with or without the king's knowledge. John, however, another son, happened to be in Jerusalem at the time of the murder; he secured his father's position for himself and drove Ptolemy out of the country.¹⁶⁹ Almost immediately he had to face the attack of the royal army and soon found himself besieged in Jerusalem. The siege went on for a year. Hostilities were interrupted once by a truce to allow the Jews to celebrate the Feast of Tabernacles, to which the king himself contributed gifts, but, soon after, famine forced John to ask for terms. Antiochus' counsellors advised him to exterminate the Jewish nation or at least enforce radical changes in their way of life, but the king granted peace with moderate conditions and dismantled the fortifications of the city (c. October 134).¹⁷⁰ About the same time he sent rich gifts to P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, who had visited the east in 139 and now had assumed command in Spain.¹⁷¹

Seleucid authority over the Jewish nation had been restored, but not for long. A few years later, when Antiochus' efforts to resolve the Parthian question had ended in disaster, royal authority vanished from Judaea. An ancient writer observed that Antiochus VII was the last of the Seleucids to rule over the Jews.¹⁷²

Nothing is known about Antiochus' activities from the time of his success in Judaea until he began his eastern campaign in 131.¹⁷³ He was probably engaged in preparations for the expedition which, as he must have anticipated, would be a serious task, for the situation in the east had deteriorated since Alexander's rule.

The Seleucid princes, because of their internal feuds, had neglected the dangerous growth of Parthian power far too long. They had remained lethargic in the face of severe losses.¹⁷⁴ In the early 160s, it seems, the Parthian king Mithridates I struck coins with his own portrait, which implied that he no longer acknowledged Seleucid suzerainty. Antiochus IV made plans to invade, but died before he could carry them out (p. 352). Scholars once believed that Parthian aggression began shortly

¹⁶⁹ Schürer 1973, 197–202: (E 112). I *Macc.* ends its narrative with John's accession, thereby avoiding mentioning his surrender in 134.

¹⁷⁰ Poseidonius, *FGrH* 87F109 (Diod. Sic. xxxiv.1); Jos. *AJ* xiii.236–247; *BJ* 1.61; Just. *Epit.* xxxvi.1.10; Plut. *Mor.* 184EF. Coins of Antiochus VII were minted in Jerusalem. The decree of the Roman Senate in favour of the Jews, preserved in Jos. *AJ* xiv.145–148, may date from December 134, i.e. from the time immediately after the city's surrender; *MRR* 1.491 n. 2, admitted as a possibility by Giovannini and Müller 1971, 165: (E 98), who, however, argue for 142; see also n. 165, furthermore Rajak 1981: (E 110).

¹⁷¹ Livy, *Per.* lvii, discussed by Astin 1967, 127 and 138–9: (H 67).

¹⁷² Just. *Epit.* xxxvi.1.10.

¹⁷³ Speculations on 'many wars against neighbours' (Just. *Epit.* xxxviii.10.11) in Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 370: (E 8).

¹⁷⁴ The fundamental study on the eastern satrapies of the Seleucids, based largely on the study of the coinage, is Le Rider 1965, 361–80: (E 149). References that can easily be found there are given only in special cases.

after the death of Antiochus IV and that they conquered Media as early as c. 160. It has since become clear that Demetrius I continued to strike coins in Ecbatana, the capital of Media, and that his successor Alexander also had coins minted there. In addition, a dedication from Bisutun in Media, dated to the summer of 148, proves that a Seleucid governor-general was in charge of the 'upper satrapies'. Mithridates occupied Media only in c. 147.¹⁷⁵ Camniscires, the ruler of Elymais, seized Susa and the satrapy of Susiane about the same time.¹⁷⁶ Alexander Balas apparently did not react to the simultaneous loss of two major provinces. The Parthian king now followed the example of the rulers of Bactria and of the usurper Timarchus (p. 356) and styled himself 'The Great King'.

The next blow fell in 141. Mithridates invaded and occupied southern Mesopotamia. Cuneiform tablets attest to his rule in Babylon and in Seleuceia on the Tigris in July 141 and, before October of the same year, in Uruk.¹⁷⁷ Demetrius II, then involved in his struggle with Tryphon, nonetheless responded to the call of his eastern subjects. In the spring of 140 he marched on Parthia. Persis, Elymais and Bactria gave him substantial support and he was successful at first, but in Media one of Mithridates' generals defeated him and took him prisoner (139).¹⁷⁸ The Parthian king now assumed the title 'King of Kings' and had his prisoner displayed in the regions Demetrius had reconquered or come to reconquer. He then assigned him a residence in Hyrcania and married off one of his daughters to him. Mithridates was also victorious in a battle fought, probably in 140, against the Elamites at Kut-el-Amara, where the Schatt-al-hai joins the Tigris; he took Susa and Susiane away from them, but he did not hold them long: coins show that Susa and the satrapy Susiane were under the control of an independent ruler, Tigraios, perhaps the successor of Camniscires, for several years, c. 138-132.

Mithridates, the architect of Parthian greatness, died in 138 and his son and successor Phraates II had to face the challenge of Antiochus' expedition in 131.¹⁷⁹ Antiochus' army, including a strong contingent of Jewish soldiers commanded by the high-priest John in person, was larger than any Seleucid army had been for at least forty years. The Seleucid king was victorious in three successive battles, one of them fought against the Parthian satrap Indates on the River Lycus (Zabu êlû) between Gaugamela and Arbela. He reconquered Babylonia; when he entered Babylon, he assumed the title 'The Great King'.¹⁸⁰ He soon

¹⁷⁵ The lower chronology has now generally been adopted. The dedication from Bisutun: Robert 1963, 76: (B 65). ¹⁷⁶ LeRider 1965, 349-54: (E 149); Strauss 1971, 109-40: (B 139).

¹⁷⁷ Olmstead 1937, 12-13: (B 213); LeRider 1965, 363-4: (E 149).

¹⁷⁸ Diod. Sic. xxxiii.8, xxxiv.15; App. Syr. 69.363-364; Porph. *FGrH* 260F 32.16; Just. *Epit.* xxxvi.1.2ff.; I *Macc.* 14.1-3; Jos. *AJ* xiii.184-186.

¹⁷⁹ The sources are transcribed in full in Fischer 1970, 29-35: (E 18).

¹⁸⁰ Just. *Epit.* xxxviii.10.6. *IDélos* 1547-8.

recovered Seleuceia on the Tigris, Susa and Susiane, and he invaded Media, where the final scene was played. Phraates was concerned enough to open negotiations, but he refused Antiochus' demand for his subordination and released Demetrius, who twice had escaped and twice been caught; he hoped that concern for his crown might move Antiochus to retreat.

When the winter of 130/29 came, the large Seleucid army and the enormous number of camp-followers had to be distributed in groups throughout the country. The native population, who suffered from the mere presence of so many foreigners and who also were harassed by them, turned hostile towards the army they had welcomed a few months before. A large number of them, obeying Phraates' orders, attacked all the camps on a given day. When Antiochus left his own encampment to go to the rescue of one of the posts, he encountered the Parthian army, which far outnumbered his own force. His staff suggested retreat to the hills, where he would be safe from the enemy's cavalry. The king, however, refused. He fought bravely, but several of his high-ranking officers and part of his army deserted and he lost the battle and his life (spring 129). Phraates is said to have remarked, 'Your drunken audacity has tripped you up, Antiochus, for you expected to gulp down the kingdom of Arsaces in big wine-cups.'¹⁸¹ He ordered the king's remains to be sent back to Syria. He also tried, in vain, to recapture Demetrius, who escaped to Syria.

The victory, however, was decisive. Parthia kept Media and recovered Babylonia and Susiane. For a year or so, a local dynast, who had been a satrap of the Seleucids, Hyspaosines of Charax, seized power in Babylon and Seleuceia, but this was a mere episode (128/7).¹⁸² Parthian control over both places was re-established by 126/5. Phraates intended to invade Syria after this victory, but he was forced to deal with unexpected trouble. He had hired 'Scythians', probably Tocharians, for the war against Antiochus; they arrived after the battle, but still demanded to be paid. When the king refused, they invaded Hyrcania. Phraates fought them and was defeated and killed in a battle in which the remnants of Antiochus' army, pressed into Parthian service, deserted to the enemy, thereby avenging their king (c. 128).

The defeat and death of Antiochus VII has rightly been called 'the catastrophe of hellenism in continental Asia and at the same time of the Seleucid empire'.¹⁸³ The casualties were enormous; there was not a single household in the capital of Antioch, it was said, that did not mourn the death of one of its members. Never again did a Seleucid king dare to take

¹⁸¹ Ath. x.439DE, tr. A. S. Bradford. ¹⁸² LeRider 1965, 368: (E 149).

¹⁸³ Meyer 1921, 272: (I 26), and 1925, 67: (E 152).

the field against the Parthians. The eastern satrapies beyond the Euphrates were lost forever. The kingdom, once by far the largest of all Hellenistic monarchies, was now reduced to Cilicia and northern Syria. The Jewish high-priest John Hyrcanus¹⁸⁴ extricated himself unharmed from the disaster in Media and swiftly regained his independence from the Seleucid princes who followed Antiochus VII. These princes were not much more than *condottieri*, fighting against their cousins, against the growing and increasingly aggressive power of the Jews, against the Nabataean and Ituraean Arabs, the Greek cities in Syria and Phoenicia, and the local dynasts. The final agony of the Seleucids had begun.

IV. ASIA MINOR, 158-129 B.C.

(a) *The last Attalids and the origin of Roman Asia*

When Eumenes II died in 158, his son Attalus was too young to rule.¹⁸⁵ The kingdom passed to Eumenes' brother Attalus, whom Eumenes had already made his co-ruler, undoubtedly with the understanding that his son was to succeed him. Attalus had always been loyal, even when his loyalty incurred the Senate's disapproval (p. 332). An expression of this loyalty was Attalus' formal epithet *Philadelphos* ('the one who loves his brother(s)'). Attalus made it clear from the beginning that his brother's son was to be his heir. He also married his brother's widow Stratonice.

With the accession of Attalus II relations with Rome improved, since the Senate harboured no grudge against him as it had against Eumenes. The change, however, was only superficial; there was no change in the Roman policy that had penalized the kingdom by setting Galatia free (p. 333), and Roman suspicion about Pergamene activities was kept alive by the repeated charges of enemies, especially Prusias II and the Galatians. Eumenes and Attalus were accused of secret activities in Galatia (p. 334); the accusations were not without foundation. Soon after his accession Attalus considered using force to regain some control of Galatia, and all his advisers but one shared his view. A unique document, a secret letter written by Attalus c. 158 to the priest of Pessinus in Galatia (published much later), gives a valuable insight into the matter.

¹⁸⁴ For the surname and its origin: Schürer 1973, 201 n. 2: (E 112).

¹⁸⁵ A birth-date in the sixties seems to follow from Polyb. xxxiii.18.2. For the vexed question who were the parents of Attalus III: Hansen 1971, 471-4: (E 57); Hopp 1977, 16-26: (E 60); Walbank 1957-79, III.417-18: (B 38); Allen 1983, 189-94: (E 52). On balance, the view seems preferable that he was the son of Eumenes and Stratonice, not to be easily reconciled with Polyb. xxx.9.6 (an oddly phrased addition to the text after 138 B.C.). The alternative seems to be that he was Eumenes' son by a concubine. There are decisive arguments against the view once widely held, that he was born in 171 as the son of Attalus (II) and Stratonice, and there is little to recommend the opinion of Vatn and Hopp that he was borne by Stratonice to an anonymous natural father; against: Polyb. xviii.41, not discussed by Hopp or Walbank.

When we came to Pergamum and I assembled not only Athenaeus and Sosander and Menogenes but many others also of my 'relatives', and when I laid before them what we discussed in Apamea and told them our decision, there was a very long discussion, and at first all inclined to the same opinion with us, but Chlorus vehemently held forth the Roman power and counselled us in no way to do anything without them. In this at first few concurred, but afterwards, as day after day we kept considering, it appealed more and more, and to launch an undertaking without their participation began to seem fraught with great danger; if we were successful the attempt promised to bring us envy and detraction and baneful suspicion – that which they felt also toward my brother – while if we failed we should meet certain destruction. For they would not, it seemed to us, regard our disaster with sympathy but would rather be delighted to see it, because we had undertaken such projects without them. . . . I decided, therefore, to send to Rome on every occasion men to make constant report of cases where we are in doubt. . . .¹⁸⁶

Nothing shows more clearly than this document how the Senate's message after the Third Macedonian War to its former allies came to be understood at the court of the Attalids: they were to have no independent policy. Action in pursuit of policy was restricted to cases where it served Roman interests (as in the support given to Ariarathes in 157, p. 359, or to the Syrian pretender Alexander, p. 362), or where no Roman interest was at stake. Self-defence, of course, was still tolerated, as in 156, when Prusias attacked Attalus (p. 359), but the Senate intervened, when, in the aftermath of that war, Attalus and Ariarathes took punitive action against the city of Priene (p. 361). The Senate's concern in Asia Minor then was to preserve the *status quo*. Little room was left for Attalid policy.

It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that the Senate did not react sooner and more strongly than it actually did to Attalus' one display of adventurous spirit: in 149 Attalus was instrumental in having his old foe Prusias of Bithynia overthrown. Prusias had sent his son Nicomedes to Rome to petition the Senate for an exemption from the payment of the rest of the indemnity which he owed to Attalus under the treaty of 154. He is also said to have instructed Menas, should the mission fail, to have the prince assassinated, since he wanted to leave the throne to another son. When the matter was discussed in the Senate, Attalus' ambassador Andronicus easily won the day by demonstrating that the indemnity did not cover the amount of damage done. Menas revealed his instructions to the prince, the two contacted Andronicus, and the Pergamene promised Attalus' support if Nicomedes would rise against his father. In a town in north-western Greece on their way home Nicomedes was proclaimed king in the presence of Andronicus, some Pergamene and some

¹⁸⁶ Welles, *RC* 61. The traditional interpretation of this document, attacked by Sherwin-White 1984, 39–40: (A 34), seems to be correct. See also Gruen 1984, 391 n. 87: (A 20).

Bithynian troops. Attalus received him in his capital and demanded from Prusias the cession of part of his kingdom to Nicomedes. When this was rejected, he invaded Bithynia. Prusias informed the Senate, convinced that Rome would not tolerate such a flagrant breach of the peace. In fact, Roman intervention was so slow and so hesitant that the Senate's partiality became obvious, much to the anger of Cato. Prusias was abandoned by his subjects, his troops, and the Romans; he was killed by his son's soldiers in Nicomedia in the temple of Zeus where he had sought refuge (149). Attalus had helped Nicomedes II to the Bithynian throne.¹⁸⁷

There was a sequel to this war. Prusias' last resort had been five hundred Thracian soldiers, sent at his request by his kinsman Diegylis, the king of the Thracian Caeni who dwelt in the hinterland of Byzantium. Diegylis is described as utterly vicious and cruel; he harassed the Greek cities, particularly those in the Thracian Chersonese, the Gallipoli peninsula, which had become Attalid territory after the war against Antiochus. He seized and burned down Lysimacheia. Attalus declared war and defeated and killed Diegylis in or shortly before 145. The city of Elaeus (Gallipoli) praised him as 'Saviour and Benefactor'. After some time, however, the Thracian raids began again, and when the Attalid dynasty ended and there was no Attalid governor in charge of the Chersonese and the Thracian lands, Thracian pressure on the Greek cities seems to have increased.¹⁸⁸

During this time Attalus twice showed his loyalty to Rome by supporting Roman armies: in 148 in Macedonia against Andriscus with his fleet, in 146 against the Achaeans with a detachment of soldiers under the command of his general Philopoemen, who also had charge of the king's seal as is shown by a dedication erected in his honour in the Heraeum of Samos by Attalus himself. Several works of art from the rich booty of Corinth found their way to Pergamum and some were still there to be seen by Pausanias in the later second century A.D.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Habicht, *PW*, 'Prusias', 1120-4. Walbank 1937-79, III.673: (B 38), suggests that Prusias' order to assassinate the prince may have been invented to justify the conspiracy of Menas and Nicomedes. For Cato's role: Astin 1978, 125: (H 68). The Numidian king Massinissa also seems to have given support to Nicomedes (*IDelos* 1577). Attalus II, in a dedication in Pergamum after the victory, unabashedly and falsely stated that Prusias had violated the treaty of 154, concluded under the auspices of Rome (*OGIS* 327). See also *OGIS* 299, with Jones 1974, 188: (E 61).

¹⁸⁸ For Diegylis see Diod. Sic. xxxiii.14-15, xxxiv.12 (his son Zibelmus); Strabo XIII, p. 624; App. *Mithr.* 6; Trogus, *Prol.* xxxvi. Attalus in Gallipoli: *CRAI* 1917, 25-8; *CQ* 11 (1917) 1-2. See also the dedications from Panium, *OGIS* 303-4. For the date of the expedition see *OGIS* 330, with Robert 1928, 439-41: (B 62), and 1935, 76-8: (E 161); Jones 1974, 189: (E 61). For the renewal of Thracian incursions, *OGIS* 339, 12-16 and 55. In general: Hopp 1977, 96-8: (E 60).

¹⁸⁹ War against Andriscus: Strabo XIII, p. 624; Zon. ix.28; Hopp 1977, 93-6: (E 60). Achaean War: Paus. viii.16.1, 8; Pliny, *HN* vii.126. For Philopoemen: Paus. *loc. cit.*; *MDAI(A)* 44 (1919) 30 no. 16; Plut. *Mor.* 792A. He must have been the successor of Demetrius (n. 18).

In the capital Attalus completed the smaller frieze of the Great Altar (n. 17) and built and dedicated the temple of Hera 'the Queen' (*Basilis*) in the vicinity of the upper gymnasium. In conformity with the tradition of the royal house he made rich donations to various Greek cities and sanctuaries outside the kingdom, the most lavish of which was the erection of a magnificent stoa in the agora of Athens.¹⁹⁰ Within his realm Attalus founded or refounded a number of cities, among which were Philadelphia in Lydia and Attaleia in Pamphylia that still bears his name today.¹⁹¹

When the Roman ambassadors to the east, led by Scipio Aemilianus, visited Pergamum in 139 they found a well-organized and stable kingdom.¹⁹² The king, by now over eighty years of age, had done much to strengthen it. He was on good terms with his Cappadocian neighbour and had contributed to the decline of Seleucid power. Bithynia, formerly a country hostile to the Pergamenes, was now ruled by a king indebted to Attalus. The old monarch had not only repelled Thracian aggression against his European territories, but also succeeded in expanding his kingdom there. In 139 it could hardly have been foreseen that a few years later the monarchy of the Attalids would disappear.

Attalus died in 138 and was succeeded by his nephew Attalus III *Philometor* ('who loves his mother').¹⁹³ A letter from Attalus to Ephesus, the home of one of young Attalus' teachers, shows how seriously the king had taken the responsibility of preparing the crown prince to govern. Other inscriptions show that Philometor had been given some royal functions to perform several years before his uncle died.¹⁹⁴ It was

¹⁹⁰ For the temple of Hera: *MDAI(A)* 37 (1912) 283 no. 6. For the Stoa of Attalus and its dedicatory inscription: Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 103–8: (B 203). Attalus and Ariarathes V as princes were thought to have dedicated in Athens a statue of the philosopher Carneades, as their teacher (*IG* II².3781). The dedicants, however, could be Athenian citizens named after the kings: so Mattingly 1971, 29–32: (D 43). For donations in Miletus see Herrmann 1965, 96–7: (E 142); Müller 1976, 53 n. 99: (E 155); Hopp 1977, 6–13: (E 60). A gift to Iulius on Ceus: *IG* XII.5.625. A royal delegation paid respect to the sanctuary of the Cabiri in Samothrace (*IG* XII.8.170, 79).

¹⁹¹ Hansen 1971, 177ff.: (E 57); Hopp 1977, 102–4: (E 60). Attaleia: Strabo XIII, p. 667.

¹⁹² Astin 1959: (E 123); Knibbe 1960: (E 146).

¹⁹³ Strabo XIII, p. 624, gives Attalus twenty-one years. Cistophoric coins show that year 21 was his last and Attalus III's first year: Kleiner 1972, 18–23: (B 103). This must then be 139/8, since Eumenes' last year (year 40) can only have been 159/8 and this was also Attalus' first year. Consequently, the fourth year of Attalus III that appears in two of his letters (Welles, *RC* 66.19, 67.17) was 136/5 and not, as is usually assumed, 135/4.

¹⁹⁴ Letter of Attalus: *JÖAI* 47 (1964–5) 2 no. 1, with emendations listed in Rigsby 1979, 45 n. 26: (E 160). Participation in the government: Welles, *RC* 65 line 14, 66 line 9; Swoboda, Keil and Knoll 1935, 33–4 no. 75: (B 202). For the sequence and chronology of the three letters published there see also Magie 1950, 774: (E 150), and Hopp 1977, 70–4: (E 60). There is a dedication of 146/5 from the gymnasium in Pergamum by the new epebes, in honour of Prince Attalus (*MDAI(A)* 29 (1904) 170 no. 14); it tells nothing about the age of Attalus (*pace* Hopp, p. 25). Apollonius, son of Demetrius (col. II.48), may be the son of the former minister of Eumenes' seal (n. 18), and Dionysius, son of Asclepiades (col. I.47), will be the eponymous magistrate of Pergamum in 105, as attested in the document Jos. *AJ* XIV.149; he therefore held office at the age of c. 58 years.

not the latter's fault that the nephew did not live up to people's expectations. Attalus III, Diodorus says, was 'unlike his predecessors'.¹⁹⁵ He is charged with cruelty, disregard for his responsibilities, and a preference for the study of various sciences. Except for the last, it is extremely difficult to assess the validity of these charges. The king is accused of having many of his predecessor's counsellors and their families slaughtered in the royal palace by the most brutal barbarians in his service. No names or other details are given, except that the king is said to have suspected some of his victims of having been implicated in the death of his mother (who was still alive in October 136) and his bride Berenice, others of plotting. The few surviving documents issued by Attalus III give no indication that he did in fact neglect his duties, but neither do they prove that he did not.¹⁹⁶ In the autumn of 133 the Roman Senate formally decreed that all of Attalus' acts, down to the day before he died, should remain valid (p. 378). This shows the Roman opinion, at least, that whatever the king's qualities, the administrative routine was carried out more or less normally.

The sources also say that Attalus III was hated by his subjects and that they longed for his overthrow. The charge, however, may have been invented in order to make the Roman takeover look desirable. Decrees praising Attalus survive and honours were bestowed upon him. On the other hand, official documents of this kind do not prove that he was, in fact, popular.¹⁹⁷ Attalus was an active investigator of a variety of sciences and some art techniques: pharmacology, botany, zoology, medicine, agriculture and metalwork. He planted, cultivated and tested drugs, and apparently wrote works on a variety of such topics. The ancient scholars Varro, Columella, the elder Pliny and especially Galen speak of his achievements seriously and with respect.¹⁹⁸ Such interests and activities, however, were not regarded as befitting a king and this eccentricity may well have been the origin of the accusation that Attalus neglected his duties.

Because of the extreme deficiency (and obvious hostility) of our sources, Attalus III will always remain an enigmatic figure, but the sources do bear out the fact that he was 'unlike his predecessors'. Apart from internal affairs, his reign seems to have been uneventful. Chance alone preserves the information that the king once fought a successful

¹⁹⁵ Diod. Sic. xxxiv.3. For his rule see Magie 1950, 30-2: (E 150); Hansen 1971, 142-7: (E 57); Hopp 1977, 107-20: (E 60). References have been kept to a minimum. That it was Attalus who had the grammarian Daphitas executed for stinging verses about the royal house is far from certain, although Fontenrose 1960: (E 55) has convinced several scholars including Hopp 1977, 119 n. 66: (E 60). See Braund 1982, 354-7: (E 125). ¹⁹⁶ Welles, RC 66-7, perhaps also 68-9.

¹⁹⁷ *OGIS* 332; *MDAI(A)* 32 (1907) 311 no. 33; *ibid.* 33 (1908) 375 no. 1. See also n. 194. Nicander of Colophon (or rather Nicander II) dedicated a hymn, the beginning of which survives, to the king: Gow and Schofield 1953, 7-8: (I 14). ¹⁹⁸ References in Hansen 1971, 144-5: (E 57).

campaign and was granted extravagant honours by the people of Pergamum on his return. Whom he fought, where and when he fought is not known.¹⁹⁹ Even less illuminating is the information that in 134/3 he sent (as did Antiochus VII of Syria) splendid gifts to Scipio Aemilianus who was campaigning in Spain – he must have met him more than once and certainly did so in the capital in 139.²⁰⁰

The one truly memorable event of Attalus' reign is his bequest to Rome: before he died in the spring of 133, without family or heir, he willed whatever was his to the Roman people.²⁰¹ The king's testament took the Romans by surprise. The first to react was the tribune Tiberius Gracchus; he introduced a bill with a provision that the bequest be used to help finance his agrarian programme. He also declared that the Senate had no right whatsoever to deal with something bequeathed to the Roman people.²⁰² Only after Gracchus' death was the Senate free to act. As already mentioned, a decree was passed that all measures taken by the deceased king down to the day before he died should remain valid and not be changed by the Roman representatives who were to be sent to Asia. Acceptance of the bequest is clearly implied,²⁰³ and, in fact, before the end of the year, a committee of five Roman *legati*, headed by the *pontifex maximus* Scipio Nasica (who, as the murderer of Gracchus, had become highly unpopular), went out to settle affairs. The committee ran into difficulties. Not only did Scipio die soon after his arrival in Pergamum, but a pretender to the throne challenged Rome.²⁰⁴

Soon after Attalus' death, Aristonicus, who claimed to be and may have been an illegitimate son of King Eumenes II, had himself proclaimed King Eumenes III, as coins with the abbreviated title and name show.²⁰⁵ At first he had considerable success, partly owing to the fact that the Romans were involved in internal feuding, the last stages of the

¹⁹⁹ *OGIS* 332; see *IvP* III, p. 3, and Hopp 1977, 111–12: (E 60). ²⁰⁰ Cic. *Deiot.* 19.

²⁰¹ Main sources in Greenidge and Clay 1960, 11–12: (B 212).

²⁰² Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 14; Badian 1972, 712–14: (H 32). The statement seems to have referred specifically to the cities in Attalus' kingdom. The bill may never have been passed.

²⁰³ *OGIS* 435 (Sherk, *Documents* 11) with the comments of Drew-Bear 1972: (E 134), superseding all previous work. As Drew-Bear has shown, *OGIS* 436 lines 1–5 (Sherk no. 13) is from another copy of the same decree. Gruen 1984, 603–4: (A 20), dates these documents to 129 B.C.

²⁰⁴ The bilingual funerary inscription of Scipio has been found in Pergamum: *MDAI(A)* 35 (1910) 483 no. 77; Tuchelt *MDAI (I)* 29 (1979) 309–16.

²⁰⁵ Demonstrated by Robinson 1954: (B 129) from cistophoric tetradrachms, dated to years 2, 3 and 4, and minted in Thyatira, Apollonis and Stratoniceia-on-Caicus. Another from Synnada with the legend *BA AP* has been interpreted *Βασιλέως Ἀριστονίκου*, 'King Aristonicus', most recently by Hopp 1977, 121ff.: (E 60), who theorizes from this that Aristonicus' usurpation occurred during Attalus' lifetime, that the usurper took the title 'King Aristonicus' and changed it, after Attalus' death, to 'King Eumenes'. If correct, this would shed new light on Attalus' motives for the bequest, but such a change is extremely unlikely, and the absence of a date year I would then be very hard to explain. The theory collapses, in any event, since this coin is considerably earlier: Kleiner and Noc 1976, 81: (B 105); perhaps referring to King Ariarathes IV: Mørkholm 1979, 52–4: (B 116). See further Adams 1980: (B 76) with Gruen 1984, 595 n. 101: (A 20).

Spanish War, and a slave revolt in Sicily and so were slow to decide upon the bequest and slow to react to the usurpation. Most of the major cities seem to have opposed Aristonicus; some, if not most, had been declared free in Attalus' will. For Pergamum this was the confirmation of an already existing state of affairs, but for others, like Ephesus, a new grant.²⁰⁶ Pergamum immediately reacted to Aristonicus' move with a decree designed to strengthen the citizen body; this was passed before it was known whether Rome would accept the bequest.²⁰⁷ Among the Greek cities only Phocaea is known to have joined Aristonicus spontaneously. Others like Samos, Colophon and Myndus (in Ionia and Caria) had to be taken by force.

Aristonicus has sometimes been regarded as the leading spirit of a social movement. He is said to have mobilized the slaves and the rural poor against the free and the wealthy in the cities. The evidence does not bear this out. Aristonicus, it is true, after he had suffered some setbacks, appealed to poor people and to slaves. It is also true that he called his followers 'citizens of Sun-city' (*Heliopolitai*) and that the Stoic philosopher Blossius of Cumae joined him after the death of Tiberius Gracchus, to whom he had been close. These facts, however, prove only that Aristonicus was eventually forced to look for support where he could find it. Nothing suggests that he began as a social reformer or that he was transformed into one. His goal most likely was political: to establish himself as the successor of the kings. An appeal to the lower strata of society in emergencies was common in antiquity. Most of the usurper's support during the war will have come from those who had political and national reasons rather than the desire to change the conditions under which they lived.

The war must have begun in 133.²⁰⁸ Aristonicus was opposed by much of the urban population as well as other inhabitants of the former kingdom, by the kings of Asia Minor allied with Rome, Nicomedes II of Bithynia, Mithridates V of Pontus, Ariarathes V of Cappadocia, and

²⁰⁶ That Attalus in his will reaffirmed the freedom of Pergamum is attested in the Pergamene decree cited n. 207, line 5. Riggsby 1979: (E 160) has shown that the 'era of the province of Asia' from 134/3 is, in fact, a municipal era of Ephesus – so, independently, Adams 1980 311-14: (B 76) – probably motivated by a grant of freedom to the city in Attalus' will.

²⁰⁷ *OGIS* 338; Hopp 1977, 131-5: (E 60).

²⁰⁸ The principal modern works are Vavřinek 1957: (E 69); Dumont 1966: (E 135); Carrata-Thomes 1968: (E 130); Hansen 1971, 150-9: (E 57); Rubinsohn 1973: (B 30); Vavřinek 1975: (E 70); Hopp 1977, 131-47: (E 60); Delplace 1978: (E 133); Adams 1980: (B 76); Collins 1981: (E 131); Braund 1983, 21-3, 49ff.: (E 126); Gruen 1984, 592ff.: (A 20); Sherwin-White 1984, 84-8: (A 34). Inscriptions referring to the war (besides those cited in other notes): *IGRom* IV.131 (Cyzicus); *JÖAI* 11 (1908) 69 no. 6, perhaps also *LIW* 504 (Halicarnassus); Holleaux 1919: (E 24) from Bargylia with Jones 1974, 191-2: (E 61), and Herrmann 1974, 257-8: (E 143); Herrmann 1962, 5 no. 2: (E 141) (Maeonia); *Epigraphica Anatolica* 3 (1984) 157 (Gordos). General allusions to the war are to be found in Robert 1937, 459-67: (E 162), from Bargylia; *OGIS* 339.16-24 from Sestos; *IG XII Suppl.* 116 from Methymna; *IVP* 14 from Pergamum.

Pylaemenes of Paphlagonia, and by Byzantium and other cities abroad. A Roman army under the consul and *pontifex maximus* Publius Licinius Crassus finally arrived in 131, but Crassus was soon defeated and killed in a battle near Pergamum; Ariarathes was another casualty. Crassus' successor, the consul Marcus Perperna, defeated Aristonicus in 130 and took him prisoner in Stratoniceia-on-Caicus, but Perperna died while the victory celebrations, to be held in Pergamum, were being prepared.²⁰⁹ So the consul of 129, Manius Aquillius, assumed command, had the last strongholds of Aristonicus' followers stormed, and brought the war to an end. With the assistance of ten senatorial envoys he transformed the kingdom of the Attalids into the Roman province of Asia.²¹⁰

(b) *Rhodes after 164 B.C.*²¹¹

Once the Senate had capped the humiliation of the Rhodians in 164 by granting them the treaty they had long been petitioning for, Rome could indulge in a more generous attitude. The Senate agreed to allow Rhodes to acquire the Carian city of Calynda, whose inhabitants preferred Rhodian rule to the domination of Caunus. The Rhodians, to show their gratitude, voted to erect a colossal figure of the people of Rome. In Caria, at least, Rhodes remained attractive to a number of smaller towns, especially to those that had uneasy relations with larger cities; Ceramus for one, it seems, at her own initiative, was granted a treaty by Rhodes c. 163.²¹²

Since the Rhodian economy had been hard hit by the Roman punitive measures, Rhodes was quite prepared to accept royal donations – and what they implied – from such men as Eumenes II in 161/60 and

²⁰⁹ The identity of this Stratoniceia (as opposed to Carian Stratoniceia) has been argued by Broughton 1934: (E 129), and established when the coins minted there were recognized as coins of Aristonicus (n. 205). For the victory of Perperna and the festival to be held in Pergamum see *IPriene* 108.223–32, 109.91–5; for the victories of both Perperna and Aquillius see *OGIS* 695.89 with n. 17. Perperna granted a privilege to the sanctuary of the Persian Artemis, Anaitis, in Hieracome in Lydia: Tac. *Ann.* iv.62.2; Robert 1948, 37–8: (B 61).

²¹⁰ Strabo xiv, p. 646; Sherck, *Documents* 25.15. Gruen 1984, 605–8: (A 20), argues that transformation into a Roman province came considerably later. For several years Aquillius was occupied with the building of roads and several milestones survive: *CIL* 12.646–51; Magie 1950, 157–8, 1048–9: (E 150); he returned to celebrate a triumph in 126. Pergamum established a cult of Aquillius, which still existed two generations later: Jones 1974, 197–8: (E 61).

²¹¹ The principal sources are Polyb. xxxi.4–5, xxxi.31; Diod. Sic. xxxi.36; for the Cretan war: Polyb. xxxiii.4 (Diod. Sic. xxxi.37), xxxiii.13.2, 15.3–17; Diod. Sic. xxxi.38, 43–45; Trogus, *Prol.* xxxv; *ILindos* p. 1009, and perhaps also *SIG* 673. The date is disputed: Robert, in Holleaux 1938–68, iv.i.173 n. 2: (D 35). For the Rhodian squadron in the Third Punic War see App. *Lib.* 112.534. A Rhodian delegation in the sanctuary of the Cabiri in Samothrace, c. 130: *IG* xii.8.171, 65. In general: Schmitt 1957, 171–80: (E 77); Sherwin-White 1984, 30–6: (A 34); for the cult of Roma: Mellor 1975, 27–36: (1 25).

²¹² Michel, *Recueil* 458, with Robert 1935, 60–1: (E 161). For later Rhodian activities in Caria, c. 130, see Holleaux 1919, 16–19: (E 24); Robert 1937, 463: (E 162).

Demetrius I at about the same time.²¹³ It seems significant that the donors were kings whose relations with Rome were rather delicate. Part of what Eumenes promised was left for Attalus II to pay after Eumenes died in 158. Perhaps these gifts influenced the Rhodians to lend Attalus naval support in his war against Prusias (n. 134) and, in that same year, to decline a request from Priene to intervene when Attalus and Ariarathes were ravaging Prienian territory (n. 137). In any event, they had their hands full with a war of their own against Cretan cities (155-153) and it was not going well at all. The cause of the war may be connected with Rhodian attempts to suppress Cretan piracy. Allusions in Polybius and Diodorus make it clear that the Rhodians suffered unexpected defeats and that the Cretans were on the attack in several places, such as Carpathos, where they were finally repelled, and Siphnos, which they seized through treachery and brutally sacked before they were forced to retreat and were destroyed. Both sides appealed to the Achaean League in 154/3 for military assistance, but the Achaeans kept out of the struggle. At last, prompted by a Rhodian embassy, Roman envoys seem to have laid the war to rest.

A Rhodian squadron participated in the last Roman war against Carthage in 147, but the destruction of Carthage may not have been welcomed in Rhodes; it certainly meant the disappearance of a competitor, but probably also the loss of a partner in international trade.²¹⁴ The destruction of Carthage was witnessed not only by Polybius, but apparently by the most famous Rhodian of his time, the Stoic philosopher Panaetius, who was a friend of Scipio Aemilianus and who appeared again in his entourage during the latter's famous mission to the east in 140/39.²¹⁵ After Rhodes had been reduced to a second-rate power, men such as Panaetius and his pupil Poseidonius made the island a famous cultural centre that rivalled Athens and surpassed Pergamum. Its philosophical school, throughout the later second and the entire first century, attracted eminent Romans. Their respect for Rhodians such as Panaetius may well lie behind the phrase in a decree of the Senate, passed in 135, upholding an earlier decision made by Rhodian arbitrators in a quarrel between Priene and Samos: 'It is no easy matter for us to change what the people of Rhodes, on whose arbitration both sides had agreed, have ruled.'²¹⁶

²¹³ For Eumenes: Diod. Sic. xxxi. 36; for Demetrius, n. 123. Polybius scorns the Rhodians for the acceptance of Eumenes' gift, probably because his fellow-Achaeans had shown greater pride rejecting an earlier offer by the king: n. 20. See Walbank 1957-79, III.515: (B 38).

²¹⁴ Schmitt 1957, 278: (E 77).

²¹⁵ See Blinkenberg in *ILindos*, pp. 501-2; for the Roman embassy of 140/39: Astin 1959: (E 123); Knibbe 1960: (E 146).

²¹⁶ Sherk, *Documents* 10, B 10-11.

V. EPILOGUE: ROMAN POLICY IN THE EAST, 189-129 B.C.

It can be argued and has in fact been argued that Roman policy in the east during the third century was defensive, reacting only to developments that seemed to endanger Rome's security. Roman policy in the second century, on the contrary, was aggressive, often treacherous, unpredictable, cruel and immoral. These verdicts are mainly based on the account of the contemporary historian Polybius. He was Greek, to be sure, but he cannot be accused of anti-Roman bias. Being himself a victim of an arbitrary Roman action, he had, in his misfortune, the good luck of being well treated by the members of a powerful Roman family. During the many years he spent in Rome he came to admire the efficiency of the Roman state and some of the ideals of the nobility. Above all, he was fascinated by the unfailing instinct for power displayed, individually and collectively, by Roman senators. And he was overwhelmed by the dimensions of Rome's growing empire. Rome's arm already reached out to the whole of Italy and Sicily, to Africa, Spain, Greece, Asia Minor, the Near East and Egypt. For Polybius this was the universe. He never ceased to be a Greek and a patriotic Achaean, but he eventually persuaded himself that the conquest of the world by the Romans was not only a great and memorable achievement, but that it was also beneficial for those conquered.

Nevertheless it is this admirer of Rome who reports many of the actions which made Roman policy in the east unique and awful. It has been observed, rightly I think, that his standards were different from ours, that he was more inclined than modern historians to tolerate acts of questionable morality, if a worthwhile political gain resulted.²¹⁷ It is, however, fairly obvious that Polybius must have gone through some pain before he arrived, on balance, at a favourable verdict of Rome's rise to world power. A good many passages in his work suggest at least that he felt some uneasiness, that he had reservations about Roman actions. However, the deficiencies of the Greek states and the Greek society from which he came and the respect and honour paid to him personally by some of the most eminent Romans undoubtedly made him more inclined to stress the glorious rather than the dark features of Roman expansion.²¹⁸

Be that as it may, it is not so much Polybius' judgement that is relevant here as that of those who read him in order to form an opinion on Rome's rise to world power. They cannot fail to notice that, from the end of the third century onwards, Roman policy was aggressive. In 200, for instance, the Romans had reasons for going to war with Philip (mainly the

²¹⁷ Walbank 1972, 171-3; (B 39).²¹⁸ Walbank 1972, 166-73, 178, 181; (B 39).

indecisive peace of 205), but hardly a sufficient cause. They had no obligation whatsoever towards Athens, Aetolia or Rhodes, and a very slight one, at best, towards Attalus. Some of Philip's actions, however, caused concern. But the Romans made no serious attempt to settle the disputed questions through negotiations. Instead, they presented Philip with flat demands that made war unavoidable.

No sooner was Philip defeated than the Senate proclaimed that all the Greeks of Asia should be free. This was a statement unwarranted by the events, unacceptable to Antiochus and therefore hazardous to the peace. It was, moreover, altogether needless, unless it was meant to provide some basis for future Roman intervention. It is therefore significant that this doctrine was promptly abandoned as no longer useful after Antiochus' defeat: it had served its purpose. True enough, Antiochus himself had played into the Romans' hands when he tied himself to the Aetolians and made the fatal mistake of invading Greece. Nonetheless, the conflict originated from unwarranted and provocative declarations on the part of Rome. Twenty years later, when the Romans declared war on King Perseus, they had no cause at all. Perseus was willing to avoid war by almost all means, but was not given a chance. The fate of the Carthaginians in 149 was similar. It cannot be denied that Roman policy had become aggressive by the end of the Hannibalic War and that after the victories over Philip and Antiochus the veil dropped from Rome's aggressive character.

Macedon and Carthage had been enemies, Antiochus neither enemy nor friend. It was for the allies and friends to experience the treacherous character of Roman policy. The assurances given to Prusias of Bithynia in order to keep him away from Antiochus' camp were withdrawn as soon as Antiochus was defeated, and part of Prusias' realm was given to his foe Eumenes (p. 325). Rome's oldest and firmest allies in the east, Pergamum and Rhodes, fared even worse, once Macedon was extinguished (pp. 332, 337). It was utterly dishonest of the Senate to play the prince Demetrius against his father, King Philip, or Attalus against his brother, King Eumenes (p. 332), or the Galatians against the latter (p. 333). The same class of nobles that had assured Demetrius I that he would find Rome amenable if he satisfied Roman expectations soon thereafter gave its support to an obscure pretender, although Demetrius had done no harm to Rome (pp. 357-8).

Roman policy was also unpredictable, since wherever the Senate concluded that a situation could be exploited to Rome's advantage, it did so without much regard for legal claims. In 189 the Senate gave away large parts of Asia Minor as a gift. Twelve years later the Rhodians were formally told that the gift had not been a gift, and eventually it was taken away from both Rhodes and Eumenes (pp. 336-7, 333). Likewise, there

was nothing in the treaty with Antiochus III preventing the Seleucid king from making war against Egypt. But in 168 Rome threatened Antiochus IV (who had not been the aggressor) with war, if he did not withdraw from Egypt and Cyprus (p. 344). This was tantamount to adding a clause unilaterally to the treaty. Nor did Rome hesitate to violate that treaty to a degree that made it obsolete. When it was concluded the parties had established peace and friendship between themselves. Loyalty was to be expected and was in fact observed by the Seleucids. Rome, on the contrary, contacted and encouraged rebellious subjects of Antiochus Epiphanes and even accepted them as allies (pp. 354, 358-9). Roman policy, it may be said, was determined by political considerations; to these, questions of law and morality were subordinated. Philip V was the first to complain openly about this, when he realized that the peace he had concluded with Rome went contrary to his expectations; it was not only the end of hostilities, but also the beginning of Roman interference in his affairs.²¹⁹ Philip recognized what soon became more and more apparent: that Rome did not intend to negotiate but to give orders.

If indeed the Senate considered itself to be the final arbiter of world affairs, then the notorious arrogance of Roman representatives in the east is easily explained. Aemilius Lepidus displayed such arrogance in his encounter with Philip as early as 200, Cornelius Lentulus in his dealings with Antiochus III in 196, the consul Acilius in 189 *vis-à-vis* the Aetolian ambassadors. Similar was the conduct of Popillius Laenas towards Antiochus in 168 (p. 344), of Sulpicius Galus towards Eumenes in 164 (p. 334) and of Octavius in Syria (p. 354). Even cases of outright criminality were taken lightly by the Senate: nothing suggests that T. Flamininus was censured for having acquiesced in the murder of the *boeotarch* Brachylles, and the treacherous conduct of Marcius Philippus' dealings with Perseus, although criticized by some senators, was approved by the majority of the House.²²⁰

There is no need to elaborate on Roman cruelty, since the phenomenon is well known. The treatment of Epirus in 167 may be cited as just one example, inflicted on the unlucky country by a man who was considered by many to be a model of Roman virtue, L. Aemilius Paullus. The ways in which the second-century Senate handled international affairs and conducted its foreign policy show that it was fully aware of Rome's superior power. This superiority was recognized early and far beyond the frontiers of Rome. About 180 B.C. the Achaean Callicrates formulated his political doctrine that the Achaeans, while being allies of

²¹⁹ Polyb. xxiii.2.7; Livy xxxix.26, 28.

²²⁰ Flamininus: Polyb. xviii.43. 'Pilate's role', Walbank 1957-79, iii.180: (B 38). Philippus: Briscoe 1964: (D 8).

Rome, could do nothing better than to regard Roman requests as orders to be obeyed, superior even to the laws and the treaties of the Achaeans themselves.²²¹ It is therefore no surprise to find the same Callicrates later stating that the Achaeans without Roman authorization should not make war with anybody nor give military support to anybody.²²² By that time King Attalus of Pergamum too had been forced to admit that he had better avoid any move that could be viewed by the Romans as a sign of an independent policy (p. 374). If there had still been doubts about the superior power of Rome or the Senate's determination to exploit it even in areas that seemed of no immediate concern to Rome, they were dispelled by the fate of Macedon, the retreat of Antiochus from Egypt and the punishment inflicted upon Eumenes and Rhodes. This is clear from the facts and is also explicitly stated by Polybius, who says that thereafter 'it was universally accepted as a necessary fact that all must submit to the Romans and obey their orders'.²²³ This feeling was so general that when the free city of Athens in the later part of the century granted the guild of artists some privileges, it was found desirable to add 'provided that nothing in this is found contrary to the Romans'.²²⁴

When Polybius announces that he decided to continue his narrative beyond the year 168 which capped the rise of Rome to supremacy and when he adds that this would also enable his readers to see how those subject to Roman domination reacted to it, he thought this period an important one for forming a judgement about Roman domination by both contemporaries and posterity.²²⁵ Rather surprisingly, he nowhere discusses the problem thoroughly. Only a partial answer is given in a long chapter (xxxvi.9), where he quotes anonymous Greek voices either condemning or defending Roman policy and Roman domination. There are parallels for such a method in ancient historiography, which allows the historian to discuss controversial issues without openly committing himself.²²⁶ There has been much discussion as to whether Polybius himself sides with the attacking or the defending opinions.²²⁷ His opinion may lie between, but what matters more is that to those who judge Roman policy from a distance in time the attackers seem to have by far the stronger case.

It is perhaps the most significant feature of Roman policy that the Senate was not prepared to regard a settlement with another major power – even if it was made after a decisive victory and therefore advantageous to Rome – to be final. As Philip learned in 200 and again in 185 and Perseus somewhat later, peace with Rome as far as the Senate was

²²¹ Polyb. xxiv.8-13; Errington 1969, 200ff.: (D 23). ²²² Polyb. xxxiii.16.7-8.

²²³ Polyb. iii.4.3, tr. W. R. Paton. ²²⁴ *FD* iii.2.68, 60. ²²⁵ Polyb. iii.4.6-7.

²²⁶ Compare the anonymous Athenians judging Alcibiades on his return to Athens in 408 (Xen. *Hell.* i.4.13-17) or the famous discussion about Augustus in Tac. *Ann.* 1.9-10.

²²⁷ Discussion and bibliography in Walbank 1957-79, iii.663ff.: (B 38).

concerned was only an intermediate stage. So was the peace with Antiochus of 189, as his son, Antiochus IV, came to realize in 168, and so was the peace of 201 with Carthage. For republican states of lesser strength, there were other means to secure their obedience: the treaty between Rome and the Aetolians obliged the Aetolians to respect the *maiestas* of the Roman people; the treaty granted to Rhodes in 164 may have carried a similar clause. The Achaeans, however, who had been allied with Rome from the early years of the century, paid for their first firm opposition to an arbitrary Roman act with the destruction of Corinth and the dismemberment of their League.

No doubt, second-century Rome was driven to extend its power, whether deliberately, as Polybius asserts,²²⁸ or by instinct. The result was that all major Hellenistic states, whether monarchies or republics, were either eliminated, reduced to the role of satellites of Rome, or henceforth entirely negligible. Whereas Hellenistic culture survived and proved strong enough to conquer even Rome, political domination shifted to other powers, to the Romans, the Parthians, the Jews. It now was for them to decide whether to protect Hellenistic culture, as the Parthians tried to do from the beginning and the Romans learned to do, or whether to attack it, as seemed natural for the Jews (although the Hasmonean dynasty adopted a good many Hellenistic features). There can be no doubt that Roman policy in the second century played into the hands of native, non-Greek people in Egypt and in the Near East. Roman policy thereby contributed at least to the rise of the Hasmoneans and to the expansion of the Parthians. By adding to the difficulties of the Seleucids, Roman policy made it easier for the Parthians to reach the Euphrates; in an indirect way the Romans put self-imposed limits on the possible growth of their empire. When they supported the Jews against their Seleucid masters, the Romans created major problems for their own descendants. There was, however, a long time to come before the Romans, in the days of Pompey, themselves took over Syria and Palestine, and still more time before they annexed Egypt. On the other hand, Macedon, Greece and a large part of Asia Minor were their direct responsibility by 129. It may safely be doubted that Roman domination improved conditions of life for those who inhabited Macedon and Greece. For Roman Asia, on the other hand, it is beyond doubt that life became much harder when the Romans took over from the kings. The hardships brought about by the methods of exploitation used by the *publicani* are well known. They led to violent reaction in 88, when, on the instigation of King Mithridates Eupator, the Romans and Italians throughout the province were slaughtered. After that, Asia had to suffer

for two more generations: from the punishment inflicted by Sulla, from the last Mithridatic War, the civil wars between Pompey and Caesar, between the murderers and the heirs of Caesar and finally between Antony and Octavian. A time of respite came only after Octavian's final victory. A century had gone by since the establishment of the Roman province. In its turn Asia had experienced more oppression and violence, more poverty and injustice than under its previous masters, the Persians, Alexander, the Seleucids or the Attalids. Roman rule in the east during the Republic enriched many Romans; for those subject to it, it was anything but beneficial.²²⁹

²²⁹ This chapter was delivered in 1984.

CHAPTER 12

ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

ELIZABETH RAWSON

I. THE ROMAN TRADITION

It is difficult to look directly at the Rome of the late third century and isolate her characteristics and traditions; too little contemporary evidence survives. Perhaps we may do best to attempt to see her first through the eyes of two contrasted writers, Polybius and Fabius Pictor. Polybius wrote in the middle of the second century, but tried to describe the Romans in his first book as they were at the time of the First Punic War, while his extended account in book VI of their institutions is meant to be a picture of these as they were at their best, near the start of the struggle against Hannibal.

That 'best' should give us pause, and of course Polybius' sources were primarily aristocratic Romans looking back to an idealized past. But Polybius is not entirely uncritical. His Romans are also more unlike his own familiar Greeks than is sometimes supposed.¹ Above all, they are soldiers: immensely courageous, partly because subject to a strict and indeed terrifying discipline,² though also spurred on by praise and rewards; persistent to the point of obstinacy – they think that force can control even the weather, and thus, impressive as their rapid and determined building of a fleet against the Carthaginians was, they have frequently met disaster at sea.³ Their haughtiness, especially in defeat, is imposing, but sometimes impractical. At a later point Polybius notes their thoroughness when sacking a town – they even dismember the dogs. In book VI he shows a great admiration not only for the structure and weapons of the legion, so different from those of the Greek phalanx, but for the whole way in which a campaign is organized, following it from the first enlistment of the men to the measuring of the camp. King Pyrrhus of Epirus is supposed to have wondered if a people so well organized in military affairs could be called barbarian; Polybius certainly does not call the Romans so – it is their Gallic enemies whom he regards as typical barbarians, brave but often disorganized and so not really

¹ As by Momigliano 1975, 22: (1 27).

² Polyb. 1.17.11.

³ Polyb. 1.20.11–13, 37.7–10, XXVII.8.8.

formidable. But some of his Greek characters do call the Romans barbarians, and indeed at the start of the second century the playwright Plautus was still ready to apply the word to them and their language, if primarily just to mean non-Greek⁴ (he also identifies them as porridge-eaters, *pultiphagi*⁵); while Cato was to complain that the Greeks called the Romans *Opici*, assimilating them to rough Italic tribes of southern Italy against which the Greek colonial cities had long struggled.⁶

The other fact that Polybius stresses is the sheer size of the Roman military and naval effort. The manpower resources of Rome and her Italian allies were, in the eyes of a Greek from the Peloponnese, enormous; her navies in particular larger than anything a Greek power could produce.⁷ In general, he regarded the Romans even of the third century as wealthy, though simple in their way of life. He notoriously admired Roman piety and the role given to religion in public life,⁸ for he held that this contributed to the obedience of the lower, and the traditional integrity of the upper, class (he believed that none of the latter took bribes until shortly before the period in which he was writing). He is thinking of the fear of divine punishment in this and a future life, a fear which in fact Greek and Etruscan influence were probably largely responsible for imposing on the Romans. There were still primitive aspects to Roman religion; in times of crisis, says Polybius, when he reaches the disasters of the first years of the Hannibalic War, the Romans think nothing unworthy of them in their effort to placate the gods.⁹ This is perhaps a veiled reference to the sacrifice involving the burial of a Gallic and a Greek couple (though it was the Sibylline books that advised this, a collection of oracles in Greek supposedly originating at archaic Cumae but acquired at an early date by the Roman state). Polybius describes openly the more harmless, if uncivilized, custom of the women, who sweep out the shrines with their hair in such emergencies.

He also admires the Roman political system; but here it is true that he does, with some violence, assimilate it to the Greek pattern of the 'mixed' constitution, or rather, in his case, a 'balanced' constitution.¹⁰ In rough outline, however, there were similarities between Greek and Roman institutions, if Rome is regarded simply as a city-state; and Polybius, at least in the surviving parts of his work, gives us little idea of the way in which Rome had already gone beyond this conception, especially through bestowing the status of *civitas sine suffragio* and *Latinitas*, and how by colonization and alliance she had come to dominate Italy. (As early as 215, however, her ability to colonize widely, caused as he

⁴ Plaut. *Asin.* 11, *Most.* 828, etc. ⁵ Plaut. *Mostell.* 828, *Poen.* 54.

⁶ Pliny, *HN* xxix.14. ⁷ Polyb. i.26.8-9, ii.24. ⁸ Polyb. vi.56.

⁹ Polyb. iii.112.9. ¹⁰ Polyb. vi.11.11.

thought by the generous granting of full citizenship to freedmen, had struck Philip V of Macedon.¹¹)

If it is always complained that Polybius, in book VI, draws his horizontal divisions – consuls, senate, popular assembly – without counterpointing them with the vital vertical divisions resulting from the *clientelae* of the great nobles, he does note, for his own time, how an aristocrat is expected to spend his days in the Forum, collecting supporters by defending clients in the courts; and also the narrowly legalistic outlook that led most Romans religiously to fulfil their pecuniary obligations, but never to go an inch beyond them.¹² And the materialistic attitude which regarded the acquisition of wealth, so long as it was done in acceptable ways, as one of the most important things in life, comes over clearly; as it does in a genuine late third-century document, the eulogy of L. Metellus, given at his funeral in 221, and also praising his military achievements, prominence in the Senate, and many children.¹³ Opportunities for the acquisition of wealth (except by gaining booty) must, however, have been limited at this time, when Rome's economy was largely agricultural; it is Cato, not Polybius, who looks back to this tradition, saying that our ancestors, if they wished to praise a man, praised him as a good farmer and cultivator.¹⁴ The *lex Claudia* of 218 limited the extent to which a Roman senator or his son might engage in trade (and thus incidentally barred one route to foreign contacts, while it was probably also forbidden, by this or another law, to senators to own land abroad); but foreign trade at least was still restricted in volume. Opportunities for conspicuous consumption were also limited: Cicero thinks C. Duilius, who had won a victory in the First Punic War, and who liked in his old age to be accompanied of an evening by a torchbearer and a flute-player, on the Greek model, was absolutely unexampled.¹⁵

Polybius perhaps also underestimates the strength of aristocratic family feeling, in spite of his well-known description of a great man's funeral, with masked figures representing all his prominent ancestors;¹⁶ which he regarded as admirably calculated to inspire youthful members of the family to seek the fame that rewards valour. He notes too that young Scipio Aemilianus was under intense pressure to live up to the traditions of his house, and we can well believe that this was so when we read the surviving epitaphs of third- and second-century members of the family – though one, dating from as early as the late third century, pauses to note that its subject's beauty, *forma*, was equal to his *virtus*, a sign probably of Greek influence, perhaps primarily Homeric.¹⁷

¹¹ SIG 543. ¹² Polyb. xxxi.23.11, cf. 26.9–28.9. ¹³ Pliny, *HN* vii.139.40.

¹⁴ Cato, *Agr. praef.*

¹⁵ Cic. *Sen.* 44 (another version has it that they were privileges officially granted).

¹⁶ Polyb. vi.53–4. ¹⁷ *ILLRP* 309.

Polybius has nothing to say about the arts or intellectual activities at Rome in the third century, perhaps because they did not seem to him worth talking of, though he criticizes Greek states that lack education and the arts. Cicero tells us, however, that the only complaint he had of Roman institutions was that no public provision was made for education; it is a pity that this passage is lost.¹⁸

What Polybius does is to show us what aspects of Rome's tradition a Greek could believe to be the cause of her great achievements, even believe to be better than their Greek equivalents. The Romans, partly because of their inbuilt reverence for ancestral tradition, partly perhaps in response to Greek admiration, were slow to modify these aspects. In spite of the famous tag from Horace, the conqueror was never taken wholly captive; the vitality of the Roman tradition was greater than that of almost any other area that came under the influence of Greek civilization, in part of course because the Romans were in fact the conquering and not the conquered or colonized partner.

It was possible to stress the connections, not the differences, between Greeks and Romans. The senator Fabius Pictor, who wrote a history of Rome in the Greek language, perhaps shortly after rather than during the Hannibalic War, attempted to prove not only that her policy in her recent wars had been eminently just, but that she was to all intents a Greek city. He was trying, no doubt, to redress the balance against the pro-Carthaginian historians from Sicily and Magna Graecia, in an unprecedented attempt to influence Greek opinion.¹⁹ He accepted, of course, the story of Aeneas' coming to Latium, which had been current for a long time, and which fitted Rome nicely into Greek legendary history, though it did not make her Greek. But we now know that he had Hercules' visit to Italy,²⁰ and perhaps to the site of Rome, and he almost certainly had the tale of the Arcadian Evander's settlement on the Palatine. (He also had accounts of legendary connections between Sicily and Latium, which fell out of the tradition when Sicily lost all political importance.) For the actual foundation of Rome by Romulus and Remus he seems to have followed a Greek writer, Diocles of Peparethus (though Diocles may have been building on a genuinely Roman version),²¹ and it is hard to doubt that he knew Timaeus' great history dealing extensively with the western Mediterranean, though Roman historians seem to have made a point of differing from Timaeus wherever possible.

Fabius also had an account of an old festival, the *Ludi Romani*, probably designed to show how Greek Rome was.²² His naiveté is shown

¹⁸ Cic. *Rep.* IV.3. ¹⁹ Gelzer 1962-4, III.51: (A 19); Momigliano 1966, 55: (B 18).

²⁰ Alföldi 1974, 389: (H 275). ²¹ Peter, *HRRel.* frs. 5a-b.

²² *Ibid.* fr. 16. The thesis was perhaps not first introduced into the passage by Dionysius, who is our direct source.

by his belief that the games, and their cost, had not changed since their foundation in the early fifth century B.C., but in spite of his desire to prove a thesis, his description is perhaps reasonably accurate for his own time. He apparently began with an account of the Greek customs involved in the preliminaries to the games which the Augustan Dionysius of Halicarnassus, our immediate source, has passed over. Dionysius does describe the procession, the sacrifice and the games themselves, quoting from Homer (as possibly Fabius had not done) to prove that early Greek customs lay behind the Roman ones. The chariot-races, the musical instruments, the dancers in armour or dressed as satyrs all recall Greece; the images of the gods are carried in 'showing the same likenesses as those made by the Greeks, with the same dress and symbols as they have in Greece'. Victorious athletes are rewarded 'in the most Greek of ways', with wreaths. The passage provides a number of puzzles, but it is probably true that some of the customs mentioned were archaic, and ultimately of Greek origin, perhaps (though not necessarily) filtered through Etruria; while others were doubtless comparatively recent imports, either from Magna Graecia or Sicily, from both of which Rome received much influence, from the late fourth century; or even from Greece itself, with which Rome was in direct if occasional touch.

Fabius will hardly have seemed to his readers to prove more than the 'faint traces of a common origin' which Plutarch says that the Greeks admitted at the time of Flaminius' first passage to Greece in 198 B.C. (as indeed they must have done when they allowed the Romans to compete in the Isthmian Games in 228).²³ By that time the pace of hellenization had quickened dramatically. But the term is often used in altogether too undefined and undifferentiated a fashion. We must distinguish many elements in it, and many sources of origin, establishing which aspects of it the Romans were at different stages able to admire or absorb, and which they would only very slowly come to appreciate or would even positively reject.

II. THE HANNIBALIC WAR

During the first years of the Hannibalic War Rome was too hard-pressed to look much beyond her immediate problems in the west, except that the Senate turned in its anxiety to whatever religious means could be found for obtaining the gods' favour; and this meant turning not only to such traditional Italic institutions as the *ver sacrum*, but also to the Greek ones recommended by the Sibylline books, which as we saw were or purported to be an archaic collection of Greek oracles. Thus in 217 a *lecti-*

²³ Plut. *Flam.* 11.4; Zon. VIII.19.7.

sternium, a Greek rite not in itself new at Rome, by which the images of the gods were placed on couches and offered feasts, was held to the twelve Great Gods, chosen and paired according to Greek conceptions.²⁴ In the next year Fabius Pictor, later the historian, was sent to the oracle at Delphi. The Romans had probably dedicated gifts, and consulted the oracle, occasionally from early times. They were to turn to it again some ten years after Fabius' visit.²⁵ The Sibylline books also recommended the vowing of a temple to Venus Erycina, whose cult in Sicily showed Greek as well as Punic influences.²⁶ Games to Apollo, who was probably still felt to be a Greek god (his temple was outside the *pomerium* or city boundary and he was worshipped *Graeco ritu*) were instituted in 212 and paid for by public collection (a Greek custom which, introduced in this time of financial stringency, became common); they were made regular in 208 – all this on the advice both of the Sibylline books and the native prophecies of Marcius. In 208 a Roman envoy was told to attend the Olympic Games while in Greece (though for political purposes).²⁷ In 205 Rome even sent to her most distant ally, Attalus of Pergamum, to help her import the rites of the Great Mother from Phrygia, as Delphi and the Sibylline oracles had commanded.²⁸ Both Venus Erycina and the Great Mother were actually given temples within the *pomerium*; perhaps the connections of both cults with the Aeneas story made them seem not wholly foreign, but it is noteworthy that both were firmly adapted to their new context. Venus of Eryx did not bring her temple prostitutes with her, and was regarded as a goddess of victory rather than love, and the orgiastic elements in the worship of the Mother were strictly controlled, her eunuch priests being restricted in number and activity, and the post strictly confined to foreigners. The traditional structure of Roman religion was never, in our period, to be broken down.

The Senate does not seem to have had very much prejudice against foreign rites in themselves, in spite of its action in 213 in repressing what Livy calls foreign superstitions. It acted through a praetor to destroy a mass of written prophecies, prayers and books on sacrifice, which were leading to irregular practices even in the Forum and on the Capitol, especially by women, and to the financial exploitation of the rural plebs gathered in the city during the war. It was then primarily a police measure, rather than an attempt to extirpate foreign influence as such.²⁹

²⁴ Livy xxii.10.9; cf. *SIG* 589, a *lectisternium* to the 12 Olympian gods at Magnesia.

²⁵ Livy xxii.57, xxiii.11, xxviii.45.12. ²⁶ Livy xxii.9.7, 10.10, xxiii.30.13, 31.9.

²⁷ Livy xxv.12.15, xxvi.23.2, xxvii.11.6, 23.5, 35.3–4.

²⁸ Livy xxix. 10.4–11.8. It is perhaps unlikely that the Roman envoys went themselves to Pessinus to fetch the sacred stone as Livy reports; it may have come from the Megalesion at Pergamum, as Varro, *Ling.* vi.15, supposes. ²⁹ Livy xxv.1.6–12.

Both the *Ludi Apollinares* and, when they came to be set up shortly after the War, the *Megalesia* of the Great Mother, were *ludi scaenici*, at which plays were produced. The first production of a real Latin play was believed to have come in 240 with Livius Andronicus' first adaptation from a Greek original; this is the better of two ancient chronologies, but is not quite universally accepted. Livius was a freedman, traditionally from Tarentum, and possibly enslaved on its fall in 272. It is not inconceivable that plays in Latin were already known in the Latin-speaking towns on the borders of theatrically-minded Campania, and companies of Greek actors from the Greek city of Neapolis there may even have reached Rome.³⁰ It is clear, from late red-figure vases and other evidence, that both Magna Graecia and Campania were familiar with performances of Attic tragedy, especially Euripides, and of New Comedy, as well as of their own burlesque dramas in Greek, which in Campania at least had led to imitations in the Oscan language, though perhaps these did not take written form. It was from flourishing Oscan-speaking Capua, near Neapolis, that Naevius, Rome's second playwright, came; he wrote both comedies and tragedies on Greek models (Livius too wrote both, in unGreek fashion: there was clearly a shortage of authors). Sicily also had theatrical traditions, and it is often thought that many Romans developed a taste for drama there in the First Punic War. It has been objected that armies are 'almost perfect non-conductors of culture'; but many Englishmen did come to Italian opera when fighting in Italy in the Second World War.

Even if its beginnings are slightly earlier, it seems to have been in the last two decades of the third century that Roman drama gained its real hold and arrived at some kind of maturity; the *Ludi Plebei*, set up about 220, were or soon became *scaenici* as well. Naevius was active till near the end of the Hannibalic war; by then, Plautus had begun to write comedy. The Romans seem to have ignored plays by Sicilian or Italiote authors, perhaps because of their growing contempt for these areas and increasing interest in 'real' Greece, even if this still had to be largely mediated through the west. Of many of the plays produced by the Roman poets we have only the titles. Those of the tragedies suggest, as is often pointed out, that the Romans were (not surprisingly) interested in the legends of the Trojan War, and also that they were not averse from stories about Dionysus and Dionysiac religion, which had made its way into Italy and was thus not unfamiliar; but that, perhaps, they avoided the hostile portraits of Odysseus that were to be found in a number of later fifth-century tragedies, since he was much honoured in the western areas he was thought to have visited. If Roman taste could really be reflected in

³⁰ Fraenkel 1960, 439: (H 180).

this way, the poets must have had an extensive repertory of models from which to choose.

The plays may have been known originally as much by the Greek author's name and title as by those of the Latin adapter, or so some passages of Plautus would suggest.³¹ Dress and setting remained strictly Greek, but the adaptations were in many respects remarkably Roman. Livius and Naevius probably established many of the traditions of the Roman stage: for tragedy, in particular, the elevated language, exploiting the native love of alliteration, assonance and play on words; and, for both tragedy and comedy, the remarkable expansion of the parts of the accompanying flautist and the actors as singers. Whether this was done under the influence of Hellenistic Greek, or native Italian, semi-dramatic forms is still disputed; it is also possible that trained choruses were hard to obtain in Rome (some tragedies at least do seem to have had a chorus, though comedies do not), and that the musical element had therefore to be transferred to the actors.

Possibly under the stimulus of the Hannibalic War and the national feeling it provoked came the first creation of a literature based on Greek forms, but Roman in content. All Naevius' *praetextae*, plays based on Roman history, may date from this period (the *Clastidium* certainly does); they were perhaps all, like that, produced for such special occasions as the triumphs or funerals of great men. There is no good evidence that Naevius set any comedies in Italy. But we have Cicero's warrant for regarding his historical epic concerning the First Punic War as a work of his old age and so of this period.³² Though the plays had been written in metres adapted from the Greek, the *Bellum Punicum* was still in the to us somewhat mysterious 'Saturnian' verse, which Livius Andronicus had employed for his adaptation of Homer's *Odyssey*. How far Naevius was influenced in his choice of subject by Greek historical epics, which he may or may not have known, and how far by the strong feeling of the Romans for their less as well as their more distant past, we cannot tell.

According to a notice in Livy, in 207 Livius Andronicus (by now surely very elderly) composed for the state a hymn to Juno, to be sung by a chorus of virgins³³ – in other words a *partheneion*, probably new in its kind at Rome, though old-fangled in Greece by now. There is a slight possibility that Livy's source here was accepting the lower and less reliable chronology for the poet, and that the hymn was really written some time earlier. According to the Augustan scholar Verrius Flaccus (accepting the later date), Livius' hymn led to permission being given for a guild of 'scribes and actors' (supposedly linked because Livius both wrote and acted; the guild was conceivably already in some sort of

³¹ Plaut. *Poen.* 1 in particular: Aristarchus' *Achilles*.

³² Cic. *Sen.* 50. ³³ Livy xxvii.37-3, cf. xxxi.12.9.

existence) to meet and make dedications in the temple of Minerva on the Aventine.³⁴ If poets were associated thus with government or other clerks, *scribae* proper, this shows us how unused to creative writers Rome still was. The history of this institution is obscure; what, for example, was its relation to the society of *parasiti Apollinis*, who were actors of some kind, possibly the less well-regarded mimes? This body, according to another passage of Verrius (often, however, disbelieved) existed during the Hannibalic War,³⁵ having perhaps been founded with the new games to Apollo. At all events it is interesting that actors in Rome were under the protection of Minerva or Apollo, or both; they were not, as in Greece, associated with Dionysus, and organized into companies of artists bearing his name. There may have been some precedent in Sicily for linking Apollo with the theatre,³⁶ but it may be that, as with Venus Erycina and the Magna Mater, the Romans were trying to avoid the emotional and extravagant.

Greek medicine, like Greek drama, was percolating into the city at this time. We happen to know that a Greek from the Peloponnese, who specialized in wounds, set himself up in Rome with state assistance just before the war, and was remembered later as the first representative of Greek medicine in the city.³⁷ Since we can hardly doubt that doctors from Magna Graecia or Sicily, in both of which there were strong if now perhaps old-fashioned medical traditions, had reached Rome before this, the notice is further evidence of the Romans' growing disregard for the Greeks of the west. But Greek medicine did not altogether 'take' at Rome yet, as we shall see; the Peloponnesian was regarded as a butcher, and few or no Romans took up the profession; none tried to translate Greek medical literature into Latin.

As the war went on, armies were again committed to Greek-speaking areas, in Magna Graecia and Sicily, and the attempted intervention of Philip V of Macedon in support of Hannibal led to the first formal alliance of Rome with a state of old Greece – the Aetolian League, unfortunately a predatory and comparatively unsophisticated people later to prove a liability. The terms of the treaty, which included one by which Rome was to have all the moveable booty in any Greek town taken by the allies, including the enslaved population, do not suggest that she was eager to recommend herself to Greek public opinion, though on one occasion a general, professing favour to the Greeks, did permit ransom, noting it as a non-Roman custom.³⁸ One or two other alliances followed, however, including those with (probably) Athens, with Sparta and with

³⁴ Festus, *Gloss. Lat.* 446 L. ³⁵ Festus, *Gloss. Lat.* 436, cf. 438.

³⁶ Webster 1964, 257: (H 219) – if not Apollo, at least the Muses.

³⁷ Peter, *HRRel.* Cassius Hemina fr. 26. ³⁸ Livy xxvi.24.11; Polyb. ix.42.

King Attalus of Pergamum. But Rome's naval superiority prevented Philip from invading Italy, and the Romans pulled out of Greece entirely on the conclusion of the Peace of Phoenice in 205. There had been considerable diplomatic activity, however, and the Senate doubtless found itself better informed about affairs in Greece than it had ever been. Meanwhile, as Polybius says, the eyes of the Greeks were turned onto the great struggle playing itself out in the west, and several Greek historians, mainly westerners, took Hannibal as a hero, a bias that Fabius Pictor was probably to try to redress. Another Roman senator, Cincius Alimentus, who had actually been taken captive by Hannibal, also wrote a history of Rome in Greek. Between them they established the position that historiography, with its military and political slant, was a respectable activity for a Roman senator, at least in old age, revolutionary as this might appear.

How far, at this time, had the hellenization of the dominant political elite, or of some members of it, progressed? The answer is probably 'not very far', though we know too little about education in Rome at this period to be sure – and it should be remembered that Greek civilization was felt to be dependent on, or even identical with, Greek *paideia*, education. There is some evidence that in the upper classes Roman boys were taught mainly within the family, until they were entrusted to a distinguished public figure to gain experience of the courts and politics under his wing; military service from the age of seventeen (earlier in crises) would cut short such training, at least as a full-time occupation. There was one theory later that the first school for learning one's letters was set up by a freedman of Sp. Carvilius, supposedly the first man in Rome to divorce his wife, perhaps about 230 B.C. 'Letters and Law' were to Plautus the staple of education, and Cicero as a boy still learnt by heart the archaic code of the Twelve Tables.³⁹ Literature, to the Greeks the basis of real education, was first taught according to Suetonius by Livius Andronicus *domi forisque*, in his house and elsewhere – perhaps in his master's house and those of other nobles, rather than in a real school.⁴⁰ His Latin *Odysseia* may have been produced primarily for teaching purposes, but Suetonius, who may have had no evidence, thought he also taught Greek literature – primarily no doubt Homer in the original. Many Romans of various classes will have known some Greek, though they may often have spoken it with a Sicilian or Italiote accent: a number of nobles bore Greek cognomina, presumably nick-names in origin, and one was actually called Atticus – had he been to Athens, or did he just speak unusually pure Greek? – while at the start of the century an ambassador had attempted, disastrously, to address the Tarentines in

³⁹ Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 59, cf. 54; Plaut. *Mostell.* 126; Cic. *Leg.* II.59. ⁴⁰ Suet. *Gram.* 1.2.

Greek. Some Romans may have read a certain amount in Greek too (the priestly *decemviri* who were responsible for consulting the Sibylline books must always have been able to read oracular Greek verse). Given the Roman regard for the past, and the fact that historiography was to be the first prose genre produced in the city, one suspects that Timaeus and other western historians were among the best known authors. A reading public for Latin can hardly have existed; Latin plays seem long only to have been known from performance, though Greek plays were always much read in Athens and elsewhere.

Fortunately Plutarch was interested in the question of Greek culture as it affected the subjects of several of his biographies, and there are scraps of other evidence concerning the same figures. None of these famous men need be typical even of their own class, but their cases may be suggestive.

Fabius Maximus, the great Cunctator, was to be written up as the traditionalist opponent of the hellenizing Scipio Africanus. But two Fabii had been envoys to Alexandria in the third century, and it was as we saw a Fabius who was sent to Delphi (as a much earlier ancestor was supposed to have been) and was later to take the great step of writing a book in Greek. Cicero says (and historical statements in his dialogues usually have some basis) that Fabius Maximus had read much 'for a Roman', and knew the history of foreign wars as well as of Rome's.⁴¹ He might have read some Greek, probably Sicilian, historians. He brought back one statue from the capture of Tarentum in 209, the giant Hercules of Lysippus; but statues were traditional booty, and the Fabii claimed special devotion to Hercules, who, though Greek in origin, had long been naturalized in Rome and Italy.⁴² Fabius is not recorded as taking any other advantage of his opportunities at Tarentum. The famous M. Marcellus, the 'sword of Rome' while Fabius was her shield, went a step further. Plutarch says that he admired the Greek culture that he had not had time to acquire (in fact, opportunities had doubtless been restricted in his youth); even after his Gallic campaigns in the 220s he sent spoils as a gift to Delphi, and also to King Hiero of Syracuse (perhaps his family already had ties with Sicily, as others certainly did, here or in Greek-speaking areas of southern Italy). At the sack of Syracuse in 211 Marcellus tried to save the great scientist Archimedes; it was as a military engineer that he had impressed the Romans, but Marcellus brought back to Rome Archimedes' celestial globes, keeping one for himself, though nothing else according to Cicero,⁴³ and dedicating the other in a temple where all could see it. We hear nothing of his annexing books, but he

⁴¹ Cic. *Sen.* 12 (but *bella* is often excised on the grounds that *domestica bella* means civil wars, which the Romans had not had; *domestica et externa* could mean simply 'native and foreign history').

⁴² Pliny, *HN* xxxiv.40; Plut. *Fab.* 1. ⁴³ Cic. *Rep.* 1.21.

carried off many works of art, boasting even to the Greeks, according to Plutarch, that he had taught the Romans to admire Greek art.⁴⁴ It is paradoxical, but also fateful for their attitudes to Greece, that the visual arts, which on the whole they despised, were one of the elements of Greek civilization that the Romans accepted most easily; but their local art was ultimately Greek-influenced, and indeed minor Greek artists had worked in Rome and elsewhere in central Italy, so that the contrast with Greek art proper was not too shocking. Marcellus, who naturally became patron of the city he had taken, also dedicated gifts from the booty at distant Samothrace, with which Rome felt a link through Aeneas, and at Rhodes, with which naval state she had probably long had some sort of connection. He also erected a gymnasium for the people of Catana in Sicily, which perhaps suggests some sympathy with the Greek way of life, though hardly a desire that Romans should take to exercising naked.⁴⁵ Marcellus had also spared the general population of Syracuse, though Fabius may have enslaved that of Tarentum, and Valerius Laevinus certainly did that of Agrigentum (though he had made the treaty with the Aetolians, and was now no doubt their patron, as his son was to be). Their possession of Greek slaves was also to be significant for Roman attitudes, and the tension in these between admiration and contempt.

Even leading members of the generation that emerged in the later part of the Hannibalic War, who were later to have a great deal to do with the Greek world, probably had little formal Greek education. Cato, who claimed to have spent his youth labouring on Sabine hillsides, clearly had none, though if it is true that, just at the end of the war, he met the hellenized South Italian Ennius and studied Greek literature with him, he was anxious to remedy the omission, to some extent at least.⁴⁶ Scipio Africanus is a difficult case to evaluate, since Polybius has probably made him over in the likeness of a Hellenistic statesman, and attributed to him characteristics, such as scepticism in religion, perhaps implausible in a Roman of this period: while our annalistic sources have worked him up as a contrast to the traditionalist Fabius Maximus. But it is probably true that, possibly already as aedile in 213 and then subsequently in his command in Spain, he showed an awareness of the traditions of Hellenistic kingship, as aedile distributing oil to the plebs, and later telling the Spaniards that they might regard him as king, though he could not take the title; while he showed a courtesy and restraint to a captive lady that was surely modelled on Alexander's (if not on that of Alexander's own model, Xenophon's Cyrus).⁴⁷ He may even have been responsible for equating the idea of a Roman consul with that of a king, by using the

⁴⁴ Plut. *Marc.* 21.5.⁴⁵ Plut. *Marc.* 30.4-5.⁴⁶ See n. 116.⁴⁷ Polyb. x.38 and 40.

symbols of Roman office as presents for a foreign monarch. He sent gifts to Delphi from Spain.⁴⁸ In Sicily, before his invasion of Africa, he is supposed to have adopted Greek dress and spent his time in the theatre, palaestra and baths, shocking his quaestor Cato and provoking an official investigation: but the story, only in Plutarch, is often thought a throw-back from the later quarrels of Cato and Scipio.⁴⁹ And it should be noted that Scipio's heroes, according to Polybius, were the Sicilians Dionysius and Agathocles, who might be seen as a rather old-fashioned choice (or perhaps only a personal one – they had fought Carthage);⁵⁰ while Cicero says of Scipio's son that he united his father's greatness of soul with richer learning.⁵¹

It is likely that T. Quinctius Flamininus, the conqueror of Philip V and 'Liberator' of Greece, also acquired little *doctrina* in his earlier years. We know that he spoke Greek fluently and got on well with Greeks;⁵² but this would seem to be the fruit of the time he spent at Tarentum in the Hannibalic War, and there is no evidence that he had a real Greek education. An ability to speak colloquial Greek, or even to understand the more flowery language of formal orations, does not, it should be remembered, imply an ability to cope with the language of Homer or of fifth-century Attic authors, let alone other dialects. And it is dubious to what extent Flamininus took up Greek ways; a coin with his image struck in Greece shows him bearded in traditional Roman fashion (though Scipio appears, on Spanish coins thought to represent him, as clean-shaven).⁵³ But to both Scipio and Flamininus we shall have to return.

III. CONTACTS WITH THE GREEK WORLD IN THE EARLY SECOND CENTURY

The Second Macedonian War (200–197) brought Rome into direct contact with the Greek world and initiated a period of unprecedentedly rapid social and cultural change. Relationships of many different kinds between the two peoples began to be formed. The armies that campaigned in Macedon and Greece against Philip, and a few years later in Asia Minor as a result of the declaration of war against Antiochus of Syria, returned home with few losses, enriched by booty and often perhaps with new ideas of refinement and luxury (as later moralizing historians supposed – engraved plate, elegant stuffs and inlaid furniture are picked out, with music-girls and other luxurious accompaniments to

⁴⁸ Livy xxx.15.11–12; App. *Pun.* 32.137 – sometimes disbelieved. Delphi: Livy xxviii.45.12.

⁴⁹ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 3.7; Astin 1978, 14: (H 68).

⁵⁰ Polyb. xv.35. ⁵¹ Cic. *Sen.* 35. ⁵² Plut. *Flam.* 5.5.

⁵³ Scullard 1970, 41, 248: (H 77). Gell. *NA* iii.4 shows that middle-aged men generally shaved in the mid-second century.

feasts, and the regarding of cooking for the first time as an art); one modern estimate suggests that over half the adult male population fought at some time in the army, though of course not all of it in the east.⁵⁴ Some Romans, mostly captured in the Hannibalic War rather than later, actually served as slaves in Greek parts – 1,200 in Greece according to Plutarch, whose figure perhaps does not include Latins and Italians; these the Achaeans ransomed, and Rome probably exerted pressure to recover those in other areas.⁵⁵ Such men, many no doubt humble countrymen, would have brought home a peculiarly intimate knowledge of Greek domestic manners – or of Greek agriculture; ordinary soldiers, however, were often billeted on the local population.

There were some Romans along with the Campanian and other south Italian traders and businessmen (also some Latins, especially from Praeneste) who began to be more prominently visible in Greece and the Aegean, though not yet in the numbers typical of the second half of the century. They might turn out to be long-term settlers, who put their sons through the local schools or even their adopted city's *ephebeia* (an organization giving young men a period of now only tenuously military service, with a little intellectual education sometimes thrown in), held local priesthoods or were initiates at Samothrace or Eleusis, and took a prominent part in local life, being rewarded with proxenyships and other honours. But it cannot be doubted that they were often in touch with family or friends in Italy, and that some at least retired in old age to their original homes, bringing with them a certain knowledge of Greek language and life; a few had probably even been patrons of literature and the arts.

More temporary were the visits to the east of Roman senators, a good few of whom were, increasingly, sent out on fact-finding or arbitrational embassies. Some came from families developing, in the traditional manner, *clientelae* in areas newly come under Roman influence. Such, for example, were the patrician Claudii, who had long had links in Campania, Sicily and Magna Graecia. Two at least now served under Flamininus, one was on the commission sent out to advise Vulso in Asia; subsequently Claudii went as envoys to Macedon, the Achaean League, Sparta and even Syria – but hardly ever to Africa or the west. On these embassies they will have stayed with local magnates, or in the special guest-houses for Roman visitors attested in more than one Greek centre; they will have given and received gifts and political advice. But it is interesting that there is no evidence for any of the Claudii being interested in Greek art or literature; it is unlikely that many Roman aristocrats

⁵⁴ Peter, *HR Rel.* Piso fr. 34; Livy xxxix.6.7–9; Hopkins 1978, 35; (H 99).

⁵⁵ Plut. *Flam.* 13.4–5. Livy xxxvii.60.2: 4,000 Romans and Italians restored by the Cretans (number from the unreliable Valerius Antias). Victims of piracy, in part?

really were. They probably took to Greek manners and luxury, however; Cato delivered a speech against the *mores* of one Ap. Claudius Nero, a sure sign.

At the same time, there were now many more Greeks in Rome, as in central Italy in general. There clearly came to be many humbler Greek or Greek-speaking settlers; though traders and sailors maybe did not always get beyond Puteoli in Campania or at most Ostia, whence small boats perhaps under local masters took wares up the Tiber to the port of Rome (to which additions and improvements were made between 193 and 174), yet for Plautus the language of business and shipping is largely Greek. When war with Perseus of Macedon broke out in 171 there were Macedonian residents, as well as envoys, who were told to leave the city and Italy.⁵⁶ Above all, of course, there was the influx of Greek-speaking, or at least partly hellenized, slaves into Italy; many were put to agricultural tasks in the country, helping, in certain areas, to transform the nature of agriculture, but not all entirely insulated from the surviving free peasants; some, including the well-educated, of whom there were clearly a number, worked in the swelling households of the rich, especially at Rome. If they were freed, some might be given small properties by their masters, like (no doubt) the model smallholder C. Furius Cresimus held up to admiration by a later second-century historian;⁵⁷ others engaged either on their own behalf or that of a patron on business ventures of many kinds.

Rome took foreign hostages, for example, Philip's son Demetrius and other Macedonians, then rotating hostages from the Syrian court – though not all stayed in Rome, some being farmed out to country towns. We know that the Syrian prince Demetrius at least, who came to Rome as a child, mixed on familiar terms with young Roman aristocrats.⁵⁸ A few notables, such as the younger Charops from Epirus,⁵⁹ came (like most of the hostages, with a suite) to be educated in Rome. There were also perpetual queues of Greek envoys, leading citizens come from various states to appeal to the Senate and to treat it to displays of elaborate Greek oratory which, though interpreters were used, most members may have been increasingly able to follow. The speeches doubtless included *exempla* from Greek history, the examples or illustrations thought so necessary by rhetoricians, and also compliments to Rome, perhaps as having a mixed constitution on the approved model, or as the successor to the great empires of the past, especially Persia and Macedon. (One Roman, a certain Aemilius Sura, seems to have taken up this last idea in

⁵⁶ Polyb. xxvii.6.3.

⁵⁷ Peter, *HRRel.* Piso fr. 33. *MRR* puts the occasion c. 191.

⁵⁸ Polyb. xxxi.2.5.

⁵⁹ Polyb. xxvii.15.4 – perhaps in the 170s?

some sort of book.⁶⁰) Even kings came – Amynder of Athamania was expected to make a great impression in 198, on account of his title, but after the repeated visits of Pergamene and other royalty, such a petty Balkan kinglet would have cut little ice.⁶¹ Sometimes envoys were forced to stay for a considerable period of time; there was bad congestion in 184 owing to a great influx of embassies with complaints against Philip. And a Greek inscription shows one group of ambassadors, perhaps around 170, who had attended each morning at the receptions of great Romans to gain their favour, and worked on the patrons of the city they were representing by visiting them in their homes.⁶²

The two races met, then, at all levels; they did not actually mingle much, except in so far as freed slaves became for most purposes full Roman citizens, and their sons wholly so. But legal intermarriage between Romans and foreigners, *peregrini*, was not allowed, and what has often been a fertile source of cultural influence was thus not available to the Romans.

One way of measuring the impact of the new relationship is by study of the comedies of Plautus. Most cannot be precisely dated, or even securely attributed to a single man, whose very name poses problems; but they certainly run from the closing years of the Hannibalic War through the succeeding period into the 180s. The stage, for the historian, has the advantage of addressing, and needing to please, a wide if unfortunately not precisely definable audience, of whose tastes something can be said. This audience included all classes – special seats for senators were established in 195.⁶³ Women and probably slaves were present. The shows were free; to some of them many country people may have been at leisure to come in, either because the games fell at slack times of year or also because, as some argue, where subsistence agriculture prevails peasants tend to be underemployed. In fact, Plautus' comedies, though clearly written for Rome, may also have been seen in the country towns of the *ager Romanus* and Latium, for a manager or *dominus gregis* would wish to keep his actors, who were often his slaves, in fairly continual employment, and besides this there can be no doubt that especially in southern Latium and the now increasingly Latin-speaking parts of northern Campania there was a lively theatrical life, probably partly independent of Rome. It was indeed primarily through the stage that Greek culture impinged on the poorer classes (and through the visual arts, always especially important to the illiterate, and from which,

⁶⁰ Swain 1940: (1 34) for the date of this work; he suggests that Ennius knew the idea too, though it was not yet taken up generally in Rome. But Mendels 1981: (E 30) dates Sura much later.

⁶¹ Polyb. xviii.10.7.

⁶² Polyb. xxiii.1; *StG* 656 (with new readings by P. Herrmann. *ZPE* 7 (1971) 72–7).

⁶³ Livy xxxiv.54.4.

especially with the aid of an *aedituus* or verger in a temple, many may have learnt something of Greek mythology as well as Roman history).

Though the *palliata*, as the name implies (it refers to the Greek *pallium* or cloak), deals with Greek characters, and indeed is closely based on Greek originals, it becomes more and more possible, as our knowledge of Greek New Comedy advances, to identify Roman changes and additions. Both what is Greek and what is Roman in these plays is informative.

The recent tendency has been to abandon the low estimate of Plautus' audience that used to be common. This audience clearly has some knowledge of the theatrical traditions that now went back over a generation, and can pick up references and parodies. It sometimes likes to know who wrote the original play. It prefers comedies to be set in 'Athens of Attica', as 'more Greek'; though in fact various cities of *germana Graecia*, 'real Greece', do appear, it is necessary to be defensive about a play that takes place in Syracuse, and a character offers a girl as dowry 'a thousand good Attic *logi* (stories or plots?) without a Sicilian one among them'.⁶⁴ The audience also has a basic knowledge of Greek myth (though only basic, and Plautus himself, who as Fraenkel shows inserts many of the mythological references, occasionally makes mistakes), just as it has heard of some figures of Greek history (Alexander and the great Sicilians, primarily), the sages Thales and Solon, and even the artists Apelles and Zeuxis, though these are only names; it does not know the philosophers, apart from Socrates (and there are two general references to the poverty of the Cynics)⁶⁵ – in contrast to the audiences of the first century, who are expected to relish jokes about Democritus and Epicurus. Rhetors, obviously not yet known in Rome, are not mocked, though there is a general jeer at Greeks who walk about with books under their arms but also create drunken disturbances.⁶⁶ The Greeks indeed are regarded as dissipated, as the word *pergraecari* suggests, and their slaves are undisciplined. Plautus takes his spectators into what must be for them to some extent an amoral, fantasy world, peopled by idle young men and their courtesan mistresses, cunning slaves and greedy parasites; but his specifically Roman references, often legal or military, bring them back to the real one, where his standards tend to be conservative and traditional.

The audience also knows, and probably itself employs, a good many Greek words, clearly considered vulgar, since the middle-class characters rarely use them. Some can be shown to be South Italian or Sicilian; opinions differ on whether they were mostly picked up by soldiers on

⁶⁴ Plaut. *Men.* Prol. 7ff., *Pers.* 394.

⁶⁵ Plaut. *Mostell.* 775, *Pseud.* 532, *Men.* 409, *Poen.* 1271, *Epid.* 626; Cynics: *Pers.* 123, *Stich.* 704; Socrates: *Pseud.* 465; Thales: *Rud.* 1003, *Bacch.* 122, *Capt.* 274. ⁶⁶ Plaut. *Cure.* 288.

campaign or introduced to Rome by slaves, traders and others. One also suspects that some of the female spectators wear the fashionable articles of apparel with Greek names that are the subject of complaint;⁶⁷ perhaps many respectable matrons still avoided these, but the terms of the *lex Oppia* of 215 show that already matrons had abandoned the traditional toga for 'multicoloured dresses'.⁶⁸

It is true that this audience prefers low to high comedy – Plautus greatly elaborates the role of the slaves, and sometimes that of the parasite, cutting down on the more serious middle-class characters – and it is fond of descriptions of horrific punishments inflicted on slaves. But it does not want, or does not get, much direct presentation of violence or obscenity. In fact, though the plot is rarely uplifting – sometimes the reverse – Plautus keeps much of the sententiousness that marked Greek New Comedy, even expands it; we know that later at least Roman audiences greatly enjoyed the moralizing they heard on both the comic and the tragic stage (and anthologies were made from it). This, for Plautus, is 'philosophizing', and seen as learned and Greek. In the absence of many other sources of moral advice, it may be that ordinary Romans articulated many of their moral perceptions by what they experienced in the theatre.

Plautus also assumes a certain level of literacy in most of his spectators; words are described as differing by a single letter, slaves read and write. Fraenkel contrasts Plautus' work with the anonymous German travesties of Shakespeare's plays given in seventeenth-century Germany by the 'English Comedians', to the great advantage of both the Roman dramatist and his audience.⁶⁹ Indeed, though the Roman stage never produced a Shakespeare, the Roman public was perhaps not much inferior to that on the Bankside.

Naturally, some members of the oligarchy, who were becoming deeply involved in Greek affairs, were more profoundly influenced by Greek ideas than the average spectator in the theatre. But the old idea that Flamininus or the Scipiones were influenced in policy by sentimental, basically literary, philhellenism is not plausible. As we have seen, they had probably not read much Greek literature; and if Rome intervened to protect the Greeks against Philip, it was doubtless largely to punish the latter for his 'stab in the back' during the Hannibalic War, and his later rupture of the Peace of Phoenice, and also in response to the inherent pressures of the militaristic society of Rome.⁷⁰ If the Greeks were subsequently declared free, this was to weaken Macedon while not committing Rome to garrisoning or administering a large new territory; when the principle was not convenient to her she abandoned it, reward-

⁶⁷ Plaut. *Epid.* 223ff. ⁶⁸ Livy xxxiv.1.3.

⁶⁹ Fraenkel 1960 387: (H 180). ⁷⁰ Harris 1979, 212: (A 21).

ing for example her friend the king of Pergamum with territory. But favour to Greece was expressed more than once, and we need not doubt that the Romans' feelings towards the Greeks were different from those they held towards Gauls, Spaniards or Carthaginians. Flamininus (who had probably not scrupled to enslave any Greeks proper, perhaps chiefly Thessalians, who had fought in Philip's army at Cynoscephalae) professes amity and high moral sentiments in his surviving letter to the Chyretians.⁷¹ It is worth noting that the letter is not in very good Greek, whoever actually wrote it, and indeed those responsible for translating Latin documents were for a long time varyingly inept, sometimes incapable even of coping with the definite article that Greek has but Latin lacks; though a technical vocabulary of Greek terms for Roman institutions did rapidly emerge, and where letters are concerned, the basic framework of the Hellenistic chancery style may have been adopted even before 200 B.C. But even generals in the east would not seem to have used Greek secretaries, who were certainly not employed by the state at Rome, where the *scribae* of the Treasury seem to have translated decrees of the Senate that needed to be communicated to the Greeks into a language that must have struck the latter as barbarous. If the Romans wrote to the Greeks in Greek of a kind, they seem usually to have spoken to them in Latin, which an interpreter translated.

To return to Flamininus, Plutarch probably does not mean to imply that he himself composed the Greek elegiacs placed on his dedications at Delphi, and indeed this is barely conceivable.⁷² No other patronage by him of Greek (or Roman) writers is recorded, though he naturally carried sculptures to Rome as booty.⁷³ It was probably his Greek clients who set up a statue of him at Rome with a Greek inscription.⁷⁴ And much of his subsequent favour to Greeks will be thanks to the fact that he regarded himself as their patron, though being their patron may also have led him to feel sympathy for them; he certainly cared exceedingly for praise and honours from them.

Scipio Africanus, of course, was to treat on equal terms with Hellenistic monarchs, visit and correspond with them; he became personally friendly with Philip, and (it was thought, too much so) with Antiochus. In letters he and his brother Lucius assert benevolence to all Greeks, or that the Romans are not opposed to kings as such, as is widely believed.⁷⁵ Both made dedications at Delos, and Lucius at least was represented in a statue at Rome wearing Greek dress.⁷⁶ But Lucius' choice of the bastard title *Asiagenus* (rather than *Asiaticus*) suggests an indeed rather surprising ignorance of Greek. Africanus himself lived in modern splendour

⁷¹ Sherck, *Documents* 33. ⁷² Plut. *Flam.* 12.6-7.

⁷³ Livy xxxiv 52.4; also precious vessels in huge quantity. ⁷⁴ Plut. *Flam.* 1.

⁷⁵ Sherck, *Documents* 35; Polyb. xxi.11. ⁷⁶ Cic. *Rab. Post.* 27.

(his wife assisted at religious ceremonies in great state⁷⁷); he clearly gave his son, who was to write a history in Greek and whose superior *doctrina* we have seen Cicero note, something of a Greek education – more remarkably, perhaps his daughter too, for she was later a patroness of learned men.

Scipio was perhaps regarded during his own lifetime as almost super-human, and in direct touch with Jupiter in a way that was not traditional at Rome. Certainly after his death it would seem that Ennius, the Italian from near Tarentum who had become a Roman poet, and who had praised Scipio in a special work bearing his name, suggested in an epitaph that his great deeds had opened to him the gates of heaven.⁷⁸ Heroization such as this implies was not really a Roman conception, but, as has been pointed out, Ennius was not a Roman.⁷⁹ Certainly no actual cult was set up to Scipio in Rome, though by the time of his death generals in the east, above all Flamininus, had even been hailed there as saviour-gods in the Hellenistic fashion. Scipio and the other great generals often made dedications at Greek shrines, but Greek deities are not predominant among the gods of all kinds, traditional and less traditional, to whom they set up temples in Rome as a result of vows made on campaign. True, a second temple of Venus Erycina was built in 181 B.C., this one outside the *pomerium*, and at least a place where prostitutes made offerings, though there were still no temple prostitutes proper;⁸⁰ one or two other new cults might be mentioned. And a few old ones seem to have changed their nature; the goddess Salus, who to Plautus still typifies Safety in political or military contexts, by the time of Terence has become, sometimes at least, Health, the Greek Hygeia.⁸¹

The rather younger Fulvius Nobilior probably had more interest in Greek art and literature than Scipio. In a fashion that was to be a portent for the future, it led him in fact to ill-treat the Greeks; he enslaved the inhabitants of Same, and it was doubtful if he should have sacked Ambracia in 189, as the city had not been stormed. It had been Pyrrhus' capital, and its fall will have impressed Roman opinion; it was full of works of art, all of which Fulvius carried off (except the sculptures of terracotta, though some of these were by Zeuxis; Fulvius was obviously still unable to judge work at its true value, and associated terracotta with the despised Italian tradition⁸²). His opponents, who included M. Aemilius Lepidus and Cato, got the Senate to vote that the Ambracians should get their objects back. It is doubtful if they did; at all events the statues of the Muses that remained in Fulvius' temple of Hercules

⁷⁷ Polyb. xxxi.26. ⁷⁸ Vahlen 1928, 216: (B 37A).

⁷⁹ Walbank, *PCPS* 13 (1967) 57. ⁸⁰ Livy xl.34.4, *Ov. Fast.* iv.865ff.

⁸¹ Ter. *Hec.* 338. ⁸² Pliny, *HN* xxxv.9.66.

Musarum came from Ambracia.⁸³ We do not know whether there had been an odd cult of Hercules and the Muses there, or whether it was Fulvius who associated them, perhaps as symbols of the union of warlike valour and poetic fame; at all events, Ennius had accompanied Fulvius to Greece, as Greek poets had accompanied Alexander and later kings on campaign, and he celebrated his patron's deeds in the *Ambracia*, perhaps a play, as well as in his epic *Annales*. Poetry, if now under the protection of the Muses, did not deny its earlier roots; an ancient shrine of the Camenae was moved to Fulvius' temple, and Ennius, who unlike Naevius did not directly invoke these Italian goddesses, may possibly have asserted their identity with the Muses. The new precinct was no Museum in the Alexandrian sense – for example we hear nothing of a library – but we do have evidence for poets later giving readings there, and some sort of *collegium poetarum* meeting, while the tragic poet Accius was to dedicate a statue of himself in the temple.⁸⁴ Perhaps the poets, or some of them, with Fulvius' approval, now detached themselves from scribes and/or actors and the low and mercenary associations of Minerva, goddess of crafts, and met henceforth in this temple. If so, it was a mark of their increasing status. Fulvius probably set up an inscribed calendar in the temple (rather than depositing a book in it, though the Latin of our source is ambiguous), which also contained would-be learned notes, such as naive etymologies of the names of the Roman months;⁸⁵ he, or whoever compiled it for him, must have had some knowledge of Greek antiquarian scholarship, possibly only as it appeared in so many Greek historians, and perhaps also some knowledge of astronomy. It has been argued that the probably Pythagorean statement that studying the heavens increases devotion to the ineffable god, attributed by a late source to a Fulvius, also goes back to this work (here conceived as a book), and that the Muses stand for a Pythagorean harmony.⁸⁶ It is at least true that Pythagorean views, as we shall see, would not be out of place in a Roman of this generation. More certainly, Fulvius celebrated with splendour, and with the aid of artists collected from Greece, the games that he had vowed on campaign.⁸⁷ There were athletic contests for the first time, says Livy, no doubt meaning contests strictly on the Greek model, but a troupe of 'artists of Dionysus' was probably also imported to give plays in Greek. It is likely that others followed Fulvius' lead in this.⁸⁸

Fulvius' campaign marked the break with Rome by her earliest Greek

⁸³ Cic. *Arch.* 11.27. ⁸⁴ Val. Max. III.7.11; Pliny, *HN* xxxiv.19.

⁸⁵ *Gramm. Rom. Frag.* 15. ⁸⁶ Boyancé 1955: (H 172); Martina 1981: (H 209).

⁸⁷ Livy xxxix.22.2.

⁸⁸ Livy xxxix.22.10, from the unreliable Valerius Antias again, says that in this very year L. Scipio imported artists from Asia for his games.

allies, the Aetolians. One by one, her relations with other Greek states began to turn sour; the Greeks did not always realize that the gift of freedom was, in Roman eyes, a *beneficium* which implied a corresponding sense of *officium*, or obligation, on the part of the beneficiary, and the Romans often behaved in a disingenuous and brutal fashion, while themselves being shocked at the intrigue and corruption endemic among the factious Greeks. In the 170s in particular, a period of unease and disputes among the Roman aristocracy, and of the build-up to and start of the war with Perseus of Macedon, Macedonians and Greeks were shockingly treated at the hands of Machiavellian diplomats like Q. Marcius Philippus, and greedy and savage commanders like the praetors Lucretius, Hortensius, Octavius and others. The idea that the Greeks needed to be terrorized into submission had been put into the heads of such Romans by the sort of Greek politician loathed by Polybius. There was a reaction against this *nova sapientia*, new-style wisdom, among the older Romans, says Livy, who felt that it was a betrayal of 'ancient custom',⁸⁹ and there was some attempt to check and punish abuses both in the east and the west. These dubious new figures seem to have been, in several cases at least, hellenizers – at least to the extent of desiring Greek objects of art and luxury with which they could make a figure at Rome (including no doubt slaves: they were quick to enslave Greek populations, though indeed even the best Romans only had occasional qualms about this). Marcius Philippus stressed his Greek *cognomen* and links with the royal house of Macedon. But the clearest case is Cn. Octavius, who had a Greek doctor in his suite, could translate a Latin speech by Aemilius Paullus into Greek off the cuff, made a dedication at Delos and was honoured at Olympia and elsewhere, and was finally murdered in Syria – actually while anointing himself in the gymnasium – for his Roman arrogance, by anti-Roman elements.⁹⁰ Little better, it seems, was Sulpicius Galus, who studied Greek literature more deeply than any other noble of his time, says Cicero, and was particularly interested in astronomy, being able to explain eclipses to the Roman army (though *pace* Livy probably not to predict them): we are told of his 'many arrogant words and deeds towards the Greek race', especially to the famous states of Sparta and Argos, and then to Eumenes of Pergamum (it appears that in most of this he was carrying out the orders of the Senate, and Polybius may be somewhat biased).⁹¹ But this takes us into a slightly later period.

The peak of serious hellenization in Rome in the earlier part of the second century is represented, without a doubt, by Ennius. He was not only the greatest poet but in many ways also the most significant cultural

⁸⁹ Livy XLII.47.4–9, Diod. Sic. xxx.7.1. ⁹⁰ *PIV* XVII.2.1810.

⁹¹ Cic. *Brut.* 20.78, *Rep.* I. 14.21–3, *Sen.* 14.49; Paus. VII.11.1–2, Polyb. XXXI.6.

influence of his time, a figure of impressive scope and considerable sophistication, but clearly not a typical Roman, though he ended as a Roman citizen. His case should remind us that much Greek influence doubtless reached Rome indirectly, via immigrants from parts of the peninsula that were in some ways more thoroughly hellenized than Rome, either because they lay close to surviving Greek colonies, or because they were now sending at least proportionately larger numbers of *negotiatores* to the east. There was money, from the profits of these men or from booty, in many Latin and Italian states, as the monumental building schemes from before the mid-second century, and later, show; in several places in Campania, Samnium and Latium such schemes included permanent theatres based on Greek models, which were probably sometimes used, as in Greece, not only for plays but for poetic recitations, lectures and rhetorical encomia and displays in Greek or sometimes Latin (and perhaps Oscan). This is perhaps reflected in the flattering tales of Greek legendary founders so many towns had by Cato's day (though some may be much older). Cicero tells us that in his boyhood 'Italy was devoted to the arts of Greece', and that the Latin cities pursued literary studies more energetically than did Rome⁹² – possibly in part because of the demands of war and politics on the Roman upper class. What he says probably applies to a rather earlier period as well.

Ennius himself was born at Rudiae in the heel of Italy, a Messapian town but so hellenized that Strabo was to call it a Greek city, and he may have had a fully Greek education there or at Tarentum – a rather old-fashioned education perhaps, probably with some kind of rhetoric as well as *grammaticae*, but not the main-stream Greek philosophy centred on Athens. He tells us he spoke Oscan, however, as well as Greek and Latin⁹³ (he may have learnt the last young – his sister married in the nearby Latin colony of Brundisium – or else when serving in the army during the Hannibalic War); and he perhaps also knew the ancient Messapian language. He did visit Greece proper, but it is not known how extensively, with Fulvius Nobilior, whose campaigns did not take him far from the Adriatic. If Ennius was a man of much greater genius than Livius Andronicus, he could also surely do much more because Rome was now more receptive. His works are more Greek than those of Livius, but also more Roman; Ennius, genuinely at the same time a Greek, an Italian and a Roman, seems to have felt no conflict between those roles (which is not evidence that a Roman aristocrat might not have felt some), but only great pride when a relative, perhaps the son, of his patron Fulvius Nobilior obtained Roman citizenship for him in 184.⁹⁴ He died in 169, at the age of seventy.

⁹² Cic. *De Or.* 3.43; *Arch.* 5. Wiseman 1983; (H 66). ⁹³ Gell. *NA* xvii.17.1.

⁹⁴ *Annals* 525Sk.; Cic. *Brut.* 20.79.

He naturalized in Latin (a slower and heavier language) various Greek metres, but above all the heroic hexameter, which he could wield with great power, if sometimes still awkwardly.⁹⁵ The ancient Saturnians persisted for a time, but mainly in the traditional contexts of triumphal or funerary inscriptions, and there is some slight evidence that a hexameter version of Livius Andronicus' *Odyssey* was soon found necessary, perhaps for educational purposes (Horace was still brought up on Livius, in what version we do not know).⁹⁶ At any event Ennius considered the Saturnian verse of Livius and Naevius rustic and primitive; he himself was a *poeta*, a 'maker' or craftsman, he wrote *poemata*, not *carmina* (the latter word evoked all sorts of antique spells and formulae).⁹⁷ He was the first man in Rome, he claimed, to be *dicti studiosus*, which has been thought to translate the Greek *philologos*, and imply a newly serious study of language and literature.⁹⁸ But the basis of his claim to be, by the *Annales*, a new Homer, or rather, according to Pythagorean principles, the actual re-incarnation of Homer, was a celebration of the Roman historical tradition that Cicero was still to find satisfying; and it was he who formulated the line that stamped itself on the Roman consciousness (perhaps it originally referred primarily to military discipline) about Rome's dependence on the customs of ancient days and men of ancient mark:

*moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque.*⁹⁹

His view of *virtus*, too, is the Roman view of Plautus and the Scipionic *elogia*, the sustaining of family honour, especially in war – though he tends to put *sapientia*, wisdom, at least as high as *vis*, force.

Ennius perhaps began his career in Rome by writing for the stage; his comedies were of no moment, but his tragedies developed the specifically Latin metrical patterns and diction of his predecessors. Though he bases many of his plays on Euripides, perhaps shows some traces of Greek rhetoric, and more than once didactically explains a Greek term, in a semi-philosophical digression, yet his plays have a Roman grandeur (or sometimes bombast) and he wrote a couple of *praetextae*, on themes from Roman history. In his dramatic works too, if less than in the *Annals*, values tend to be Roman rather than Greek, let alone truly Euripidean; for example he stresses social rather than moral distinctions or equates the two. We can compare the opening of his *Medea* with that of Euripides'

⁹⁵ Conceivably the prophetic *Carmina Marciana*, circulating at the time of the Hannibalic War, were in hexameters, the metre used in Greek for oracles; and, from some date, the *sortes* issued at various oracular shrines. ⁹⁶ *FPL* Bu. frs. 37–40; Hor. *Epist.* 11.1.69.

⁹⁷ The Greek word *poeta* had, however, already been used by Naevius and Plautus.

⁹⁸ *Annals* 209Sk. ⁹⁹ *Annals* 136Sk.

play; here he has left out the obscurer geographical references, doubtless beyond his Roman audience.

His knowledge of other Greek authors seems to have been wide, if odd by later standards, and he produced translations or adaptations of various kinds. He was alert to the Pythagorean traditions of his South Italian homeland, of which the Romans had probably long had some superficial awareness, and which seem to have been still acceptable to them, in spite of not coming directly from 'real Greece'. Though the Pythagorean philosophic circles in Magna Graecia had been broken up and scattered long before, some memory of them and their beliefs persisted (and the Romans could read of the history of the sect in Timaeus' work). One should note that the astronomy of Sulpicius Galus seems to have been strongly Pythagorizing; his neatly schematic distances for moon, sun and stars from the earth are certainly so and, at this stage in the history of Greek science, are markedly naive and old-fashioned.¹⁰⁰ Apart from allowing Homer, in the dream at the start of the *Annals*, to lecture him on Pythagorean cosmology, Ennius seems in his *Epicharmus* to have expounded natural philosophy as put forward in a popular poem falsely attributed to this early fifth-century Sicilian poet, who was regarded as a Pythagorean. He based his *Hedyphagetica* on another Sicilian work, the gastronomic poem of the fourth-century Archestratus of Gela. The Romans were becoming interested in fine cookery, as Cato complains (there is no evidence that the work was a moralizing parody). But one observes that Ennius did not try to introduce them to Sicilian pastoral verse.

He also made known some of the Hellenistic literature of which there had been little awareness yet in Rome. His *Eubemerus* recounted that – again Sicilian – author's imaginary voyage, which was intended to show that most of the gods, even Zeus, were in origin only great men, a view which, perhaps surprisingly, was to find some favour in Rome. This work was perhaps in prose, of a notably primitive and simple kind; as in many societies, poetry had been earlier in developing its expressive powers. But possibly our quotations are from a prose paraphrase of verse. The *Sota* was probably based on the light-hearted iambics of the third-century poet Sotades, who worked in Alexandria; if so, this is the first sign of literary influence from that great cultural centre, in spite of its long-standing diplomatic contacts with Rome. The mixed verse of the *Saturae* included fables and moralizing; though the name perhaps harks back to Roman semi-dramatic traditions, the influence of the Greek diatribe and of Menippean Satire have been suggested in the work itself. And Ennius is explicitly said to have introduced elegiac metre to

¹⁰⁰ Pliny, *HN* 11.83.

Rome,¹⁰¹ perhaps by means of the epigram; his epitaph for Scipio was in this form. The elegiac epigram, though ancient by origin, was of course a dominant Hellenistic genre. It is interesting, however, that when the Romans gave up using Saturnians for epitaphs, as they now began to do, they often, as inscriptions show, used iambic metre, familiar from the stage, not elegiacs; this is very unGreek.

Ennius' *Protrepticus* perhaps recommended the study of philosophy. But Ennius' philosophy, as far as we can see, only deserves the title by courtesy, consisting as it does of semi-religious, semi-scientific speculation, such as the identification of different gods with natural phenomena. There is no certain influence from any of the great schools of the Hellenistic period. Though he puts it into the mouth of a character in a play, Ennius may have approved of the claim that one should philosophize to a certain extent only; this was undoubtedly a usual Roman standpoint at a later period. In ours, there was obviously much suspicion of the activity. Cicero suggests that Sulpicius Galus, even though he combined his scientific interests with a full political career, could be criticized by a leading figure of the previous generation for spending too much time on useless studies.

Scholars have recently stressed, perhaps over-stressed, Ennius' position as a member of the fraternity of Hellenistic learned poets; they have tried to trace an awareness of scholiastic interpretations in his knowledge of Greek poets, and found Hellenistic patterns in his work, arguing for example that the dream that opens the *Annals*, in which Ennius meets Homer, looks back not only to Pythagoras and Hesiod, but to Callimachus' dream at the beginning of the *Aitia*, and is even an answer to Callimachus' argument that no one can write epic now: Ennius, as Homer himself *redivivus*, is exempt from the ban.¹⁰² If so, surely few of Ennius' readers will have appreciated this fine point. He is also sometimes thought to have had great influence on the language, like a true Alexandrian scholar-poet, introducing for example double consonants in spelling; but the first century B.C. was uncertain if technical grammatical works were not by a younger figure of the same name, and Suetonius certainly thought true *grammaticae* was only expounded in Latin after his time.¹⁰³ But Ennius did divide his *Annals*, as Naevius had not done his *Bellum Punicum*, into books of the length normal in the Greek book-trade, which suggests that he looked to some form of publication, rather than simply to reading his own verse to friends or pupils.

Certainly Suetonius believed that Ennius did teach, both his own poems and Greek literature. One Roman scholar also saw some kind of

¹⁰¹ Isid. *Etym.* 1.39.14-15.

¹⁰² Skutsch 1967 esp. 119ff.: (B 35), 1985, 147ff.: (B 35A); Wülfing-von Martitz 1972: (H 221) (and others *ibid.*). ¹⁰³ Suet. *Gram.* 1.

self-portrait in the faithful friend of lower rank to whom a Roman general turns in the *Annals*, whose secrecy and reliability are combined with learning, especially concerning the manners and laws of the past.¹⁰⁴ Here too Hellenistic models have been adduced, but the possibility of at least imagining such a figure in a Roman context points to a significant social development, and though self-portraiture may not have been in Ennius' mind one suspects that such indeed was his relation to the nobles, sometimes perhaps his pupils, whom Cicero pictures calling informally at the poet's humble ménage, or walking with him in Rome.¹⁰⁵ The story that on his death he was commemorated by a statue in the tomb of the Scipios is probably untrue – Cicero does not assert it as a fact¹⁰⁶ – but it may be fairly early, and we may take it to indicate the remarkable position that a poet had now been able to make for himself in Rome.

IV. REACTION AND ACCEPTANCE

The transformation of Roman society under the impact of new wealth and new customs, mostly from the Greek world (though trade and mining in the west, like booty, especially slaves, from it, contributed to prosperity) can hardly be exaggerated. It has often been believed that in certain quarters there was violent rejection of Greek influence in favour of the old ways; but it has also been argued that the Romans, intellectually unsophisticated as they were, in spite of lamenting the decline of *mores antiqui* as they had doubtless always done, did not realize how far it was Greek influence that was transforming their society, and did not take up conscious attitudes towards this influence as something to be welcomed or resisted. According to this view, not only was there no simple clash between a definable philhellene party on the one hand, inspired by love for Greek art and literature as well as aping Greek ways of life, and favourable on a political level to the Greeks, and on the other a hellenophobe one, desirous of keeping out of political and military entanglements in the east as well as of preserving Roman traditions (few would in fact now argue for so simple a conflict); but Greek ways seeped into Rome without much of an issue being made of them – some slight prejudice in some minds against some Greek customs has to be admitted.

It has also been suggested that if a few members of the intensely competitive Roman oligarchy took up Greek luxury and culture ostentatiously, the rest were forced to do the same through fear of being left behind in the race for influence. Certainly Greece could suggest profit-

¹⁰⁴ *Annals* 268ff. Sk. ¹⁰⁵ Cic. *De or.* II.68.276, *Acad.* II.16.51.

¹⁰⁶ Cic. *Arch.* 9.22; cf. Livy xxxviii.56.4.

able new methods of stressing individual or family achievements – poetic tributes, sculptural or other monuments, new ways of suggesting divine favour or even the blurring of the line between human and divine. But if it is true that the Roman upper class was, as has been stressed of late, innovative and flexible (Polybius observes Rome's willingness to learn and borrow from other nations¹⁰⁷), yet there were strong pressures for conservatism as well, largely rooted in the reverence for the ancestors, the *maiores*, which had its religious as well as social aspects. For some at least, moral authority, which was important in Roman public life, might seem to lie in preserving the old ways; and might the ruling class as a whole not have some sense of its role as the guardian of national tradition, especially in religion, where neglect of accustomed cults could anger the gods?

It is certainly not easy to document conscious awareness of and debate about the clash of traditions in the earlier part of the second century. Many of the arguments used in the past are too weak to support the superstructure erected on them. For example, it is far from clear how seriously the Senate really opposed foreign, including Greek, religion as such. In 186, when the Bacchic mysteries were strictly regulated throughout Italy, it seems to have been not the long-established devotion itself, but the strong organization that congregations were developing, with lay officials, private funds and so on, which provoked action (perhaps also a somewhat hysterical belief in the vices and scandals attributed to these as to so many secret religious groups throughout history). If Livy is to be trusted, however, some prejudice could be raised by pointing out that magistrates had often been told to prevent *sacra externa*.¹⁰⁸ In 181 the 'Books of Numa', supposedly recently found in the king's grave, were also suppressed by the civil authorities – there is no mention of the priestly colleges – but in this case it is unclear whether there was anything felt to be really alien, as opposed to dangerously unofficial, about their content, described by our earliest sources as Pythagorean and as destroyed because they were philosophical (speculation has been active; possibly rationalizing explanations of Numaic rites were given).¹⁰⁹ On the other hand Etruscan divination, which was still felt as foreign, was encouraged, at some time probably in our period, though it was put under the control of the college of *decemviri*, who also dealt with Greek cults.¹¹⁰ Astrology, an art of oriental origin but given a Greek dress, was beginning to be known; Ennius perhaps made an attack on it in his *Iphigeneia*, doubtless thinking this more likely to be received

¹⁰⁷ Polyb. vi.25.11. Cf. North 1976, 12: (H 107); Crawford 1978, 84: (A 12).

¹⁰⁸ xxxix.16.8–9. ¹⁰⁹ Pliny, *HN* xiii.84ff.; Livy xl.29.

¹¹⁰ Torelli, *Elogia Tarquiniensia* (Florence 1975) 108.

with favour than Euripides' assault on conventional divination,¹¹¹ and Cato forbade his bailiff to have anything to do with 'Chaldaei'. But astrology was probably still mainly confined to foreigners, especially slaves, like the Graeco-Egyptian cult of Isis, which Ennius may perhaps also have found occasion to mention.¹¹² The Senate was not to take steps against either Chaldaei or the Egyptian rites till after our period, and then perhaps largely, again, because they were unofficial and socially disturbing. It allowed generals to vow temples to whatever gods they pleased; some ancient deities such as Vejovis received new shrines in this manner, but we cannot tell if they were set up as a demonstration of traditional attitudes, and other such divinities seem to decline in importance.

There is no actual evidence of alarm at the sceptical or unorthodox religious views sometimes put forward on the stage, or in some of Ennius' works, though it is hard to suppose that traditionalists approved of them. It had probably always been legitimate, however, to make fun of the gods (on certain occasions); and it was the traditionalist Cato who said that a *haruspex* ought to laugh when he saw another *haruspex*. There seems to be little consciousness in the second century of a great religious crisis as postulated by modern scholars. However, there is nothing to parallel the procession of Greek divinities introduced to Rome on the command of the Sibylline books in the third century, and it is interesting that we know of no official delegation to question the Delphic oracle; while favour was shown to the town, and the free status conferred on it by Acilius Glabrio was ratified, the oracle's decline is thought to have been hastened by Rome's preference for her own, or Etruscan, methods of divination.¹¹³ It does look, then, as if the Senate was at least now cautious about the official introduction or patronage of foreign rites.

There was little Greek influence on Roman political institutions (or legal ones, unless the setting up, perhaps in our period, of the court of the *centumviri* reflects the Greek custom of empanelling very large juries). However, we may observe the rumpus over restricting the vote of freedmen to the four urban tribes, out of the full thirty-five. There must have been more freedmen now than ever before – there were simply more slaves, and especially more skilled and educated slaves for whose services freedom might seem a proper reward. Should such men, however, wield the considerable political power that enrolment in any tribe where they had property might give them? In 174 (and probably earlier) freedmen

¹¹¹ *Iph.* xcv, Jocelyn 1967: (H 196) – but *astrologi* may be astronomers. Africanus' arch with seven gilt statues (Livy xxxvii. 3. 7, 190 B.C.) has been thought to honour the seven planetary gods, but is perhaps a little early for this to be likely: G. Spano, *MAI* 8, iii (1951) 173–205.

¹¹² If Cic. *Div.* i. 132 is quoting him: Salem 1938: (B 31).

¹¹³ De Sanctis 1907–64, iv. ii. 361ff.: (A 14); Latte 1967, 223–4 (decline of old Roman religion, 264ff.): (H 205). Guesthouse for Romans at Delphi, *SIG* 609 with commentary (= Sherck, *Documents*, 37); cf. for Sparta, E. Ziebarth, *Rh. Mus.* 64 (1909) 335.

with a son or with substantial property were allowed to register in whatever tribe they wished; in 169 this was reversed for the first category, and Ti. Gracchus, father of the tribunes and later regarded as a severe character, tried unsuccessfully to disenfranchise entirely all freedmen except those in the top property class, whose existence is worth noting. (It is also worth noting that Gracchus was one of the Senate's experts on eastern affairs, and was willing to report favourably on the situation there; he left a speech in Greek that he had delivered to the Rhodians.¹¹⁴ As usual, simple philhellenism or its opposite is not in question.) But there is no evidence that prejudice against Greeks, rather than against foreigners in general, including pretty uncivilized ones, or against those who had gone through the debasing experience of slavery, was involved, and indeed the power which great men, their patrons, might exercise through their freedmen may have been part of the question at issue.

It seems less easy to deny that there may have been some conscious rejection of Greek influence in matters of morality and education. Argument here has to centre on the elder Cato, the one figure of the time of whose ideas we can really know something, since extensive fragments of his speeches and other writings survive, with the whole of his treatise on agriculture. He was a man whose opinions clearly impressed his contemporaries – even the Greek Polybius finds them worth quoting. If the possessor of the most forceful and versatile mind of any Roman of his time did not reach out to general judgements on the changes of his epoch, few others are likely to have done so.

Scholars have presented us with many Catos. The representative of opposition by peasants, or at least rural landowners, to the hellenized ruling aristocracy appears less often nowadays; the spokesman of the aristocracy into which he had made his way, intent as such on curbing the threat posed to it by great individuals who saw themselves as Hellenistic rulers or even kings, is still to be found. The idea that Cato was a simple, comprehensive hellenophobe cannot survive a glance at his fragments; the belief that he was deeply opposed to many aspects of Greek influence, but felt that it was necessary to learn from Greece in building up a sound educational literature in Latin, is more tenacious, and may go with a belief that Cato shows in his historical work, the *Origines*, a special value for Italian traditions and perhaps for peoples of the western Mediterranean in general. But recently he has been presented merely as a *novus homo*, who inevitably as such came at times into conflict with members of the aristocracy, though he had no lasting or principled hostility to the hellenizing Scipio Africanus or Fulvius Nobilior; as a man who cared (as

¹¹⁴ Treggiari 1969, 45: (H 118). Greek speech: Cic. *Brut.* 20.79.

he clearly did) primarily for law, service to the state, and thrift – one should increase not dissipate one's property, but not make money out of public office; one should devote one's efforts to agriculture and warfare – and whose literary works, written to some extent for amusement, involved at times vigorous and lively overstatement, but were too naive and chaotic seriously to put forward any general views.¹¹⁵ It is, however, probably better to think that Cato did have some real convictions about the dangers to the Romans in Greek civilization, but was ready to make some use of some sides of it, though without being quite the far-seeing eclectic with great literary and educational schemes that he has sometimes been assumed to be.

His long career spanned almost the whole of our period, from the Hannibalic War to the fall of Carthage, for which last event he was partly responsible. Some of the apparent contradictions in this career perhaps stem from its length. As we saw, he had little formal education in youth, but he perhaps learnt Greek, or some Greek, on service in Sicily and (probably) at Tarentum during the war. Cicero's statement that he lodged at Tarentum with a pro-Roman Greek named Nearchus may rest, as so much else in the *De Senectute* does, on Cato's own statements, and in reporting the Pythagorean doctrines that Cato supposedly learnt from Nearchus, Cicero was probably at least building on signs of Pythagorean influence in Cato's works (we can still see, in the *De Agricultura*, a Pythagorean regard for cabbage).¹¹⁶ It is unnecessary to reject the story that he later brought Ennius to Rome, and studied Greek literature with him, though it is disquieting that Cicero does not mention it.¹¹⁷ A later break between the two men may have been caused as much by Ennius' readiness to celebrate other patrons, notably Scipio and Fulvius Nobilior, whom Cato disliked (and in verse too – Cato had no opinion of verse) as by his transmitting to Rome aspects of Greek thought and literature of which Cato will certainly have disapproved.

Cato reached Greece proper with the Roman army in 191. He played a part in the battle of Thermopylae which suggests that he and his commander knew the course of events in 480, though they may have been told of them on the spot. And he passed some time at Athens, which he claimed to have spent discovering what Greek culture was about.¹¹⁸ He must have continued thereafter to study Greek literature, as indeed Nepos' biography states, though it is not likely that the educated slave, Chilo, whom he kept in Rome in the 180s, helped his master, as so many educated slaves did in the first century, for he is described as a *grammatistes* or elementary teacher.¹¹⁹ But acquaintance with Homer,

¹¹⁵ Astin 1978: (H 68).

¹¹⁶ Cic. *Sen.* 41; Cato, *Agr.* 157.

¹¹⁷ Badian 1972: (H 70).

¹¹⁸ Pliny, *HN* xxix. 13.

¹¹⁹ Nep. *Cato* 3.2; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.3.

Demosthenes and probably Xenophon, with leading figures of Greek history and famous Greek institutions, can be traced in Cato's fragments or is attested in anecdotes, not all from his last years. Xenophon was to become popular at Rome;¹²⁰ one wonders if his easy Greek, as well as his practical outlook, had something to do with this. On the other hand, though Plutarch says that Cato took some things from Thucydides, as well as much from Demosthenes,¹²¹ it seems unlikely that he was able to come to real grips with either the language or the thought of the great historian at least.

Cato had made his mark politically by soldiering and by pleading in court, in the traditional Roman fashion. In 195 he was consul, with his old patron L. Valerius Flaccus, and his views on luxury were revealed by his unsuccessful opposition to the repeal of the *lex Oppia*, a sumptuary measure of war-time origin; to try as he and others were doing to retain such controls in peace was significant. Now or earlier, as praetor, he passed a law limiting a provincial governor's expenditure. He himself governed Spain, and fought there, vowing a temple to Victoria Virgo, whom he perhaps did not feel to be a Greek divinity, though Greek and Roman elements combine in the conception of Victoria. He insisted that he had lived in Spain in strict simplicity, without causing the state expense.¹²² Returning, he began his career of prosecuting officials for peculation, extortion from provincials and other crimes supposedly hitherto strange to public life. In particular, he had some part in the attacks on Scipio and his brother, in the 180s, which seem to have turned on accountability for public money, though the course of events is irrecoverable. But his greatest moment was his censorship in 184, with Flaccus; he revised the rolls of the Senate and cavalry with extreme strictness, in particular excluding from the former T. Flamininus' brother, whom he accused of murdering a Gallic prisoner to gratify the whim of a catamite. He registered, as censors had to do, the property of all citizens, inventing an ingenious way to tax luxury items, and punishing those who neglected their fields.

It is true that the iniquitous practices that Cato combated are not actually stated in our wretched fragments of his speeches to be Greek (though they are in the speech that Livy puts into his mouth *à propos* of the *lex Oppia*),¹²³ but simplicity of life is repeatedly associated with 'our ancestors', and it is paradoxical to suppose that the other term of the contrast was not sometimes present in Cato's mind, whether he was inveighing against the erection of statues to effeminate cooks, or to women in the provinces (this apparently in an attack on Fulvius

¹²⁰ Münscher 1920, 70ff.: (B 21). ¹²¹ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2.4.

¹²² ORF⁴ Cato frs. 51, 53, 54. ¹²³ Livy xxxiv.4.

Nobilior), or the placing of images of the gods in private houses 'as if they were furniture', or taking poets on campaign (Fulvius again), or indeed of reciting Greek verses as well as indulging in other undignified actions. Cato did not stand entirely alone; Pliny tells us that the censors of 189 forbade the import of foreign perfumes; Plautus' *Trinummus*, which may date from the eighties, reflects anxiety about *mali mores*¹²⁴ and the non-observance of laws, and a statue of Cato was set up in the temple of Salus praising him for saving Rome from decline (though possibly Plutarch is wrong to suppose the statue and censorship contemporary¹²⁵).

But Cato's censorship could not escape the paradoxicality to which he was always condemned, or the Greek influence of which he had to admit a certain measure. The heavy spending on useful public building works (1,000 talents on the sewage system) helped to turn Rome into something more like a Hellenistic city. In particular the Basilica Porcia introduced a Greek architectural form, under a Greek name (and his own), for a building designed for legal and commercial activities. Nevertheless, some years later, after more building had taken place, anti-Roman Macedonians could still poke fun at the unpretentious and old-fashioned public and private edifices in the city (as well as at individual leading citizens and, comprehensively, Roman customs, institutions and history).¹²⁶

The most significant achievement of Cato's later life was to be in literary work, though he continued to be litigious in the extreme and a watchdog of official behaviour. Here above all he was inevitably to a considerable extent dependent on the Greeks. His first objective seems to have been the proper education of his delicate but talented son by his aristocratic first wife; the boy will have been about ten in the late 180s. The Greek slave Chilo was allowed to teach a large class of other boys (whether freeborn or more likely the slaves Cato encouraged other servants of his to train for sale);¹²⁷ young Cato was his father's care. We know that a Roman history in specially large letters was produced for the boy;¹²⁸ this was perhaps the first history in Latin of any kind (though the date of a Latin version of Pictor's history is problematic), but though it may be the genesis of, it cannot be identical with, the *Origines*, on which Cato was at work in the last years of his life. It was perhaps Roman rather than Greek to give the history of one's country so central a part in elementary education. Possibly a few years later than this first work came the *libri ad Marcum filium*, of which we know too little, for example whether they were in any sense 'published' by Cato. Rather than a proper

¹²⁴ Pliny, *HN* XIII.24; Plaut. *Trin.* 28ff. ¹²⁵ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 19.3.

¹²⁶ Livy XL.5.7. ¹²⁷ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.3, 21.7. ¹²⁸ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.5.

Greek-style encyclopaedia reflecting a more practical and Roman version of the Greek liberal education (*enkyklios paideia*), with separate books on different subjects, they may have been a rather disorganized collection of advice of different kinds.¹²⁹ They certainly forbade Marcus to have anything to do with Greek doctors, to whom Cato pronounced himself unambiguously hostile, on the grounds that they were sworn to do away with every barbarian they treated, and for pay at that.¹³⁰ Plutarch supposes that this shows that Cato knew the story of Hippocrates' refusal to treat the Persian King, and it appears from Pliny that Greek doctors at Rome in the second century had acquired a bad reputation for savage and dangerous remedies.¹³¹ It was, besides, traditionally the duty of the *pater familias* to look after his household (Cato had a notebook with a collection of prescriptions for this purpose),¹³² and the idea of healing for pay was alien. Nonetheless, it is clear that there were numerous Greek doctors in Rome by now.

In the same (somewhat ill-organized) passage Cato told his son that he would explain *suo loco*, in its right place, that the import of Greek literature to Rome would prove the city's ruin; Marcus might look into this, though not study it thoroughly. Cato clearly means Greek literature in general, not medical literature only; and we have no right to say that he did not mean these words seriously, or the sweeping condemnation of the Greeks as *nequissimum et indocile genus*, a completely worthless and unruly race. We do not know whether he in fact dealt with the whole subject *suo loco*, but the promise reveals that he took the matter to be an important one.

Cato also taught his son about the laws of his country, the old staple of Roman upper-class education. He may have written on the subject, either in the *libri ad Marcum filium* or separately, but he may have felt that it was already in safe hands. The first Roman legal work we know of is the *Tripertita* of Sex. Aelius Catus, perhaps of about 200 B.C.; the three parts consisted of the Twelve Tables, a commentary on its archaic language, and a collection of legal formulae or procedures.¹³³ If one enquires as to the results of Cato's intensive education of his son, one finds that the latter continued to evoke his father's approval; he was noted for courage, and became a well-regarded writer on the subject of law.¹³⁴

All Cato's treatises were doubtless basically didactic; Cicero comments on his passion for teaching as well as learning. He doubtless took the view that public men at least must write only for serious purposes (the introduction to the *De Agricultura*, possibly inspired by Xenophon, says that one must give account of one's leisure, as well as one's active hours).

¹²⁹ Astin 1978, 332: (H 68). ¹³⁰ Pliny, *HN* xxix.13.

¹³¹ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* xxiii.3; Pliny xxvi.12–20. ¹³² Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 23.4.

¹³³ Pompon. *Dig.* i.2.2.38. ¹³⁴ Gell. *NA* xiii.20.9.

But the *De Re Militari*, for example, was presumably not written for his son, as it addressed the supreme commander in the second person singular.¹³⁵ Perhaps it was designed in the first instance for a specific person or persons; but Cato envisages it becoming more widely known, and as a result unfairly criticized.¹³⁶ Probably there was no proper publication or sale of books, but manuscripts inevitably circulated and were copied. If the subject of this work was Roman enough, to write about it was of course Greek. In particular it was to follow in the footsteps of King Pyrrhus and his adviser Cineas, whose works may well have been already familiar to the Romans, who were interested in their authors. Little is known of Cato's work, which was used, but much mangled, by the late author Vegetius; changes in organization and equipment probably made it rapidly out of date.

The *De Agricultura*, of uncertain date, survives to us and is of interest both for what it does and does not do. What it does do is to accept without discussion that its subject is a form of modern agriculture: it is addressed to the owner (in a few passages apparently to the slave bailiff or *vilicus*) of a fair-sized estate run mainly by slaves and selling its surplus of specialized produce, wine or oil, on the market. There is no hankering, except in the rather irrelevant preface, after the old-fashioned small peasant farm; though neither does it deal with the great ranches probably already to be found in parts of southern Italy, in spite of the fact that on one occasion Cato claimed that pasture was far and away the most profitable type of land;¹³⁷ nor with the fulling establishments, pitchworks and other forms of real estate which Plutarch says in his old age Cato found more lucrative than agricultural property.¹³⁸

The book opens with a formal preface very much on the Greek literary model (though the *maiores* and military prowess add a Roman note). But though it attempts to go through the process of acquiring and developing a farm in due order – one notes that this farm is not thought of as inherited – it soon degenerates into a hodge-podge of maxims, charms, recipes, prescriptions and Best Buys, the confusion of which is unlikely to be entirely the result of a lack of final polish, or textual corruption or interpolation. In spite of Cato's dislike of Greek doctors, a good deal of Greek druggists' terminology appears,¹³⁹ along with popular medicine, not all of it unmixed with superstition. Acquaintance with the procedures of Greek technical literature is also sporadically betrayed – 'there are three kinds of cabbage, and I will show their nature and effect' – but only sporadically.

A Greek treatise on almost any subject, a *technē* or, as the Romans were

¹³⁵ Fr. 13 Jordan. ¹³⁶ Pliny, *HN* xxx *praef.* ¹³⁷ Cic. *Off.* II.89.

¹³⁸ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 21.5. ¹³⁹ Boscherini 1970: (H 170).

to say, an *ars* (as both subject and treatise were known) first defines its subject, and then subdivides it, going on to deal separately and in order with the various parts, kinds or aspects. This is a method that goes back through the great philosophers to the sophists, who first taught the Greeks to think and speak in an orderly fashion. In the first century B.C. at Rome Varro treated agriculture on this model, criticizing all his predecessors, including Cato, for not starting with an accurate definition of the subject and for including irrelevant material. In fact, it seems pretty clear that it was only from the start of the first century that Greek method was used by the Romans for organizing treatises on any subject – rhetoric, grammar and the rest.¹⁴⁰ Cato's failure shows how unsophisticated Rome still was; the prose writings of many comparatively primitive peoples show a similar tendency to hodge-podge. The early Romans also found it hard to generalize; Cato's farm is clearly in southern Latium or northern Campania (he is certainly not writing of the Sabine or Alban hills where his original estates were), and particular craftsmen in that area are recommended for brooms, tools and the like. Similarly, till even later, Roman legal writers often seem to have found it hard to do other than record or comment on particular cases. And the lack of a clear sense of form is visible in other contexts as well; Plautus, in comparison with his originals, thinks in terms of separate scenes, not of the play as a whole, and the *sc. de Bacchanalibus* at least ends chaotically.

Parallel to an inability to organize material clearly in a treatise is the inability, in a society still only superficially influenced by Greek grammar and rhetoric, to organize a speech coherently, or to produce a clear narrative line with proper logical and syntactical subordination of secondary elements. Cicero thought that all the oratorical virtues except polish and rhythm, but including good examples of tropes and figures, were to be found in Cato's speeches,¹⁴¹ and Plutarch believed that all his work showed Greek influence. But Cicero also says that Cato was not yet *doctus* or *eruditus* and lacked 'foreign and imported art'.¹⁴² As it happens, Cicero's freedman Tiro wrote a long criticism of Cato's speech 'For the Rhodians' of 167, and this is partly preserved to us by A. Gellius.¹⁴³ Since Tiro is criticizing a speech made in the Senate (and so by Greek classification deliberative in genre) as though it were a forensic one, most of his technical criticisms seem misconceived, though Gellius, writing in the archaizing period, springs too readily to Cato's support. Gellius does, however, twice suggest that Cato's arguments were not well organized, and this rings true. But the reflections on justice, honour and expediency recall the stock heads of Greek deliberative oratory, the tendency to

¹⁴⁰ Rawson 1978: (H 213). ¹⁴¹ Cic. *Brut.* 69.

¹⁴² Cic. *De or.* III.133. ¹⁴³ Gell. *NA* VI.3.

argument rather than pathos or abuse has been seen as Greek, like the stress on the idea of arrogance and the frank recognition that states act from self-interest. Most of the figures of speech, however, especially alliteration and repetition, seem native to the earliest Latin we know, that of prayers and religious formulae, and indeed some of them were positively discouraged by Greek teachers. A general awareness of Greek oratory, read and heard, but not formal teaching in rhetoric, would explain Cato's style in his speeches, much more elevated than that of the *De Agricultura*, often vigorous, amusing or cutting. A substantial fragment of another speech represents Cato as working on it seriously beforehand, with a secretary and an earlier speech of his own to help him, and is a sustained and amusing example of the figure of *praeteritio*, perhaps a conscious one.¹⁴⁴ Cato obviously kept his speeches carefully; we do not know if he published any, except those that he included in his historical work.

In fact some rhetorical training may have been available in Rome by the eighties or seventies of the second century; Ennius speaks of those who practise rhetoric (though not necessarily in a Roman context)¹⁴⁵ and Suetonius says the early *grammatici* also taught rhetoric (though he may be thinking of a slightly later date).¹⁴⁶ Cicero, however, in the *Brutus* only sees real signs of Greek training in the speeches of public men active in the second half of the century,¹⁴⁷ and the Epicurean Philodemus is probably quoting a mid second-century source when he says that the Spartans and Romans carry on their political life successfully without any use of rhetoric.¹⁴⁸ Cato noted how brief his own speech to the Athenians in 191 was, compared with what the interpreter made of it,¹⁴⁹ and indeed all his speeches were short by Greek or later standards (so were what Cicero calls the *oratiunculae* of some at least of his contemporaries) and all began piously with invocations to the gods.¹⁵⁰ Cato also said that the words of the Greeks came from their lips, but those of the Romans from their hearts,¹⁵¹ and laughed at the lengthy training of Isocrates' pupils, fully prepared to speak by the time they came before Minos the judge of Hades.¹⁵² He probably did not write a separate work on rhetoric, but in the *libri ad filium* or elsewhere gave his well-known advice to stick to the subject as the words would follow, *rem tene verba sequentur*,¹⁵³ and defined the orator as 'a good man skilled in speaking', *vir bonus dicendi peritus*.¹⁵⁴ Whether this last owes anything to Greek works in defence of rhetoric against those philosophers who attacked it as immoral, or not, it helped

¹⁴⁴ ORF⁴ fr. 173. ¹⁴⁵ Vahlen 1928, 217: (B 37 A). ¹⁴⁶ Suet. *Gram.* 4.6.

¹⁴⁷ Cic. *Brut.* 96ff.; Galba, Scipio and Laelius *docti*, Cato only *studiosus*: *Tusc.* 1.3.1.

¹⁴⁸ Phil. *Rhet.* 1.14, 11.65 and 85 Sudhaus. ¹⁴⁹ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 12.5.

¹⁵⁰ Cic. *Brut.* 63. ¹⁵¹ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 12.5. ¹⁵² Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 23.2.

¹⁵³ Fr. 15 Jordan. ¹⁵⁴ Fr. 14 Jordan.

point the way for Cicero's conception of the orator as a true statesman. But Cato himself, where rhetoric was concerned, probably followed his own advice to look into, but not study in detail, Greek literature.

How efficiently Fabius Pictor and the other Roman senators who wrote histories in Greek articulated their narratives in that language we do not know (and they may have had help from Greek slaves or freedmen). Cato's late work, the *Origines*, was perhaps the first real historical work in Latin, for the brief notices preserved for each year on whitened boards by the *pontifices*, and elaborated later, do not deserve the title. Slight as the fragments of Cato's work are, we can see the heavy, redundant, paratactic sentence structure; and the overall plan of the work, though interesting, was inelegant. The first book dealt, conventionally enough by Greek standards, with the prehistory and early history of Rome; but Cato, who was not himself a *Romano di Roma*, went on to shatter the traditional historiographical model. Books II and III turned to the foundation and origins of all other Italian states and tribes, even the Gauls of the northern plains which had perhaps been regarded as part of Italy since the late third century and had been extensively colonized by Rome. It has been suggested that Cato was simply influenced by Timaeus, who began his history with much ethnography of the peoples of the western Mediterranean; but it may be significant that Cato noted that some cities were older than Rome, and praised various peoples for their warlike qualities, and perhaps in general lauded the Italian way of life, *Italiae disciplinam et vitam*.¹⁵⁵ It is interesting that we know by chance that when in Greece Cato particularly trusted and favoured the troops of the Latin colony of Firmum.¹⁵⁶ He may even have felt that Rome did not always reward her allies as she should; one fragment laments that only the leader of a Tusculan force that saved Rome from a Sabine *coup* in the fifth century had been rewarded with the citizenship,¹⁵⁷ though this may mainly reflect his belief that it was armies not generals who won victories, and the variety of languages and cultures still surviving in Italy makes it unlikely that he thought of a wide extension of citizenship. Some pro-Italian feeling there must be; even those who cannot organize their thoughts well may have strongly held convictions.

But in spite of this regard for Italy, the early history of many of her communities had to mean the Greek legends that they, or the Greeks for them, had produced to explain their institutions or for cultural respectability. Cato seems to have had no hesitation in chronicling tales which made half the population of Italy – including the Sabines, supposed to be Spartans by origin – descended from Greeks. (It is perhaps chance that no fragments deal with Hercules or Evander in Latium, though a

¹⁵⁵ Peter, *HRRel.* frs. 73, 76, cf. 21.

¹⁵⁶ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 13.5.

¹⁵⁷ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 25.

number involve Aeneas; but for Cato the Romans certainly inherit Greek blood through the Aborigines and the Sabines.) In fact Cato is contemptuous of the ignorance of a tribe that cannot produce a story of this kind.¹⁵⁸ Whether he tried to reconcile his views by contrasting warlike and moral ancient Greeks with their decadent modern successors, as some later Roman writers do, we do not know. His research must have been quite extensive; his sources were probably both written and oral. Among the former Italiote and Siceliote historians will have bulked large. There is some evidence that he even looked out for inscriptions, which he could have learnt to do from Timaeus.¹⁵⁹ He uses the Greek scholarly weapons of etymology and aetiology, and though on the whole avoiding the miraculous, reports natural wonders, what the Greeks call *paradoxa*. In this last field his biographer Nepos noted his *diligentia*, but denied him *doctrina*, perhaps Greek scientific learning.¹⁶⁰ Cato has an eye here for agricultural and legal points of interest,¹⁶¹ however, that perhaps betray the Roman behind the at least superficially hellenizing scholar.

Passing quickly, it seems, over the early Republic though perhaps not omitting it entirely, Cato then recounted the great wars in which Rome (and her Italian allies – their part may have been stressed) conquered the Mediterranean world. If he seems to have been brief on the wars in the east, it has been rightly observed that Polybius, who was specially interested in them, and Livy, who used Polybius, have biased us; though Cato may well have had a particular interest in Spain, and certainly retailed his own campaigns there. He stressed the role of the legions as a whole, and omitted the very names of individual generals, referring to them, at least usually, simply by their official rank;¹⁶² this perhaps had roots in archaic Latin usage, but must have been purposely extended. It is perhaps illegitimate, however, to transfer the attitude to the internal political life of Rome, and argue that Cato was consciously aware that the rule of the oligarchy was threatened by the emergence of over-great individuals, usually generals and usually hellenizing. He did note, however, that the Roman constitution was not the work of a single law-giver (as so many Greek ones of course were), but of long ages.¹⁶³ On the other hand, his belief that Roman history provided *exempla* superior to the most renowned episodes in Greek history becomes explicit in his account of the military tribune Caedicius, author of a greater exploit than that of Leonidas at Thermopylae, but meeting with less eloquent praise.¹⁶⁴ Here an individual (though not a general) did step forth.

¹⁵⁸ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 31.

¹⁵⁹ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 58 is often thought to rest on an archaic inscription; cf. Cic. *Sen.* 21.

¹⁶⁰ Nep. *Cato* 3.4. ¹⁶¹ Peter, *HRRel.* frs. 39, 43, 57, 61.

¹⁶² Nep. *Cato* 3.4; Pliny, *HN* viii.11. ¹⁶³ Cic. *Rep.* ii.1.2.

¹⁶⁴ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 83. It is conceivable that Cato did not give even this name, as it appears differently in other sources.

Further formal incongruity will have been caused by Cato's insertion of some of his own speeches, apparently *in extenso*, into the last books of the *Origines*.¹⁶⁵ Short by later standards, they were probably still too long for their place. Cato presumably knew that speeches were a feature of Greek historiography, but had not grasped their proper function.

Cato is at his most Greek in the *Origines*, but it was perhaps at the same time, late in his life, that he rejected Greek philosophy uncompromisingly; it was only at this period that it was really becoming known in Rome. It seemed to him *mera mortualia*, probably 'mere funeral-dirges', which were proverbially near-nonsense.¹⁶⁶ He is said by Plutarch to have declared that Socrates' teaching (of which he may have known something from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*) was destructive of his country's laws and that the man's only recommendation was that he was a patient husband and father.¹⁶⁷ With some untechnical political philosophy he was acquainted; he knew the idea that Carthage, if not Rome too, was an example of the mixed or at least a tripartite constitution.¹⁶⁸ But if two Epicurean philosophers were really expelled from Rome as early as 173, for 'teaching the young pleasures', Cato no doubt approved, as he will have done for the expulsion of philosophers and rhetors in 161 – indeed Pliny says that he thought all Greeks should be expelled from Italy, though this can hardly be serious.¹⁶⁹ In 155 he strongly deprecated the upsetting effect on the young of the 'philosophic embassy' from Athens (see below). Let the young men of Rome return to listening to the laws and the magistrates, he said, and let the philosophers give their immoral lectures to the youth of Greece.¹⁷⁰ He was still concerned with education, and his views on it were still largely traditional.

It remains to deal with Cato's foreign policy, if he had one. It certainly seems uncertain whether he steadily advocated any sort of disengagement from the Greek East, which was in reality hardly practicable. He is not said to have disapproved of Rome's earlier campaigns, or even (for certain) of the war against Perseus, though we can be sure he disliked the rush to enlist for that war in hopes of personal enrichment. He did thereafter approve of the 'freeing' of Macedon, on the grounds that it could not be protected by Rome,¹⁷¹ and he opposed the attempt to declare war on Rhodes for sympathizing with Perseus, and for tactlessly trying to arbitrate between him and Rome. Here he put forward a whole collection of reasons, but he was perhaps greatly influenced by the fact that once again the proponents of war were much moved by thoughts of

¹⁶⁵ Peter, *HRRel.* frs. 95, 106. ¹⁶⁶ Gell. *NA* xviii.7.3.

¹⁶⁷ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 23.1. ¹⁶⁸ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 80.

¹⁶⁹ Ath. xii.547a – now or, perhaps more likely, in 154 (an L. Postumius was consul in both years): Pliny, *HN* vii.113. ¹⁷⁰ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22.5. ¹⁷¹ ORF⁴ fr. 162.

gain.¹⁷² These two cases are not enough for us to build far-reaching theories upon; and on both occasions Cato had a majority in the Senate. He expressed on several occasions a Roman and republican distaste for kings, but he could also praise an eastern monarch if need be.¹⁷³ It is worth noting, however, that in spite of his early experience of both war and diplomacy in Greece, he never went back as an ambassador in later years (as he did to Africa), and that there is no sign that he had any sort of *clientela* in the area (as he did in Spain). He must have been regarded as unusually unsympathetic to Greeks, and unwilling to have more to do with them than he must.

Cato stands, to some extent, nonetheless, for a synthesis of Greek and Roman elements. Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Perseus, represents another synthesis, with stronger Greek elements, which was perhaps more significant for the future. Born about 230 B.C., he was doubtless brought up, as we would expect in that period, largely in the Roman tradition. He remained till his death an exceedingly conscientious augur, and a strict disciplinarian to his army at a time when (says Plutarch) most generals were trying to win the favour of their men as a step to a further command.¹⁷⁴ But he was, unlike Cato, anxious that his sons should have both a traditional and a Greek education. They were provided with Greek grammarians, 'sophists' (probably philosophers), rhetoricians, sculptors, painters and huntsmen. Some of these were perhaps only recruited after the defeat of Perseus and when the two elder sons were already grown up; we know that Paullus' son Scipio Aemilianus was introduced to hunting in Macedonia, and it was when Paullus was in Athens that he boldly asked the Athenians for a philosopher and a painter. The Athenians combined the two in the person of one Metrodorus, and though Paullus thought he had a great catch, the Athenians probably did not consider sending anyone of eminence. Metrodorus' philosophical school is not recorded; Paullus had apparently not specified what he wanted.¹⁷⁵

We are told that Paullus attended his sons' lessons when he could, and he must at least have read some Homer, if he was able when at Olympia to comment that Pheidias' Zeus there was the Zeus of Homer;¹⁷⁶ he somehow got hold of an Athena by Pheidias to dedicate at Rome. Otherwise, what struck him on his sightseeing tour of Greece seem to have been mainly strategic possibilities.

¹⁷² ORF⁴ frs. 163-71. Cf. Sall. *Cat.* 51.5.

¹⁷³ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 8.8; ORF⁴ frs. 58, 180. Note that it was after a speech by Eumenes that Cato said that kings were carnivorous animals: perhaps when Eumenes had urged war with Perseus? Possibly, in backing Ptolemy Euergetes' claim to Cyprus, Cato was showing disapproval also of intervening in the affairs of Egypt (ORF⁴ frs. 177ff.).

¹⁷⁴ Plut. *Aem.* 3-4. The main source for this life is probably Polybius.

¹⁷⁵ Plut. *Aem.* 6.4-5. ¹⁷⁶ Polyb. xxx.10.6.

After his Macedonian victory, he discoursed on the power of Fortune, the Greek Tyche, and Perseus' punishment by Nemesis – Greek ideas, if popular and superficial ones.¹⁷⁷ He behaved in many ways as a Hellenistic king victorious over a rival might be expected to behave; he set up his own statue on the pillar that Perseus had prepared for himself at Delphi, and sailed up the Tiber on the royal galley.¹⁷⁸ The claim that the Aemilii were descended from Pythagoras perhaps dates from this period (as other bogus genealogies of great Roman families, usually involving figures of Greek mythology, may do). But Paullus showed a Roman severity too. He rebuked Sulpicius Galus for lax discipline, though a friend of this student of Greek science;¹⁷⁹ perhaps from him he learned to understand eclipses, but he sacrificed piously when one occurred. He threw deserters to wild beasts, enslaved the whole population of Epirus (though on the Senate's orders and perhaps unwillingly), claimed that it was military experience that allowed him to organize games in Greece efficiently, and died a martyr to his augural duties.¹⁸⁰ His funeral was celebrated with the performance of plays by Terence and Pacuvius; and by the savage gladiatorial games, probably of Etruscan origin, that were becoming increasingly popular.

Faute de mieux, perhaps, Cato approved of Paullus, marrying his beloved son to the latter's daughter. And he was to look with favour on Paullus' son, Scipio Aemilianus (adopted by Scipio), who was much influenced by his father and whose combination of Greek and Roman traditions probably owed much to him.

V. FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH

The end of the Third Macedonian War brought a new flood of educated Greeks to Rome and Italy. The whole Macedonian court was deported (Perseus' son Alexander was kept in Rome, learnt metal-work and Latin, and became a *scriba* – he at least should have been able to translate legal Latin into decent Greek).¹⁸¹ So were the thousand hostages from Achaea, of whom Polybius was one; he too, exceptionally, was allowed to remain in Rome. King Genthius of Illyria, with all his family, was confined in Umbria.¹⁸²

Events had altered the pattern of Rome's relationships in the Greek world; Macedon was eliminated, Rhodes weakened, and compensatory favour to Athens, which led to a revival of prosperity there, may have helped cause the movement towards classicism, in the visual arts at least, discernible a little later in Italy. If this favour was mainly owing to

¹⁷⁷ Plut. *Aem.* 26.5–27.4. ¹⁷⁸ Plut. *Aem.* 28.2, 30.1. ¹⁷⁹ Livy XLV.28.9.

¹⁸⁰ Plut. *Aem.* 39.2. ¹⁸¹ Plut. *Aem.* 37.3. ¹⁸² Livy XLV.43.9.

Athens' loyalty to Rome, it may be that the Romans' respect for her great past did play some part. To Delos, now a free port under Athenian control, Roman and Italian businessmen began to flock in numbers unknown before; it became a great entrepôt for the slave trade. The flood of embassies to Rome from Greek states continued (it was to decline, though not disappear, when, later, Roman governors were on the spot). It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the extent to which Greek states felt unable to take any action without getting Rome's approval: even King Attalus of Pergamum, favoured and distant, was persuaded by a councillor that it would be wise 'to send at all times to Rome to make continual report' about his military and political problems with the Galatians, in order to avoid Roman jealousy and suspicion.¹⁸³

The war also brought to Rome the books of the Macedonian royal library, given by Aemilius Paullus to his sons, Scipio and Fabius Aemilianus,¹⁸⁴ but probably made freely available by them to other readers, as the great libraries of Lucullus and others were in the next century. It has been suggested that the library was not very up-to-date, and this might be one reason for the Roman tendency to look to Greek literature of the classical rather than the Hellenistic period. Certainly Perseus and his immediate predecessors had not had literary tastes, but the library may have had a nucleus going back to Archelaus, the patron of Euripides and other Greek poets, and then reflecting the links of the court in the fourth century with the Academy and with Aristotle. It is not known if it was in this library that young Scipio found Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia*, certainly known to Alexander the Great; it may have reached Italy earlier, but at all events Scipio became devoted to it¹⁸⁵ (indeed the only authors that Scipio is recorded as praising or quoting are the in a sense elementary Homer and Xenophon, though his reading will not have been restricted to these). We may guess with some plausibility that the Macedonian library also possessed the works of Antigonos Gonatas' Stoic protégé Persaeus (we know he wrote on kingship and the Spartan constitution) and the other Stoics admired by Antigonos, like Cynics such as Bion; though Cynicism was too subversive to have much influence on the Romans, the arrival of the library may have paved the way for the coming impact of philosophy, and especially of a more up-to-date Stoicism. Another visitor to the court of Macedon had been the astronomical poet Aratus, and Cicero suggests that his work was or could have been known to Scipio and his friends, and even to Sulpicius Galus; it was certainly later much read in Rome.

For this period it is certain, from Polybius, what was only highly

¹⁸³ *IGRom.* III.222; Welles 1934, no. 61: (B 74); cf. Polyb. XXIII.17.4 agreeing that the Romans wanted everything submitted to them. ¹⁸⁴ Plut. *Aem.* 28.6.

¹⁸⁵ Cic. *QFr.* I.1.23, *Tusc.* II.62; *Sen.* 59 includes Scipio's friend Laelius.

probable in the preceding one, that there was much consciousness of the difference between 'the Greek way of life' and 'the Roman way of life' – Polybius uses the word *hairesis*. He describes A. Postumius Albinus, a young man of distinguished family who first appears as a junior officer in the war with Perseus, as one whose enthusiasm from boyhood for Greek studies, the Greek language and the less worthy aspects of Greek culture – love of pleasure and hatred of toil – turned the older and more distinguished Romans against Greek ways.¹⁸⁶ Cato may be among these, for Polybius shows him rebuking Albinus for apologizing in case the style and organization of his history in Greek were faulty; there was no need to write one at all. (Albinus even wrote a poem in Greek as well.) Polybius also looked back to the fall of Syracuse and regretted that the Romans had carried off its spoils, especially the works of art. To imitate the habits of the conquered had been an error, and hatred had been created among the subject population.¹⁸⁷ Young Scipio Aemilianus, who spent his time in study and hunting, instead of pleading in the Forum, was unhappy at being regarded as unRoman, though he did not indulge in the 'Greek laxity' that Polybius says infected Roman youths during the war with Macedon, and ran riot with the transference of Macedonian wealth to Rome¹⁸⁸ – affairs with boys and courtesans, concerts and stage performances (*acroamata*), drinking parties: 'many paid a talent for a catamite or three hundred drachmas for a jar of caviare'. Here Polybius is using a speech of Cato's which contrasted such spending with that on agricultural land. Polybius' views are in fact probably much influenced by those of his Roman friends, and perhaps even by Cato's. He strongly approves of those who were disgusted by the flattery of King Prusias of Bithynia on his visit to Rome,¹⁸⁹ and those, notably M. Aemilius Lepidus, *pontifex maximus* and *princeps senatus* (later to insist on a simple funeral), and Aemilius Paullus, who closed their doors to the murderous Charops of Epirus.¹⁹⁰ It may be that the occasional aping of Roman habits by foreign potentates – Prusias was not the only example – helped the Romans to be conscious of their own way of life.

In 161, as we saw, philosophers and rhetors were actually expelled from Rome, though it has been doubted whether the measure was strictly enforced against those living with a patron, and one observes that the *grammatici*, who taught the language and some literature, seem to have been exempted (people did have to learn Greek).¹⁹¹ In the same year a

¹⁸⁶ Polyb. xxxix.1. ¹⁸⁷ Polyb. ix.10.

¹⁸⁸ Polyb. xxxi.25.4. If it is true that commercial bakers only became known at the time of the war with Perseus (Pliny, *HN* xviii.197) this is another index of changing ways; Plautus has the word *artopta*, *Aul.* 400, but does not use *pistor* in the sense of baker.

¹⁸⁹ Polyb. xxx.18; Braund (1982): (E 125) on Prusias' pose as a Roman freedman.

¹⁹⁰ Polyb. xxxii.6.5. ¹⁹¹ Suet. *Gram.* 25.

sumptuary law regulating expense at dinners was introduced. On the other hand, in 164 the Romans acquired an accurate public sundial from the censor Marcius Philippus; in the third century they had ignorantly supposed that one carried off from Sicily would work in Rome too. A few years later Scipio Nasica set up a public water-clock. Civilization was advancing.

The period after Pydna would have been called, till a few years back, by anyone writing on the cultural and intellectual traditions of the time, the age of the Scipionic Circle. But the concept has recently become discredited, as largely a creation of Cicero, who, in a desire for dramatic concentration, gathered together most of the intellectuals of this or rather a slightly later period in his *De Republica*, of which Scipio is the central figure. It is true, however, that the period between Pydna and the fall of Carthage is that of Scipio's younger manhood, and that he and his friends Laelius and Furius Philus are among the most interesting figures of their time. They, and particularly Scipio, may be seen as the heirs of Aemilius Paullus, who had found it possible to combine what he saw as best in both Greek and Roman traditions. Polybius in fact does not find it paradoxical that Scipio should ask a Greek to help him become more worthy of his ancestors. Indeed Polybius 'believed that there was no one more suitable than he was himself to do this', there being as he pointed out plenty of teachers of mere school subjects flooding into Rome at this time.¹⁹² Polybius encouraged Scipio to seek a reputation for temperance (the idea if not the practice was Greek), financial generosity (unRoman) and courage (with preparation in the hunting field, where the Romans did not usually seek it).¹⁹³ The young man's qualities were seen in 151, when it was impossible to recruit for the Spanish War, owing to an unexampled panic that shocked the older generation; he volunteered to serve, and then distinguished himself in single combat.¹⁹⁴ He was later to show himself a strict disciplinarian in the field, like his father, and at Rome a positively Catonian scourge of lax morals – as well as a friend of learned Greeks.

Whether, as ancient tradition has it, Scipio, Furius and Laelius were in their youth friends and patrons of Terence, whose brief career was traditionally run in the 160s, is uncertain. The nobles whom Terence tells us were accused of helping to write his comedies must, it was already thought by a scholar of the first century B.C., have been older, as they were described as having been made use of by the people in war and in peace.¹⁹⁵ This may imply some advance in the *cursus honorum*, though Scipio had fought bravely, young as he was, against Perseus. The scholar concerned suggested the names of Q. Fabius Labeo and M. Popillius,

¹⁹² Polyb. xxxi.24.5–6. ¹⁹³ Polyb. xxxi.25.2, 29.

¹⁹⁴ Polyb. xxxv.4.8, 5.1–2. ¹⁹⁵ Ter. *Ad.* 15ff.; *Gramm. Rom. Frag.* 387.

both consulars, and, as he reveals, poets; or else that of Sulpicius Galus, who did perhaps have an interest in the stage, for several plays are recorded as produced in his magistracies. However, some connection on Terence's part with Paullus' family is suggested by the choice of one of his comedies for representation at Paullus' funeral.

At any rate, what is significant is that it is now conceivable that Roman nobles might be secretly writing verse, and that Terence does not feel it necessary, from loyalty to them, flatly to deny the rumour; and also that Terence, though a slave by origin, should frequent aristocratic circles simply on the basis of his talent. His art, so much more refined than that of Plautus, or indeed than that of Plautus' successor Caecilius, recently dead, perhaps partly reflects the growing sophistication of taste of his patrons. But his lack of popular success, with most of his plays, suggests that audiences had not changed much since Plautus' time; though Terence must have thought that they would sit through prologues (rather rhetorical in style and organization) about literary disputes and the nature of translation. This was a subject for which the Romans could not find assistance among the basically monoglot Greeks, though they may have been influenced by Greek ideas of 'imitation' of an earlier work. But to say that *bene vertere* is *male scribere*, good translating is bad writing, can only be a Roman formulation.¹⁹⁶ Whether any earlier playwrights had used the prologue for such discussions we do not know; the prologue to the *Hecyra* suggests theatrical quarrels in which Caecilius was involved.

Compared with Plautus, Terence seems at first sight to be far more Greek. He keeps Greek titles for his plays (as Caecilius often did), though the Romans did not worry about the accurate transliteration of Greek names until, at the end of the century, some of the newly self-conscious Roman *grammatici* demanded it. He does not despise philosophy, indeed represents it as – in moderation – a proper activity for a young man, in Greece at least. The lyrical element in his plays is smaller and the farcical additions and the exuberant play with the Latin language are reduced, though not wholly done away with: Terence's diction is still richer than Menander's elegantly transparent Greek, and, as was to be so often the case in Roman poetry, pathos and emotion are brought out, at the expense, in this case, of gnomic detachment. There is some desire, it seems, for a measure of realism – the language is more colloquial (educatedly colloquial) than that of Plautus, offering ellipses, interjections, and so on, while Terence avoids breaking theatrical illusion by patently Roman insertions, by direct addresses to the audience, of which there were many in Greek New Comedy, and by the formal prologues,

¹⁹⁶ Ter. *Eun.* 7.

favoured by the Athenian dramatists, that explain the plot beforehand. Scholars have recently stressed his comparative individuality as an artist. By free use and combination of models he enlivens plot and action (his beloved Menander might sometimes seem rather slight); more interestingly, he minimizes Greek local colour, thus giving his characters a universal humanity, if also some lack of individuality. It might be wrong to deduce too much about Roman culture in his time from this universality, for Terence was an ex-slave, probably from Africa, and will have had neither a strong Roman patriotism nor roots in the Italian theatrical tradition. But it may be that he and his patrons could take Greek details for granted now, and he possibly foreshadows the acceptance, in some quarters at Rome, of cosmopolitan Stoicism. He is said, however, to have died on a study-tour of Greece, the first that we know of a Roman writer taking.¹⁹⁷

There has recently been much disagreement whether his *Adelphoe* reflects contemporary interest in Rome in the proper education of young men. Some find a Roman preference for severity in the final unexpected condemnation of the hitherto sympathetically liberal old Micio, and think that this, or at least Demea's speech justifying a father's right to correct extravagant and inexperienced youth, is a Terentian addition. This is disputed; certainly attempts to identify Demea with Cato, and so on, are misconceived.¹⁹⁸ But it is possible that Terence's endings do tend to be more serious and moral than those of his models; and even that his plays are apt to be concerned with relations between fathers and sons, which must often have been difficult in Rome in this period. And if it is true that Terence lays less stress than his Greek models on the weakness of man, and more on his worth and dignity, this perhaps has something to do with Roman self-confidence and *gravitas*, and adumbrates a real humanism that is inconceivable without the civilizing influence of Greece, but is not itself purely Greek.

With the other comic poets of the time we suffer from miserable fragments and uncertain chronology. Titinius, who introduced the *togata*, still based on New Comedy but set in the country towns of south Latium or (probably) Rome, was at one time seen as representing a post-Terentian reaction against the Greek atmosphere of the *palliata*, but in fact his date is probably considerably earlier in the century¹⁹⁹ and his work influenced by traditions and tastes in southern Latium, where he may have been born and his plays may conceivably have been first produced, rather than by attitudes in Rome itself. It is interesting that characters from these towns seem to be laughed at for aping Greek ways. In the *togata* free women were more prominently represented than in the

¹⁹⁷ Suet. *Vit. Ter.* 5. ¹⁹⁸ Büchner 1974, 412ff.: (H 174).

¹⁹⁹ Weinstock, *PlW* 2.VI.2.1540.

palliata, in accordance with the comparative freedom they enjoyed in Italy, and we are told that slaves were not allowed to appear cleverer than their masters, as they so often did in the latter.²⁰⁰ The prologue to the *Casina* of Plautus reveals that, perhaps in or soon after Terence's time, there was a demand for the revival of earlier plays; the *Casina* is one of Plautus' most lively and indecent comedies, and we may suspect that the tastes of the educated and the uneducated were now drawing apart. The next prominent composer of *palliatae*, Turpilius, was probably to write more in the Plautine than the Terentian tradition.

Polybius speaks with crushing contempt of Roman audiences even in this period. At the time of L. Anicius' games celebrating his victory over Genthius some time in the mid sixties, several distinguished Greek flute-players brought over for the occasion were put all together onto the great stage that had been built in the circus, together with a chorus, and to liven things up were made to lead mock fights between various groups. There was great applause. Two dancers, their accompanists, and four boxers, with buglers and trumpeters, joined in. 'As for the tragic actors', says Polybius, 'whatever I said of them I would seem to be making fun of my readers.'²⁰¹ What on earth happened we are left to wonder; perhaps the audience expected a larger musical element in the dialogue, and doubtless few could follow fifth-century tragic language. (Plays in Greek, which continued to be produced in Rome, were never a great success, implies Cicero.²⁰²) One recalls Terence's audience, which preferred to watch boxers, gladiators or rope-dancers.²⁰³

And yet tragedy in Latin, though Polybius does not deign to mention it, was still successful. This is the age of Ennius' nephew Pacuvius (though he may have begun producing somewhat earlier). He was born in the Latin colony of Brundisium, but retired at the end of his long life to nearby Greek Tarentum;²⁰⁴ he may, like Ennius, have had a Greek education. Cicero, perhaps embroidering, notes a friendship with Laelius.²⁰⁵ With the art of tragedy, Pacuvius practised that of painting, a reminder perhaps of the incomplete specialization still obtaining in Rome. He was perhaps the earliest poet to be regarded in the classical period as *doctus*, though Horace and Quintilian, reporting the judgement, reject it.²⁰⁶ Various explanations of the term have been offered – the semi-philosophical disquisitions, such as that on *terra* and *aether*, based on Euripides, in his *Chryses*, or the possibility that some of his plays were based on relatively unknown post-Euripidean models. The choice of obscure legends of a romantic or pathetic kind has been seen as Hellenistic. Pacuvius' style is more elaborate than his uncle's, though it is

²⁰⁰ Donat. *ap. Ter. Eun.* 57. ²⁰¹ Polyb. xxx.22. ²⁰² Cic. *Att.* xvi.5.1.

²⁰³ Ter. *Hec. prol.* 1.4, II.33. ²⁰⁴ Hieron. *Chron.* 142 H; Gell. *N.A.* XIII.2.2.

²⁰⁵ Cic. *Amic.* 24. ²⁰⁶ Hor. *Epist.* II.1.55; Quint. *Inst.* x.1.97.

hard to decide to what extent he is attempting effects based on the Greek; with his heavy compound adjectives he must be doing so. But early first-century rhetorical writers complained that his argumentative passages were incoherent and did not follow rhetorical rules.²⁰⁷ And Cicero observes that he cut down the lamentation that Sophocles had given the wounded Odysseus in his *Niptra*;²⁰⁸ this was doubtless in deference to Roman taste. It would be useful to know more of his *Antiope*, based on Euripides, where Amphion defends a life of study against his brother's preference for action; how far did Pacuvius feel he could go? There is elsewhere an attack on divination as such, which is probably bolder than Ennius' assault on unofficial *vates* and *harioli*, and marks a movement of opinion in Rome, though the play may have shown the speaker as mistaken.

In 154 the censors apparently began to build a permanent stone theatre, the first in Rome. The Senate was persuaded shortly thereafter by Scipio Nasica Corculum to have it destroyed and all seating at the games was forbidden for a time, though seats at plays had, it is quite clear, been usual. This seems to have been a *cause célèbre*, and it is often suggested that conservatives feared that a permanent theatre might be used, as theatres often were in Greek cities, for political assemblies. There were no seats in the Roman *comitium*, or in its imitations elsewhere in Italy, and this must have helped to cut meetings short; might not a comfortably seated populace demand a larger political role? The evidence suggests, however, that the opposition saw the idea of seats at any sort of *ludi* as soft and unmilitary; if Augustine is right, Scipio Corculum argued that *Graeca luxuria* was ruining manly ancestral practices.²⁰⁹ Cicero's *Brutus* suggests that no speech of Corculum survived, and Augustine's wording may be influenced by a later historian, but anxiety about a decline in Rome's military standards was clearly prevalent in the years after the fall of Macedon.

Feeling against the Senate was developing, over the levy in particular. It is just possible that politicians of what one may call a proto-*popularis* tendency looked back not only to the Struggle of the Orders in Rome, but found support in Greek political traditions, even those of a somewhat democratic kind. Cicero's *De Republica* suggests that by 129 there was an interest in the moderate democracy of Rhodes,²¹⁰ and the Gracchi may have been affected by the reformist ideas of the Spartan kings, Agis and Cleomenes, while they were compared, perhaps already in their own day (but with hostile intent?) to Athenian democratic

²⁰⁷ *Rhet. Her.* II.27.43; cf. *Cic. Inv.* I.94. ²⁰⁸ *Cic. Tusc.* II.21.48.

²⁰⁹ *Livy, Per.* XLVIII; *Cic. Brut.* 79; *August. Civ.D.* I.31. Taylor 1966, 29ff.: (H 30).

²¹⁰ *Cic. Rep.* I.47, III.48.

politicians and orators. This takes us outside our period, but there may have been debates within it that we cannot reconstruct.

The great debate that we do know of, that about the declaration of war with Carthage, may have taken place in somewhat Greek terms, if the theory that fear of an external enemy is necessary to keep a state from luxury and decay was really put forward by Scipio Nasica.²¹¹ Certainly the effect that the war would have on foreign, no doubt primarily Greek, opinion was, says Polybius, seriously taken into account.²¹² Something of political and intellectual interest may also be extracted from the tiny fragments of a historian of this time. Cassius Hemina, who seems to have composed at least part of his history (in Latin) before the Third Punic War, wrote with brevity, but with a more complex sentence-structure than Cato's *Origines*, or indeed some later historical works, can boast.²¹³ He could produce commonplaces of Greek philosophy, quoted Greek phrases, and may have criticized a merely literary historian, without practical experience, in a way that recalls Polybius on Timaeus.²¹⁴ To write in Latin was surely not a polemical act for him, as it may have been for Cato. But in spite of Greek influences he was one of the first Roman historians to subordinate the origin-stories and the recent wars to the reconstruction, of interest only to Romans, of the internal history of the early Republic. However, he deployed the traditional weapons of Greek antiquarianism, etymology and aetiology, with unsophisticated enthusiasm (the Latin towns Crustumium and Aricia were founded by 'Sicels' called Clytemnestra and Archilochus²¹⁵). He rationalized and euhemerized the early legends; he gave a cool explanation, possibly under Stoic or Cynic influence, of the ill-fame attaching to suicide;²¹⁶ at the same time he shows an interest in Greek mystery religions and, still, Pythagoreanism – he was not yet aware that it was chronologically impossible that King Numa should have been a pupil of Pythagoras,²¹⁷ and in fact the Romans had no convenient instruments for comparing dates of Greek and Latin history till the mid first century.

Cassius combines naiveté with some sophisticated Greek influences. Rome had been having some distinguished visitors of late, though they came primarily as envoys rather than to teach (some intellectuals had done so earlier, like Antiochus' ambassador Hegesianax in the 190s, but there is no evidence that the Romans took anything from them). Perhaps in 168, or possibly some years later,²¹⁸ the great *grammaticus* Crates of Mallos arrived. It was only because he broke his leg in an open drain that he stayed to give lectures, which Suetonius thought introduced true

²¹¹ Gelzer 1962–4, II.39: (A 19). ²¹² Polyb. xxxvi.2. ²¹³ Leeman 1963, 72: (H 207).

²¹⁴ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 28. ²¹⁵ Peter, *HRRel.* frs. 2 and 3. ²¹⁶ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 15.

²¹⁷ Peter, *HRRel.* fr. 37. ²¹⁸ Suet. *Gram.* 2.2 is confused.

grammatical learning into Rome; before that the *poetae* and *semi-Graeci* Livius Andronicus and Ennius had simply read Greek poetry, and their own, with their pupils (Suetonius cannot be literally accurate). Crates perhaps lectured both on what we would call grammatical theory and on Homer, on whom he wrote extensively. Cassius may have been influenced by Crates' Stoic faith in etymology.

Suetonius tells us that it was owing to Crates' influence that certain Romans began to bring forward Latin poems 'by their friends or others', which had not been widely circulated, and to lecture on them, reading and commenting.²¹⁹ It may be that at least C. Octavius Lampadio, whom Suetonius seems to regard as definitely the first of the true Roman *grammatici*, did this for Naevius' *Bellum Punicum* very soon after Crates' visit: he also divided the work into seven books, in other words producing an edition, which copyists could use. (One would like to see him as a freedman of the hellenizing senator Octavius, but he does not bear the same *praenomen*, as one would expect in that case; but a freedman, probably of Greek background, he almost certainly is.) Crates is said by a late source to have advised the export of parchment to Italy from Pergamum (whence the material derived its name);²²⁰ though papyrus was no doubt normally used for writing, Crates may have seen that there was scope for developing the book-trade now in Rome. It is also remarkable that Crates' visit to Rome seems to be the first sign of Rome receiving any intellectual or cultural influence from Pergamum, with which there had so long been friendly political relations, though the kings of Pergamum were great patrons of philosophy and learning. In fact certain Pergamene scholars seem markedly to ignore Rome, like Polemon of Ilium, who wrote about the foundation legends of Greek towns in southern Italy, or to be unsympathetic to her, like Demetrius of Scepsis, who denied that Aeneas ever left Asia. Nor is there any clear evidence yet of cultural influence from Rhodes, another considerable centre for things of the mind, though with her again Rome had long been associated.

In 155 the famous philosophic embassy arrived in Rome from Athens (the point at issue was the fine imposed on Athens for destroying the border-town of Oropus). In sending the heads of the main philosophic schools (Epicurus' Garden significantly excepted), the Athenians must have thought that they would now carry weight in Rome. They all gave public lectures. Their different styles of eloquence made a vast impression, and Plutarch says that many young men ran wild for philosophy, and many older men were happy to see this.²²¹ The praetor C. Acilius (author of a history in Greek) begged to interpret for the

²¹⁹ Suet. *Gram.* 2.3-4.

²²⁰ Lydus, *Mens.* 14.11 W.

²²¹ Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22.

ambassadors, and essayed a philosophic joke in which he perhaps confused Academic Scepticism and Stoic paradox. But the great Sceptic Carneades caused a furore by arguing one day for the importance of justice in politics, and the next for that of injustice.²²² If the Romans were truly just, they would give up all their conquests and return to shepherds' huts. The Romans were shocked; they always tried to persuade themselves and others that all their wars were just, undertaken in defence of themselves or their allies. Cato, as we saw, recommended the Senate to conclude the envoys' business as soon as possible.

Whether Carneades started the Romans looking consciously for a moral justification of Empire (and whether this was to be given them by the later philosophers Panaetius or Poseidonius) is uncertain. More permanent effect was perhaps produced by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (Critolaus the Peripatetic seems to have had less impact; the school was not very vital at the time). We know that Laelius and others became to some extent genuine disciples, presumably getting further than the superficial acquaintance with a few leading doctrines that may have been becoming reasonably common, and gaining some knowledge of the way in which philosophers actually argue. But it is only on a few members of the next generation – such as Q. Tubero and Rutilius Rufus – that Stoicism had a serious practical effect. Even so, the works which Greek philosophers began to dedicate to their aristocratic Roman pupils seem markedly untechnical, while the *Index Stoicorum* lists no Romans (though two obscure Samnites) as professional philosophers at this time. Laelius was to be most famous as a conscientious augur, and his speech on the religion of Numa in 145 was archaizing in language and highly conservative in tendency.²²³

Scipio Aemilianus almost certainly listened to the philosophers. Some time in the forties the Stoic Panaetius was to come to Rome, and on repeated visits spent much time with Scipio and his friends. It is unlikely that he arrived before 148, and so it is not our task to decide whether he, or other prominent Athenians, shocked by Rome's destruction of Corinth and Carthage, felt that a conscious effort must be made to civilize her leading men – perhaps it is not very probable; nor whether Panaetius' modified Stoic doctrine, humane and shorn of paradox, was produced for Roman consumption, or, as is more likely, developed in answer to attacks on Stoicism by the Sceptics, especially Carneades. The main Greek influence on Scipio in the years before 148 was probably still that of Polybius, no great intellectual, indeed opposed to the Sceptics, rather an intelligent, soldierly, not unbookish man from a political family. The relationship between them, and the position gained by Polybius at Rome,

²²² Lactant. *Div. Inst.* v.14.3–5. ²²³ Cic. *Brut.* 21.83.

was significant for the future, however. Polybius seems to be the first Greek public man to be really trusted in Rome and, having partially detached himself from his background, to have been used as an adviser and assistant by great Romans. He was with Scipio at Carthage, primarily perhaps as a technical expert in military matters; he was with Mummius in Greece, helping to re-organize the country politically after her final disaster.

On the fall of Carthage, Scipio, conscious like his father of the power of Tyche, and aware of the Greek belief that all empires pass away, shed tears and quoted Homer²²⁴ (in the first century famous Romans seem more inclined to quote Greek drama in moments of stress). But he also accompanied the capture of the city with traditional Roman rites, including perhaps the resurrection of the rite of *evocatio*, by which Punic Tanit or Juno was summoned to leave the city which had been hers, as Camillus had summoned Juno of Veii long before. Scipio's friend Furius Philus, doubtless another pupil of the philosophic embassy, was probably the author of a handbook on this ancient rite,²²⁵ and may thus have opened the era of the antiquarian monograph in Rome. Laelius' famous speech on Numaic religion, and some evidence from a rather later period, do suggest that Scipio and his friends were interested in the revival of traditional Roman rites that had decayed.

Mummius, the destroyer of Corinth, was a man who, says Cicero, used a simple and old-fashioned style in his speeches, and he was to set up a record of his victories in the now archaic Saturnian metre;²²⁶ but, though stories circulated of his ignorance of the value of the masterworks of art taken in the sack of Corinth, neither he nor his brother (who loathed rhetors and democracy, but had studied Stoicism, which may partly account for the dislike of rhetors, and wrote verse epistles from Greece to his friends²²⁷) was totally hostile to the Greeks and Greek ways; the hellenomaniac Albinus was on his staff. Plutarch has a story of Mummius weeping when a boy in the stricken city quoted Homer to him;²²⁸ Tacitus has a mysterious reference to the introduction of new *theatrales artes*, by which he may mean citharoedic contests, a wholly Greek event, at Mummius' triumphal games.²²⁹ It was then not only Scipio and his friends who were now able to take what they wanted, without strain, from both the Roman and Greek traditions. It is an over-simplification to say that in war, politics and religion they remained largely Roman, and filled their *otium*, their leisure, with Greek studies and amusements,

²²⁴ Polyb. xxxviii.22. ²²⁵ Macrob. *Satur.* iii.9.6. Rawson 1973, 168: (H 289).

²²⁶ Cic. *Brut.* 94; *ILLRP* 122 – irregular, even for Saturnians; if this is what they are meant to be, perhaps few now knew how to write them.

²²⁷ Cic. *Brut.* 94, *Att.* xiii.6a, *Rep.* iii.34.46–7, v.9.11.

²²⁸ Plut. *Quaest. conv.* ix.737a. ²²⁹ Tac. *Ann.* xiv.21.

though there is some truth in it; in fact rhetoric and philosophy were beginning to have a real effect on public life. There were, perhaps, as many different syntheses of Greek and Roman traditions as there were intelligent and educated Romans.

VI. CONCLUSION

The distance which Rome had travelled in less than a century was enormous. But there was still a long way to go. In 148 probably no Roman, of the upper class at least, had thought to pay an extended visit to Athens or Rhodes for serious study with the best Greek masters of rhetoric or philosophy, or, unless he happened to be there already on public business, had gone sightseeing in Greece. Exiles withdrew to the cities of Latium or Etruria, not to the Greek East. It was barely respectable for a noble to write verse, certainly not for him to abandon public ambitions altogether for a life of study, as a few men of prominent family did in the first century. If philosophy was beginning to be known, Academic Scepticism, Epicureanism and Cynicism were probably still all distrusted. In 146, when political developments disrupted the Museum at Alexandria, it seems that none of the scholars who had worked there fled to Rome, though we are told that 'Greece and the islands' were filled with refugee intellectuals of every kind²³⁰ (it is true that there was an Alexandrian painter in Rome somewhat earlier²³¹). It was not till the first century that, as Philodemus shows, a visit to Rome became the normal ambition of a Greek teacher,²³² partly owing to the extinction of the various royal courts that had offered patronage, and to the impoverishment of many Greek cities, partly perhaps to the fact that by now so many famous Greek libraries had come to Rome, mainly as spoils of war, that scholarly activity could be carried on there as well as anywhere else, and Rome and Alexandria could be spoken of in the same breath as intellectual centres.

It was only in the first century, too, that Cicero and others began consciously to measure Roman against Greek literary and intellectual achievements, in the attempt, that no longer seemed ridiculous, to equal or outdo them. It was only then that Latin verse, in spite of its already long history, reached the ease and elegance of maturity; it was certainly only then that prose became supple and expressive, and indeed that *grammatici* and practising writers forced some consistency and regularity on the language. Historical works uniting moral and political analysis

²³⁰ Ath. iv. 184b-c (from Andron of Alexandria and Menecles of Barca).

²³¹ Diod. Sic. xxxi. 18; cf. Val. Max. v. 1 - a *topographos*, either a scene-painter or one who painted the pictures of cities etc. carried in triumphs. ²³² Phil. *Rhet.* II. 145 Sudhaus.

with literary polish began to appear; treatises on almost every subject started to use the procedures of Greek logical organization, forging also a language in which to discuss rhetoric and 'grammar', and ultimately in the hands of Cicero and others, for philosophy too (though not, as Cicero points out, for mathematics). Medicine was not naturalized, but much of the prejudice against Greek doctors gave way. In religion, the forms of divination and the cults that the Greeks had adapted from the east proved, in this adapted form, irresistible even to many members of the upper class; on the other hand, many of this class now turned to Epicureanism, which rejected divination and all divine intervention. In politics, almost every great man with interests in the east now had an entourage of Greek advisers and assistants.

But the earlier period, as we have seen, had laid the foundations for most of these developments. Above all, it had on the one hand provided the basis for a real civilization that should be something more than a pale copy of a Greek model, but should preserve and develop much that was genuinely Roman or Italian. And, on the other, though it ultimately distanced the educated or wealthy Roman from his humbler fellow-countrymen (not that all of these were completely untouched by any sort of Greek influence), it allowed and initiated that possibility of understanding and co-operation between the Latin- and Greek-speaking elites, which was to be one of the most important factors in the long survival of the Roman Empire.

THREE HELLENISTIC DYNASTIES

(See also the tables appended to Chapter 11, pp. 420-1.)

1. THE SELEUCIDS

Seleucus I Nicator	305-281
Antiochus I Soter	281-261
Antiochus II Theos	261-246
Seleucus II Callinicus	246-226/5
Seleucus III Soter	226/5-223
Antiochus III Megas	223-187
Seleucus IV Philopator	187-175
Antiochus IV Epiphanes	175-164
Antiochus V Eupator	164-162
Demetrius I Soter	162-150
Alexander Balas	150-145
Demetrius II Nicator	145-140
Antiochus VI Epiphanes	145-142/1 or 139/8
Antiochus VII (Sidetes)	138-129
Demetrius II Nicator (restored)	129-126/5
Cleopatra Thea	126/5-123
Antiochus VIII Grypus	126/5-96
Seleucus V	126
Antiochus IX Philopator (Cyzicenus)	114/13-95
Seleucus VI	95
Antiochus X Eusebes Philopator	95
Demetrius III Philopator Soter	95-88 (at Damascus)
twins { Antiochus XI Epiphanes	95 } (in Cilicia)
Philadelphus	
Philip I	
Antiochus XII Dionysus	87 (at Damascus)
Philip II	84/3

2. THE ANTIGONIDS


Antigonus I (Monophthalmus)	306-301
Demetrius I (Poliorectes)	307-283
Antigonus II (Gonatas)	283-239
Demetrius II	239-229
Antigonus III (Doson)	229-221
Philip V	221-179
Perseus	179-168

3. THE ATTALIDS


(Philetaerus	283-263)
(Eumenes I	263-241)
Attalus I Soter	241-197
Eumenes II Soter	197-159/8
Attalus II	159/8-139/8
Attalus III	139/8-133
(Eumenes III (Aristonicus)	133-129)

GENEALOGICAL TABLES


THE ATTALIDS




THE ANTIGONIDS



THE SELEUCIDS





CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

The table displays the chronological relationship between selected events which are mentioned in this volume. A few events which are discussed in other volumes are included but entries are placed between parentheses.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
237	L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus Q. Fulvius Flaccus		Hamilcar Barca goes to Spain. (237-229) Hamilcar conquers much of southern and south- eastern Spain; he founds Akra Leuke.	
231	M. Pomponius Matho C. Papirius Maso		Hamilcar probably receives a Roman embassy.	
229	L. Postumius Albinus II Cn. Fulvius Centumalus		Death of Hamilcar. Hasdrubal takes command of Carthaginian forces in Spain.	First Illyrian War.
228	Sp. Carvilius Maximus II Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus II		(c. 228) Hasdrubal advances to the upper Guadiana. He founds Carthago Nova.	Roman envoys in Greece.
227	P. Valerius Flaccus M. Atilius Regulus	(Praetorships increased to four.)	Roman agreement with Saguntum (before 226?).	
226	M. Valerius Messalla L. Apustius Fullo		Roman envoys arrange the 'Ebro treaty' with Hasdrubal.	
225	L. Aemilius Papus C. Atilius Regulus	(Romans defeat Gauls at Telamon.)		
224	T. Manlius Torquatus II Q. Fulvius Flaccus II			
223	C. Flaminius P. Furius Philus	(Flaminius defeats Insubres.)		Accession of Antiochus III to the Seleucid throne.
222	M. Claudius Marcellus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus	(Insubres defeated at Clastidium and surrender to Rome.) (15 March becomes beginning of the consular year (probably this year).)		

221	P. Cornelius Scipio Asina M. Minucius Rufus (?M. Aemilius Lepidus II, <i>suffectus</i>)	Roman expedition against the Histri. <i>Ludi plebei</i> instituted at Rome.	Hasdrubal killed; he is succeeded in command by Hannibal. Hannibal attacks the Olcades and winters in Carthago Nova. (c. 221-220) Saguntum invites Roman arbitration in an internal dispute.	Accession of Philip V as king of Macedonia.
220	(a) M. Valerius Laevinus Q. Mucius Scaevola (these either abdicated or more probably never entered office, presumably because they were faultily elected.) (b) C. Lutatius Catulus L. Veturius Philo		Hannibal defeats the Vaccaei, captures Salamanca and conquers central Spain. (220-219) Roman envoys meet Hannibal in his winter quarters in Carthago Nova.	Expedition of Demetrius and Scerdilaidas in the Adriatic. Outbreak of the 'Social War' in Greece. Achaeus takes the royal title in Asia Minor.
219	L. Aemilius Paullus M. Livius Salinator		Hannibal besieges and (late autumn) captures Saguntum.	Second Illyrian War.
218	P. Cornelius Scipio Ti. Sempronius Longus	Foundation of Placentia and Cremona. War declared between Rome and Carthage. Hannibal invades Italy; battles of the Ticinus and the Trebbia. <i>Lex Claudia</i> concerning the ownership of ships by senators.	Roman envoys deliver ultimatum at Carthage. Hannibal crosses the Ebro and <i>marches to the Alps</i> . Cn. Scipio gains control of the area north of the Ebro. Hiero of Syracuse warns Rome of a Carthaginian plan to capture Lilybaeum. Roman naval victory off Lilybaeum.	
217	Cn. Servilius Geminus C. Flaminius II M. Atilius Regulus II, <i>suffectus</i>	Battle of Lake Trasimene. Beginning of the 'Fabian strategy'. Equalization of the <i>imperium</i> of Fabius and Minucius. Suspension of the <i>lex Genucia</i> under which second consulships within ten years were forbidden.	Roman naval victory off the Ebro. Cn. Scipio sails south of Carthago Nova and to Ebusus. He is joined by his brother, P. Scipio. Servilius demands hostages in Sardinia.	Peace of Naupactus between Philip V and Aetolia.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
216	C. Terentius Varro L. Aemilius Paullus II	Battle of Cannae. Large-scale defections in southern Italy.	Hasdrubal ordered to Italy and replaced by Himilco. Roman victories south of the Ebro. Carthaginian fleet ravages Syracusan territory.	Philip's operations in the Adriatic disturbed by Roman ships. (216-213) Campaigns of Antiochus III against Achaeus.
215	L. Postumius Albinus III (killed before he could enter office) M. Claudius Marcellus II, <i>suffectus</i> (abdicated when election declared invalid) Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus III, <i>suffectus</i> Ti. Sempronius Gracchus	Hannibal fails to take Nola and Cumae. Rome recovers some towns in Campania and Samnium. <i>Lex Oppia</i> .	Death of Hiero of Syracuse. Hieronymus makes approaches to Carthaginians. Unsuccessful attack on Sardinia by Hasdrubal the Bald.	Philip V's negotiations and agreement with Hannibal.
214	Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus IV M. Claudius Marcellus III	Rome recovers Casilinum. Hannibal fails to take Tarentum.	Hieronymus assassinated; defection of Syracuse to the Carthaginians. Syphax revolts from Carthage.	Outbreak of First Macedonian War; Philip driven from the Adriatic.
213	Q. Fabius Maximus Ti. Sempronius Gracchus II	Rome recovers Arpi.	Marcellus lays siege to Syracuse.	Philip captures Lissus.
212	Q. Fulvius Flaccus III Ap. Claudius Pulcher	Hannibal captures Tarentum, Metapontum, Thurii and Heraclea. Claudius and Fulvius begin the siege of Capua. (c. 212) Reform of the Roman monetary system.	Rome captures Saguntum and Castulo. Marcellus captures Syracuse.	(212-211) Roman alliance with Aetolia against Philip V. (212-205) 'Anabasis' of Antiochus III.
211	C. Fulvius Centumalus Maximus P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus	Hannibal marches on Rome. Capua recovered by Rome.	The Scipios defeated and killed. Carthaginians regain control of large areas of Spain.	

210	M. Claudius Marcellus IV M. Valerius Laevinus (II?)	Roman successes in Apulia and Samnium. Roman fleet defeated off Tarentum.	Scipio (Africanus) arrives in Spain. Valerius Laevinus captures Agrigentum. Carthaginians raid Sardinia. Syphax sends embassy to Rome. Massinissa in the service of Carthage.	Aegina bought by Attalus from the Aetolians.
209	Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus V Q. Fulvius Flaccus IV	Twelve Latin colonies refuse contingents for Rome. Fabius recaptures Tarentum.	Scipio captures Carthago Nova.	
208	M. Claudius Marcellus V T. Quinctius Crispinus	Both consuls killed near Venusia.	Battle of Baecula, Hasdrubal crosses Pyrenees <i>en route</i> to Italy.	
207	C. Claudius Nero M. Livius Salinator II	Hasdrubal invades Italy and is defeated at the battle of the Metaurus.		
206	L. Veturius Philo Q. Caecilius Metellus	Rome recovers Lucania. Resettlement of Placentia and Cremona.	Battle of Ilipa. Capture of Ilourgeia and Castulo. Mutiny in Roman army. Mago attacks Carthago Nova and sails to Italy. Foundation of Italica. Scipio returns to Rome. Syphax visited by both Scipio and Hasdrubal. Massinissa changes sides. Syphax occupies Massinissa's kingdom.	Peace treaty between Aetolia and Philip V.
205	P. Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) P. Licinius Crassus Dives	Fabius and Fulvius oppose Scipio's plans to invade Africa. Mago lands at Genoa. Scipio recovers Locri.	Final defeat of Andobales and Mandonius. Laclius raids the coast of Africa. Carthaginian ships captured off Sardinia.	Peace of Phoenice. (c. 205) Outbreak of 'Cretan War'.
204	M. Cornelius Cethegus P. Sempronius Tuditanus	Roman successes in Bruttium. (c. 204-184) The plays of Plautus.	Scipio lands near Utica.	Death of Ptolemy Philopator. (204 or 203) Antiochus III in Asia Minor.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
203	Cn. Servilius Caepio C. Servilius Geminus	Roman forces defeat Mago.	Carthaginian and Numidian camps destroyed. Battle of the Great Plains. Syphax captured by the Romans. Peace negotiations between Rome and Carthage. Hannibal and Mago return to Africa.	Roman embassy investigates Greek complaints about Philip V. Collapse of Agathocles' regime in Alexandria.
202	M. Servilius Pulex Geminus Ti. Claudius Nero	Last appointment of a dictator (until the appointment of Sulla).	Carthage attacks Roman supply ships. Hannibal offers terms for peace. Battle of Zama. Peace agreed on Roman terms.	Antiochus III in Coele Syria. Philip takes Lysimacheia, Chalcedon, Cius, Perinthus and Thasos.
201	Cn. Cornelius Lentulus P. Aelius Paetus	Peace settlement with Carthage ratified at Rome. Beginning of series of consular commands in northern Italy. (201–199) Veterans settled in Apulia and Samnium.		Siege of Gaza. Philip in the Aegean: capture of Samos, battles of Chios and Lade. Embassies sent to Rome by Attalus and Rhodes. Athenian embassy to Rome. (Winter 201/200) Philip at Bargylia.
200	P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus II C. Aurelius Cotta	First conflict of Cenomani with Rome. Roman assembly first rejects, then accepts proposal to declare war on Philip V of Macedonia.		Battle of Panium. Philip in Thrace; siege of Abydus. Roman envoys in Greece. Roman decision to make war on Philip. (Autumn) Arrival of Roman troops at Apollonia. Achaeans refuse to provide troops for Philip.
199	L. Cornelius Lentulus P. Villius Tappulus	Censorship of Scipio Africanus.		Sulpicius Galba attacks Upper Macedonia.
198	Sex. Aelius Paetus Catus T. Quinctius Flaminius	12,000 Latins and Italians required to return from Rome to their own communities.		T. Quinctius Flaminius takes command in the war against Philip. Achaean League joins Rome in the war.

197	C. Cornelius Cethegus Q. Minucius Rufus	Number of praetors increased to six. Tenure of the praetorship made a prerequisite for the consulship (probably in this year). Submission of Cenomani. New colonists recruited to Cosa.	Demarcation of the division between the two Spanish provinces. Spanish rebellion; beginning of continuous Roman wars in Spain.	Battle of Cynoscephalae. Antiochus III in Asia Minor.
196	L. Furius Purpurio M. Claudius Marcellus		Hannibal sufete at Carthage (196/5).	Proclamation of freedom at the Isthmian Games. Settlement in Greece and Macedonia. Abortive negotiations between Rome and Antiochus III.
195	L. Valerius Flaccus M. Porcius Cato	Repeal of the <i>lex Oppia</i> .	M. Porcius Cato's campaigns in Spain. First Roman invasion of Celtiberia. Roman envoys sent to Carthage. Hannibal flees to the eastern Mediterranean.	The war against Nabis.
194	P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus II Ti. Sempronius Longus	Roman defeat of Insubres. Eight citizen colonies established in southern Italy.		Roman evacuation of Greece.
193	L. Cornelius Merula Q. Minucius Thermus		First evidence of Lusitanians, Vettones and Vaccaei as enemies of the Romans; victories of M. Fulvius Nobilior. Carthaginian envoys to Rome complain about the activities of Massinissa in a boundary dispute; the Senate sends a mission led by Scipio Africanus to investigate but the issue is left unresolved.	Failure of negotiations at Rome between Flamininus and Antiochus' envoys. Roman envoys sent to Antiochus. War in the Peloponnese between Achaea and Sparta.
192	L. Quinctius Flamininus Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus	Fines imposed on usurers.		Roman envoys in Greece. Roman fleet crosses to Greece. Aetolians invite the assistance of Antiochus, who crosses to Greece.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
191	P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica M'. Acilius Glabrio	Roman defeat of Boii.	Rome refuses a Carthaginian offer to pay immediately the whole of the outstanding indemnity from the Second Punic War.	Rome declares war on Antiochus. Battle of Thermopylae. Antiochus driven from Greece.
190	L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus C. Laelius	Additional settlers sent to Placentia and Cremona.		Roman army crosses to Asia. Battle of Magnesia.
189	M. Fulvius Nobilior Cn. Manlius Vulso	Prosecution of M'. Acilius Glabrio. Foundation of Bononia on Boian land.		Expedition of Manlius Vulso in central Anatolia. Sack of Ambracia by Fulvius Nobilior.
188	M. Valerius Messalla C. Livius Salinator	Foundation of Forum Livii. Full Roman citizenship granted to Arpinum, Formiae and Fundi.		Peace of Apamea. Achaeans under Philopoemen force the submission of Sparta.
187	M. Aemilius Lepidus C. Flaminius	Political attacks on L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus. Construction of a <i>Via Flaminia</i> and a <i>Via Aemilia</i> .		Death of Antiochus III; Seleucus IV becomes king. (c. 187-183) War between Eumenes II of Pergamum and Prusias I of Bithynia.
186	Sp. Postumius Albinus Q. Marcus Philippus	Suppression of the 'Bacchanalian Conspiracy'.	Military successes of C. Calpurnius Piso and L. Quinctius Crispinus on the Tagus.	
185	Ap. Claudius Pulcher M. Sempronius Tuditanus			Embassy of Q. Caccilius Metellus to Macedonia and Greece.
184	P. Claudius Pulcher L. Porcius Licinus	Censorship of M. Porcius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus. Political attack on Scipio Africanus.		Embassy of Ap. Claudius to Macedonia and Greece. Demetrius, son of Philip V, goes to Rome. Eumenes defeats Prusias and his allies.

183	M. Claudius Marcellus Q. Fabius Labeo	Death of Scipio Africanus. Citizen colonies founded at Mutina and Parma.	Celtiberians invade Roman- controlled territory.	Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus to Macedonia and Greece. Messene revolts from the Achaean League. Death of Philopoemen. Peace between Eumenes and Prusias. Death of Hannibal. Pharnaces I of Pontus captures Sinope.
182	Cn. Baebius Tamphilus L. Aemilius Paullus	<i>Lex Orchia</i> , sumptuary law.	Q. Fulvius Flaccus invades Celtiberia. Conflict between Carthage and Massinissa.	Messene brought back into the Achaean League by Lycortas. Death of Prusias I; Prusias II becomes king of Bithynia. (c. 182-179) War between Eumenes and Pharnaces.
181	P. Cornelius Cethegus M. Baebius Tamphilus	<i>Lex Cornelia Baebia</i> concerning electoral corruption. <i>Lex Baebia</i> reduces the number of praetors in alternate years. Foundation of Aquileia. Beginning of deportation policy in Liguria; intensification of Roman military effort against the Ligurians.	Q. Fulvius Flaccus extends his invasion to more distant parts of Celtiberia.	Celebration of the first panhellenic <i>Nikephoria</i> in Pergamum. Eumenes supports Rhodes against the Lycians.
180	A. Postumius Albinus Luscus C. Calpurnius Piso	<i>Lex Villia annalis</i> . Founding of Luca as a Latin colony.	(180-178) Campaigns of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in Celtiberia.	Embassy of Callicrates at Rome. Philip V puts to death his son Demetrius. Assassination of Ptolemy V Epiphanes of Egypt.
179	Q. Fulvius Flaccus L. Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus		L. Postumius Albinus defeats Lusitanians and Vaccaei.	Death of Philip V; accession of Perseus as king of Macedonia. Peace between Eumenes and Pharnaces.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
178	M. Iunius Brutus A. Manlius Vulso	War in Istria	Treaties made by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus with the Celtiberians. Foundation of Gracchuris and (?) Iliturgi.	The Seleucid Antiochus, hostage in Rome, released in exchange for his nephew Demetrius.
177	C. Claudius Pulcher Ti. Sempronius Gracchus	Restrictions imposed on citizens of Latin and allied states. Foundation of Luna as a citizen colony. War in Istria.		Perseus of Macedon married to Laodice, daughter of Seleucus IV. (c. 177). Prusias II married to Apame, sister of Perseus.
176	Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus C. Valerius Laevinus, <i>suffectus</i> Q. Petillius Spurius			Death of Cleopatra, regent of Egypt.
175	P. Mucius Scaevola M. Aemilius Lepidus II	<i>Via Aemilia</i> built from Bononia to Aquileia.	Short-lived Celtiberian rebellion.	Seleucus IV murdered by Heliodorus. Eumenes supports Antiochus, who becomes king as Antiochus IV.
174	Sp. Postumius Albinus Paullulus Q. Mucius Scaevola		Cessation of Spanish wars. (174-172) Attacks by Massinissa on Carthaginian territory.	Jason appointed high-priest of the Jews by Antiochus IV; 'hellenistic reform' in Jerusalem.
173	L. Postumius Albinus M. Popillius Laenas	Latins in Rome required to return to their own cities. High-handed conduct of A. Postumius Albinus at Praeneste. M. Popillius Laenas in Liguria subjugates the Statellates; his treatment of the survivors generates political controversy. Commission led by M. Aemilius Lepidus appointed to distribute land in Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria to Romans and Latins, and possibly to other allies.		Final payment of indemnity due to Rome from the war with Antiochus III.

172	C. Popillius Laenas P. Aelius Ligus		Carthaginian envoys complain to the Roman Senate about the encroachment of Massinissa.	Eumenes of Pergamum attacks Perseus of Macedon in a speech to the Senate at Rome. Attempt on the life of Eumenes at Delphi. Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus to Greece. Boeotian Confederacy dissolved. (c. 172) Menelaus appointed high-priest of the Jews by Antiochus IV.
171	P. Licinius Crassus C. Cassius Longinus	Prosecution of three former governors of Spanish provinces.	Foundation of Carteia.	Beginning of war between Rome and Perseus (the Third Macedonian War). Perseus successful in cavalry engagement at Callicinus. (c. 171) Mithridates I becomes king of the Parthians.
170	A. Hostilius Mancinus A. Atilius Serranus		Rebellion in Nearer Spain.	Indecisive campaigns in Third Macedonian War. Perseus regains northern Thessaly. Epirote plot to kidnap the Roman consul. Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV, assassinated.
169	Q. Marcius Philippus II Cn. Servilius Caepio	Death of Ennius. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus as censor attempts to restrict the registration of most freedmen.		Roman army under Q. Marcius Philippus enters Macedonia. Rhodes, Pergamum and Bithynia waver in their support of Rome. The Molossians in Epirus and King Genthius of Illyria join Perseus. Sixth Syrian War; Antiochus IV invades Egypt.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST	534
168	L. Aemilius Paullus II C. Licinius Crassus	(c. 168?) Arrival of Crates in Rome.		Genthius of Illyria defeated by L. Anicius Gallus. Perseus defeated by L. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna (22 June) and later surrenders. Rome renounces friendship of Rhodes. Rebellion of Galatia against Eumenes of Pergamum. Second invasion of Egypt by Antiochus IV, who then evacuates Egypt and Cyprus in response to a Roman ultimatum. War in Jerusalem between Jason and Menelaus. Antiochus in Jerusalem. He prohibits the Jewish religion; Jewish martyrs.	
167	Q. Aelius Paetus M. Iunius Pennus	Speech of M. Porcius Cato concerning the Rhodians.		Macedonia divided into four, Illyria into three, separate republics. Deportation to Italy of Rome's opponents in Greece, including 1,000 Achaeans (among them Polybius). 70 towns plundered and 150,000 persons enslaved in Epirus. Prusias before the Senate; Eumenes prohibited from coming to Rome. The Senate declares Caria and Lycia free. Delos given to Athens and made a free port by the Romans.	
166	M. Claudius Marcellus C. Sulpicius Galus	Debate in the Senate concerning bribery. (166-160) The plays of Terence.		Eumenes defeats the Galatians; Galatia declared free by the Senate. Antiochus' celebrations in Daphne.	

165	T. Manlius Torquatus Cn. Octavius		Antiochus IV begins his eastern campaign; Artaxias of Armenia defeated. Judas Maccabaeus recaptures Jerusalem and the temple.
164	A. Manlius Torquatus Q. Cassius Longinus		Embassy of C. Sulpicius Galus to Greece. He invites accusations against Eumenes. The Senate grants Rhodes a treaty. Lysias' first campaign against the Jews; Roman ambassadors contact the Maccabean rebels. Death of Antiochus IV; Antiochus V becomes king with Lysias as guardian. Death of Ariarathes IV; Ariarathes V becomes king of Cappadocia.
163	Ti. Sempronius Gracchus II M'. Iuventius Thalna		Antiochus V grants the Jews all former privileges; Menelaus executed; Alcimus appointed high-priest. Lysias' second campaign against the Jews. He concludes peace and defeats Philippus.
162	P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum C. Marcius Figulus (both abdicated in consequence of faulty election) P. Cornelius Lentulus, <i>suffectus</i> Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, <i>suffectus</i>	Disputes between Massinissa and Carthage (perhaps since 174).	Cn. Octavius murdered in Laodicea. The Seleucid Demetrius escapes from Rome; Antiochus V and Lysias executed; Demetrius I becomes king. Timarchus proclaims himself king.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
161	M. Valerius Messala C. Fannius Strabo	Expulsion of philosophers from Rome. <i>Lex Fannia</i> , sumptuary law.		(161 or 160) Demetrius defeats Timarchus. Judas defeats Nicanor and concludes a treaty with Rome; he is defeated and killed by Bacchides.
160	L. Anicius Gallus M. Cornelius Cethegus			(161/60) Ariarathes of Cappadocia declines to marry Laodice, sister of Demetrius and widow of Perseus. (160/59) Eumenes of Pergamum appoints Attalus his co-ruler with the title of king. (c. 160) Nysa, daughter of Antiochus IV, married to Pharnaces of Pontus.
159	Cn. Cornelius Dolabella M. Fulvius Nobilior	Consular law concerning bribery.		Embassy of Demetrius in Rome. (159/8) Demetrius invades Cappadocia, expels Ariarathes and establishes Orophernes as king.
158	M. Aemilius Lepidus C. Popillius Laenas II			Death of Eumenes of Pergamum; Attalus II becomes sole king. Ariarathes V in Rome.
157	Sex. Julius Caesar L. Aurelius Orestes		Roman envoys visit Africa to investigate a territorial dispute between Carthage and Massinissa.	Senate decrees that Cappadocia be divided between Ariarathes and Orophernes.
156	L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus C. Marcus Figulus II			Attalus II defeats Orophernes and reinstates Ariarathes as king of Cappadocia. Prusias of Bithynia invades Pergamene territory and defeats Attalus. Roman campaign against Dalmatian pirates.

155	P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum II M. Claudius Marcellus II	Athenian 'philosophic' embassy to Rome. Conquest of Cisalpine Liguria completed.		Prusias besieges Pergamum. (155/4) Abortive attempt of Demetrius to take over Cyprus from Ptolemy VI. (155-153) War between Rhodes and Crete.
154	Q. Opimius L. Postumius Albinus M'. Acilius Glabrio, <i>suffectus</i>	Censors initiate the construction of a permanent theatre, subsequently demolished before completion.	Rome at war with Lusitanians and Celtiberians. Lusitanian successes.	Peace concluded between Prusias and Attalus. Attalus and Ariarathes ravage the territory of Priene; Rome intervenes. Coalition of Ptolemy, Attalus and Ariarathes against Demetrius.
153	Q. Fulvius Nobilior T. Annius Luscus	1 January becomes the beginning of the consular year.	Unsuccessful campaign of Q. Fulvius Nobilior against the Celtiberians. Roman envoys visit Africa in response to Carthaginian unrest directed at Massinissa. (c. 153-151) A further Roman mission sent to Carthage.	Alexander Balas of Syria in Rome.
152	M. Claudius Marcellus II L. Valerius Flaccus	Third consulship of M. Claudius Marcellus. Now or soon after, second consulships prohibited.	M. Claudius Marcellus takes command in Hither Spain and opens negotiations with the Celtiberians.	Decree of the Senate in favour of Alexander Balas, who begins war against Demetrius. Alexander concludes an alliance with the Maccabean Jonathan and appoints him high-priest.
151	L. Licinius Lucullus A. Postumius Albinus	Dispute concerning the levy; temporary imprisonment of the consuls.	Surrender of Celtiberians to M. Claudius Marcellus. Campaign of L. Licinius Lucullus against the Vaccaei and others. Carthage sends an army to resist Massinissa; suffers a major defeat. A further Roman mission arrives during the campaign.	

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
150	T. Quinctius Flaminius M'. Acilius Balbus		Ser. Sulpicius Galba defeats the Lusitanians and massacres a large number of them. Carthaginian attempts to appease Rome are met with evasions. Formal submission of Utica to Rome.	Achaean detainees released from Italy and return to Greece. Death of Callicrates. Demetrius defeated and killed in Syria. Alexander married to Ptolemy's daughter Cleopatra.
149	L. Marcius Censorinus M'. Manilius	Attempt to prosecute Ser. Sulpicius Galba for misconduct in Spain. <i>Lex Calpurnia</i> to provide a standing court for extortion cases. Death of M. Porcius Cato.	Rome declares war on Carthage; Roman army in Africa. Carthage disarmed but resists demands to evacuate the site of the city. Roman army begins the siege of Carthage.	Rising of Andiscus in Macedonia. He has initial success against a Roman army under P. Iuventius Thalna. Sparta seeks to secede from the Achaean League. Prusias defeated and killed by Nicomedes and Attalus; Nicomedes (II) becomes king of Bithynia.
148	Sp. Postumius Albinus Magnus L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus	Construction of the <i>Via Postumia</i> from Genua to Aquileia.		Attalus supports the Romans against Andiscus. Andiscus defeated and captured by Q. Caccilius Metellus (Macedonicus). (148/7) Media invaded and occupied by Mithridates I of Parthia; Susiane occupied by the Elamites.
147	P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus C. Livius Drusus	Scipio Aemilianus elected consul despite legal impediments.	Emergence of Viriathus as leader of the Lusitanians against Rome. Scipio Aemilianus in command in Africa; tightens the siege of Carthage.	Roman embassy under L. Aurelius Orestes authorizes secessions from the Achaean League. A further embassy to Greece, led by Sex. Julius Caesar. Rhodes assists Rome against Carthage. Demetrius (II), son of Demetrius I, begins war against Alexander Balas.

146	Cn. Cornelius Lentulus L. Mummius		Capture and destruction of Carthage. Annexation of its territory as the province of Africa.	War between Rome and the Achaeans; victories of Q. Metellus Macedonicus and L. Mummius. Sack of Corinth; disbanding of the Achaean League. Creation of Roman province of Macedonia. Attalus, having supported the Romans in the Achaean War, defeats Diegylis in Thrace (146 or 145). Political events disrupt the Museum at Alexandria.
145	Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus L. Hostilius Mancinus			Ptolemy invades Syria (146 or 145) and concludes an alliance with Demetrius II, who marries Ptolemy's daughter Cleopatra. Ptolemy in Antioch; declines the Seleucid crown. Alexander Balas defeated by Ptolemy and Demetrius; death of Alexander and Ptolemy. Uproar in Antioch. Diodotus Tryphon proclaims Antiochus VI king.
144	Ser. Sulpicius Galba L. Aurelius Cotta	Building of the <i>Aqua Marcia</i> .	(144 or 143) Beginning of new Celtiberian rebellion. Successes of Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus against Viriathus.	(145/4) Demetrius retreats to Seleucia. Alliance of Tryphon with Jonathan; Jonathan's brother Simon is satrap of Antiochus VI.
143	Ap. Claudius Pulcher Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus	<i>Lex Didia</i> extends sumptuary legislation to Italy.	Renewed successes of Viriathus.	Jonathan killed by Tryphon; Simon becomes high-priest.

	ROMAN CONSULS	ROME AND ITALY	THE WEST	THE EAST
142	L. Caccilius Metellus Calvus Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus	Censorship of Scipio Aemilianus.		Antiochus VI assassinated by Tryphon, who proclaims himself king. Alliance of Demetrius with Simon; Simon recaptures the citadel of Jerusalem. Simon's ambassadors in Rome. Tryphon rebuked by the Senate.
141	Cn. Servilius Caepio Q. Pompeius		Variathus' successes enable him to negotiate a treaty with Rome on favourable terms.	The Senate passes a decree in favour of Simon. Judea proclaimed independent. Mithridates I of Parthia occupies southern Mesopotamia.
140	C. Laelius Q. Servilius Caepio	Probable year of Laelius' agrarian proposal.	Rome repudiates the treaty with Viriathus and renews the war.	Demetrius sets out against the Parthians. Mithridates I defeats the Elamites at Kut-el-Amara. (140/39) Roman embassy led by Scipio Aemilianus in the east.
139	Cn. Calpurnius Piso M. Popillius Laenas	<i>Lex Gabinia</i> , ballot law. 'Chaldaeans' and Jews expelled from Rome.	Assassination of Viriathus. The Senate repudiates terms negotiated by Q. Pompeius with the Aravaci in Celtiberia.	Demetrius captured by the Parthians. (139/8) Antiochus VII proclaimed king, marries Cleopatra, and defeats Tryphon.
138	P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus	Tribunate of Curiatius; agitation concerning the grain supply. Dispute about the levy; temporary imprisonment of the consuls.	Foundation of Valentia. (138/7) Campaigns of D. Brutus in north-western Spain.	Death of Attalus II; Attalus III becomes king of Pergamum. Death of Mithridates I; Phraates II becomes king of Parthia.
137	M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina C. Hostilius Mancinus	<i>Lex Cassia</i> , ballot law.	Military disaster of C. Hostilius Mancinus at the hands of the Numantines. Treaty negotiated between him and the Numantines repudiated by the Senate.	

136	L. Furius Philus Sex. Atilius Serranus	Slave rebellion in Sicily.	M. Aemilius Lepidus and D. Brutus make war on the Vaccaei.	
135	Ser. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Calpurnius Piso			Decree of the Senate settles dispute between Samos and Priene. Simon assassinated; his son John (Hyrcanus) becomes high-priest at Jerusalem. Antiochus VII besieges Jerusalem.
134	P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus II C. Fulvius Flaccus	Second consulship of Scipio Aemilianus.	Scipio Aemilianus takes command in Celtiberia.	Jerusalem surrenders to Antiochus; the fortifications of the city are dismantled.
133	P. Mucius Scaevola L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi	(Tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus.)	Scipio Aemilianus ends the Celtiberian War by capturing and destroying Numantia.	Death of Attalus III, who bequeaths his fortune to Rome.

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Abbreviations

- AAN *Atti dell' Accademia di Scienze morali e politiche della Società nazionale di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti di Napoli*
- AAnt. Hung. *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*
- AE *L'Année épigraphique*
- AFLPad. *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia di Padova*
- AIPh *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*
- AJAH *American Journal of Ancient History*
- AJArch. *American Journal of Archaeology*
- AJPhil. *American Journal of Philology*
- AM *Annales du Midi*
- Amer. Hist. Rev. *American Historical Review*
- ANRW *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin and New York, 1972—
- ANSMN *American Numismatic Society, Museum Notes*
- Ant. Class. *L'Antiquité classique*
- Ant. Journ. *Antiquaries Journal*
- Arch. Anz. *Archäologischer Anzeiger* (in JDAI)
- Arch. Delt. *Ἀρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον*
- Arch. Eph. *Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς*
- ASAA *Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene e delle Missioni Italiane in Oriente*
- ASNSP *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa*
- Atti Taranto *Atti dei Convegni di studi sulla Magna Graecia*. Taranto
- AvP *Allertümer von Pergamon* (Museen zu Berlin and Deutsches Archäologisches Institut). Berlin, 1885— (13 volumes so far published)
- BASOR *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
- BCH *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*
- BEFEO *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient*
- BICS *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* (London)
- BMQ *British Museum Quarterly*
- BSA *Annual of the British School at Athens*
- BSFN *Bulletin de la Société française de Numismatique*
- Bull. Com. Arch. *Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale in Roma*
- Bull. épigr. J. and L. Robert, *Bulletin épigraphique* (in REG)
- Bull. Rylands Libr. *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*

- CAH *The Cambridge Ancient History*
 C&M *Classica et Mediaevalia*
 CDE *Caratteri dell'ellenismo nelle urne etrusche (Atti dell' incontro di studi. Università di Siena. 28-30 aprile 1976)*. Florence, 1977
 CE *Chronique d'Égypte*
 CIL *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*
 CJ *Classical Journal*
 CPb *Classical Philology*
 CQ *Classical Quarterly*
 CRAI *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres*
 CT *Les Cahiers de Tunisie*
 DArch. *Dialoghi di Archeologia*
 Denkschr. Akad. Wien *Denkschriften der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*
 Ep. Ind. *Epigraphia Indica*
 ESAR *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, ed. T. Frank. 6 vols. Baltimore, 1933-40
 FD *Fouilles de Delphes*
 FGrH F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin and Leiden, 1923-
 FIRA S. Riccobono, *Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiusiniani*. 3 vols. Florence, 1940-3
 G&R *Greece & Rome*
 Gramm. Rom. Frag. H. Funaioli, *Grammaticae Romanae fragmenta* (Vol. 1 only). Leipzig, 1907
 GRBS *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
 GWU *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*
 Harv. Stud. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
 Hesp. *Hesperia. Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*
 HIM *Hellenismus in Mittelitalien (Kolloquium in Göttingen vom 5 bis 9 Juni 1974)*, ed. P. Zanker. 2 vols. Göttingen, 1976
 Hist.-fil. Medd. Kgl. Da. Vid. Selsk. *Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser, Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab*.
 HZ *Historische Zeitschrift*
 IBulg. G. Mihailov, *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae*. Sofia, 1958-
 IC M. Guarducci, *Inscriptiones Creticae*. 4 vols. Rome, 1935-50
 ID *L'Italia Dialettale*
 IDélos F. Durrbach and others, *Inscriptions de Délos*. Paris, 1926-50
 IG *Inscriptiones Graecae*
 IGCH M. Thompson, O. Mørkholm, C. M. Kraay, *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*. New York, 1973
 IGRom. R. Cagnat and others. *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes*. Paris, 1906-27
 IHQ *Indian Historical Quarterly*
 ILampsakos P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Lampsakos*. Bonn, 1978
 ILindos Ch. Blinkenberg, *Lindos 11: Les inscriptions*. 2 vols. Berlin and Copenhagen, 1941
 ILLRP A. Degrassi, *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae*, 2 vols. 2nd edn. Florence, 1963-5

- ILS H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*. 3 vols. Berlin, 1892–1916
Inscr. Italiae *Inscriptiones Italiae*
 IPE B. Latyshev, *Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Ponti Euxeni Graecae et Latinae*. 2nd edn. St Petersburg, 1916
 IPriene F. Hiller v. Gaertringen, *Die Inschriften von Priene*. Berlin, 1906
 ISyrie L. Jalabert, R. Mouterde and J. P. Rey-Coquais, *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie*. Paris, 1929–
 IvP M. Fränkel, *Inschriften von Pergamon*. 2 vols. Berlin, 1890–5
 IvP III Ch. Habicht, *Inschriften von Pergamon III: Die Inschriften des Asklepieions*. Berlin, 1969
 JA *Journal Asiatique*
 JAOS *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
 JDAI *Jahrbuch des [kaiserlich] deutschen archäologischen Instituts*
 JEg. Arch. *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
 JHS *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
 JNG *Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte*
 JNSI *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*
 JÖAI *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen archäologischen Instituts in Wien*
 JRAS *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
 JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*
 JS *Journal des Savants*
 JSHRZ *Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit*, ed. W. G. Kümmel. Gütersloh, 1976
 Le arti figurative *Storia e civiltà dei Greci v: La cultura ellenistica*, 10, *Le arti figurative* (ed. R. Bianchi Bandinelli). Milan, 1977
 LEC *Les Études classiques*
 LW Ph. Le Bas, W. H. Waddington, *Inscriptions grecques et latines recueillies en Asie-Mineure*. 2 vols. Paris, 1870
 MAAR *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*
 MAL *Memorie della classe di Scienze morali e storiche dell' Accademia dei Lincei*
 MDFA *Mémoires de la Délégation archéologique française en Afghanistan*
 MDAI *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts*
 (A) *Athenische Abteilung*
 (I) *Istanbuler Abteilung*
 (M) *Madridrer Abteilung*
 Mélanges d'arch. *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'École française de Rome*
 Mélanges Heurgon *L'Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine, Mélanges offerts à Jacques Heurgon*. 2 vols. Rome, 1976
 MH *Museum Helveticum*
 Michel, Recueil Ch. Michel, *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques*. Brussels, 1900
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 MRR T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*. 2 vols. and suppl. New York, 1951–60
 NAC *Numismatica e antichità classiche*

- Neue Jahrb. Neue Jahrbücher (für das klassische Altertum*, 1898–1925; *für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, 1925–36)
- NNM Numismatic Notes and Monographs, American Numismatic Society, New York
- Num. Chron. Numismatic Chronicle*
- OGIS W. Dittenberger, *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1903–5
- ORF⁴ H. Malcovati, *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*. 2 vols. 4th edn. Turin, 1976–9
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- PBA *Proceedings of the British Academy*
- PBSR *Papers of the British School at Rome*
- PCPS *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
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- PEQ *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*
- Peter, HRRel. H. W. G. Peter, *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1906–14
- PHerc. *Papyri Herculenses*
- Philol. *Philologus*
- PJ *Palästinajahrbuch*
- PP *La Parola del Passato*
- Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*
- PW A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*
- QC *Quaderni Catanesi di Studi classici e medievale*
- RD *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*
- REA *Revue des études anciennes*
- REG *Revue des études grecques*
- REJ *Revue des études juives*
- REL *Revue des études latines*
- Rend. Inst. Lomb. Cl. Lettere Rendiconti del Istituto Lombardo, Classe di lettere, scienze morali e storiche*
- Rev. Arch. Revue archéologique*
- Rev. Arch. Narbonnaise Revue archéologique de Narbonnaise*
- Rev. Hist. Rel. Revue de l'histoire des religions*
- Rev. Num. Revue numismatique*
- Rev. Phil. Revue de philologie*
- Rb. Mus. *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*
- RIGS *Incontro di studi su "Roma e l'Italia fra i Gracchi e Silla"* (Pontignano. 18–21 settembre 1969). *DArch.* 4–5 (1970–1) 3–4, 163–562
- Riv. Fil. Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica*
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- RSA *Rivista storica dell' Antichità*
- RSI *Rivista storica italiana*
- SCI *Scripta Classica Israelica*
- SCO *Studi classici e orientali*

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 Sherk, *Documents* R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East*.
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- SIG* W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*. 4 vols. 3rd edn. Leipzig,
 1915-24
- SRPS* *Società romana e produzione schiavistica*, ed. A. Giardina and A. Schiavone.
 3 vols. Rome and Bari, 1981
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- Stud. Etr.* *Studi etruschi*
- TAPA* *Transactions of the American Philological Association*
- VDI* *Vestnik Drevnej Istorii*
- Welles, RC C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period*. New
 Haven, 1934
- YCIS* *Yale Classical Studies*
- ZATW* *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*
- ZDPV* *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästinavereins*
- ZNTW* *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*
- ZPE* *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

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